Bank Lawyer's Blog

Everybody Gets A Trophy

A few years ago, I featured the face-palming antics of Gen Y job candidates, including those interviewing for jobs with commercial banks. At the time, I asked "How much worse could Gen Y be?" Apparently, much worse. In fact, when it comes to generational cluelessness, Gen Y's joystick is frozen in the forward position and the plane is augering into the frozen tundra at 32 feet-per-second squared.

Just before turning out the office lights and grabbing a (first) Shiner Bock this past Friday evening, I received an email from a client who's a senior level bank executive for a large bank in Texas. Attached to her email was a link to what is obviously intended to be a comedy "training video" that ostensibly seeks to educate Boomer and Gen X employers on the right ways and wrong ways of dealing with the future of the American workforce. My correspondent assured me that, while the laughs are real, she has personally experienced two interactions with a member of The Not-So-Greatest Generation that were almost identical to scenes enacted in the video.

I share it with other bankers (and credit union officers) who might find it both humorous and sadly realistic.

Here's hoping we can stave off crippling the economy and allowing China to take over. At least, until I pop the final aneurysm and finally see the light at the end of the tunnel. Après moi le déluge.

Countrywide: Closed For Good

Maybe it's the fact that in another six months or so, the regime change here in the Land of the Free will lead many of the the current crop of enforcers in D.C. out the revolving door and into the loving arms of Big Law, where those wet behind the ears begin the learning curve with 15 grand a month of pocket money. Maybe it's the fact that they knew all along that they were pushing the envelope and, when called on it, they simply shrugged, smiled, and said "Ya' got me!" Whatever the reason, the U.S. Justice Department appears to be throwing in the towel several years earlier than my initial expectation, as a result of the US Second Court of Appeals decision that squashed the Justice Department's fraud claims against Bank of America that arose out of the former Countrywide Mortgage's so-called "Hustle" subprime loan program.

According to The Wall Street Journal, this week, the Justice Department sent letters to various former officers of Countrywide, including the infamous Angelo Mozilo (aka "The Tan Man"), that told them that Justice would do some justice by not filing any civil law suits against them.

Government lawyers sent letters within the past week to Mr. Mozilo and other Countrywide executives advising that the investigations against them were closed, and thanking them for their cooperation, these people said.

“We are pleased to see this investigation concluded without any further claim against Mr. Mozilo,” said his lawyer David Siegel.

I'll bet they are pleased. Mr. Siegel was sufficiently courteous to refrain from thanking the Justice Department back for providing years of legal work for defense counsel that has now resulted in the close of the investigation without criminal charges or civil lawsuits being pursued. For litigation attorneys, this is called "stroking the long ball." And, as ESPN's Sport Center loved to tell us, "Chicks dig the long ball."

To the "Occupy [Insert Venue Here]" crowd, this latest outrage will be further proof that the system is rigged in favor of fat cats and the bureaucrats who stroke them. On the other hand, those of us with actual experience in this area saw this coming years ago. From a September 22, 2009 blog post that discussed the outlook for folks like Angelo ever doing the perp walk:

Unlike the last round, when the savings and loan industry went into a tailspin, proving that CEOs and other senior executives knew about and encouraged, much less actively participated in, the fraud is tougher to prove in connection with the subprime mortgage mess. I recall a number of instances involving failed Texas thrifts in the late 1980s where there was ample evidence that thrift owners and senior executives were swapping dead horses for dead cows, making stock loans to an owner of another thrift to purchase 100% of the stock in his own S&L in return for the borrower causing his S&L to purchase a bunch of participation interests in the lender's portfolio of exquisitely ripe carcasses known as acquisition and development loans (in which the lender funded 100% of the acquisition and developments costs AND all of the interest reserve, leaving the borrower with as much equity in the collateral as a US congressperson's integrity). This time around, the CEO's and Chairman's muddy paw prints aren't stamped all over the lender's records.

"The problem is finding the executives' fingerprints on the consumer files," said Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne State University. "Angelo Mozilo may have set the tone at Countrywide, but there is no way you're going to find his fingerprints on any of those mortgages."

Even Marg Helgenberger of CSI couldn't find enough CEO DNA in these files to make a case. I'd like to watch her try, though.

If you want to become completely bent out of shape about the relative lack of suffering inflicted on Wall Street and its cronies over their role in the meltdown, consider the fact that no one in Congress has had their wrists slapped, either. Barney Frank and Friend-of-Angelo Chris Dodd even managed to get their names emblazoned on a piece of "financial reform" legislation for all eternity, masking for future generations (who seem to have short memories in any event) the major roles those two actors played in the drama. When it comes to skating, it seems to me that most of the culprits had their blades finely honed.

Let's hope that the late British physician, Havelock Ellis, was wrong when he said “Every society has the criminals that it deserves.”

De Novos: A Recipe For Success or Heartburn?

Long time community bank attorney (and former FDIC Regional Counsel) Jeff Gerrish created his recipe for cooking up a new bank charter.

The number one ingredient is cash, and plenty of it. Because FDIC policy is that de novos need meet an 8% leverage ratio by the end of the third year, "if your new bank is going to be $250 million in total assets at the end of its third year, you will need to raise about $20 million in order to obtain the charter. And that is the minimum. If FDIC determines there is some unique risk in your proposed charter, then the requirement could be higher."

My somewhat jaundiced take is that the FDIC will frequently find additional risk, so for planning purposes, count on 10%.

Jeff's second main ingredient is seasoned senior management and an impressive board of directors.

[Y]ou need to find a seasoned CEO of an existing community bank or previously healthy community bank that sold. You also need to find a couple of other seasoned senior officers, as well as a board of directors that, while not maintaining quite as much “seasoning,” still has some folks on it who have possibly been directors of community banks previously, or know something about the industry. The era of establishing a board of directors of a new bank, anywhere from 8 to 15 people typically, made up of individuals who are simply pillars of the community with no banking experience is over.

Jeff also observes that getting FDIC, as well as other regulatory, approvals is "daunting and time-consuming" (He thinks 12 to 18 months from the first meeting of the organizing group to discuss the concept among the members is "good; I'd call it "optimistic."). I think that he and I would agree that in addition to raising money for capital contributions, the organizers need to raise a decent chunk of cash to fund organization expenses, including expertise needed to prepare and shepherd the necessary applications through the FDIC and the state or federal chartering authority. Depending upon how the organizers intend to raise capital, additional expertise will be needed (and expense incurred) in those efforts.

I would throw a couple of additional ingredients into Jeff's recipe. One is a convincing argument that there is a need for a new bank in the community that it is intended to serve. The few de novo applications that have survived the "gauntlet" in the past half-dozen years have been intended to create a bank in a well-defined and targeted community that the organizers have argued convincingly is not being served by existing financial institutions. I'm not saying that that everyone has to have a "bird in hand" like serving the Amish community, but the applicants ought to have at least two-in-the-bush that can serve the same purpose. Unless you can show a need other than you'd just like to be in the community banking biz, I don't think that the regulators will see much upside in granting you a new charter.

A related ingredient is a combination of a well-thought-out and well-prepared business plan that is as close to conventional as it can be, and a feasibility study that demonstrates that, "By Gum, we can make money running this thing!" In other words, assume that you're a guard taking the rock to the iron for a thunder-dunk and the FDIC is Hakeem Olajuwon towering in the post screaming "Don't be bringing that internet-only, CRE-centric, lowering-our-payday-lending-conglomerate's-cost-of-funding-through-the-use-of-insured deposits garbage into my house!" right before he pile-drives you into the floor with a flagrant 2 foul. Moreover, spend some time and money securing help from folks who have actually carried water to the bench in this arena, so you have at least a fighting chance of surviving the initial hurdle in any such endeavor: the laugh test.

I remain skeptical about a "thaw" in this freeze. Others are more buoyant. I think a threshold question you have to ask yourself is how early in the "thaw" do you want to put out into open water. Is it better to let others blaze the trail and learn from their success (and/or failure), or is time "a wastin"? If you think you've got the necessary ingredients, including plenty of cash, patience, and persistence, then maybe the time is finally right to cast off. I would recommend that you initially paddle slowly and carefully, though.

Activist Investors Betting On Bank Mergers

It appears that "activist" investors are turning to banks because they, like many of the rest of us close to the banking sector, think that there will be continued consolidation of the banking industry in the U.S., and what better way to make yourself some hard-earned profits than buying shares in a business and then pushing its board to sell the family farm so you can cash out. Some of you may remember that this model business plan was why the FDIC apparently soured on relying on "private equity" investors to help it clean up the mess after the last banking meltdown.

According to reporters in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "[a]ctivist investors are putting the U.S. banking sector in their crosshairs, betting that headwinds whipping through the industry will accelerate consolidation among lenders." The authors cite the rapid uptick in such "activist campaigns" in the financial sector last year, and observe that the "activists" are turning their attention from insurance companies and other non-bank financial businesses to commercial banks.

Hedge funds such as Ancora Advisors, Clover Partners and Seidman & Associates are buying up stakes in lenders across the U.S., from community banks to large regional lenders.

Driving these investments is the view that ultra-low interest rates, lagging returns on equity and tough regulations will push more banks to merge, with buyers willing to pay a hefty multiple to a bank’s tangible book value. Activist investors interviewed by Reuters say another factor is exposure to energy-related loans, which is driving down the valuations of certain banks and making them all the more vulnerable to a takeover.

“Bigger banks are back in the market doing deals,” said Ralph MacDonald, a partner at law firm Jones Day, who specializes in mergers and acquisitions.

U.S. bank mergers and acquisitions volume rose 58 percent last year to $34.5 billion, according to Thomson Reuters data.

The authors think that Zions and Comerica are likely targets. Both "Systemically Important Financial Institutions" had under performing returns on equity last year. That alone makes them prime targets for "activists."

The firm believes that any bank earning a 12 percent or less return on tangible common equity needs to consider whether it can prosper as an independent institution, PL Capital co-founder Richard Lashley said in an interview.

A bank’s exposure to falling energy prices makes it even more vulnerable, he noted. But another key factor is a bank’s ability to maneuver through a climate where low rates are compressing net interest margins, and stricter regulations are increasing costs.

“Management teams and boards are just exhausted,” said Lashley, who is based in New Jersey. “It’s not fun to run a bank anymore.”

However, the article also contains a quote from a community bank chief that indicates that the trend to consolidate is not just for SIFIs.

“My phones are ringing off the hook with calls coming in from banks wanting to sell,” said Pat Hickman, the CEO of Happy State Bank, a lender in the Texas panhandle. “And one of the primary reasons is regulation.”

Yes, it's not fun to run ANY bank anymore, not just the large ones. Whether your a big bank or a small one, publicly traded or privately held, pressured by "activist" investors or simply by the facts of life: as we said a few weeks ago, 2016 will very likely be the year of the bank merger.

The Underbelly Of The Mt. Holly Settlement

The settlement of the Mt. Holly disparate impact case before it could be decided by the US Supreme Court were suspicious. At the time, it was thought by many that the US Justice Department had helped to engineer that settlement so that its (and HUD's and the CFPB's) use of that questionable doctrine in fair lending claims could continue for a while longer. The last thing the Feds wanted was for the SCOTUS to decide the matter, because they were worried (correctly) that it would strike down its use. At the same time, the banking industry wanted the SCOTUS to render a decision, because it thought that the court was more likely than not to strike down the doctrine's use in the fair lending context. The last thing that banks wanted was for the parties to the case to settle before the SCOTUS could render its decision (which is exactly what happened).

Recently, a rock has been overturned that has exposed a bunch of creepy-crawlers that work not for the federal government, but for the big banks that wanted the SCOTUS to rule in the Mt. Holly case. According to a former senior executive of Chase, that bank tried to get him to use his board position with a non-profit housing organization to "scuttle" the funding of the settlement. Moreover, the former executive, Wayne Trotman, at the time the mid-Atlantic market president of Chase, alleges that when he refused to breach his fiduciary duty as a member of the board of directors, the bank retaliated by firing him.

The fact that Mr. Trotman is an African-American adds not only to the radioactivity of the alleged wrongful conduct, but also substantial irony to those actions, if Mr. Trotman's allegations are true. While Chase counters that Trotman's claims are "baseless," Trotman's lawyers claim that they have "substantial evidence" to support them.

Obviously, the first thing that Trotman has to prove is that Chase pressured him to use his board position to scuttle the settlement. According to the linked article, which cites Trotman's Complaint, he claims that he was instructed to do so by Chase's Associate General Counsel, via email, even after he refused on the grounds that it would breach his fiduciary duty. The Complaint later states that another Chase attorney told him that he should not honor the request (which was also the position of his supervisor). Apparently, the ball started rolling in Jamie Dimon's office after he (and the heads of other large banks) received an email from Tim Pawlenty of the Financial Services Roundtable uirging the bankers to find ways to derail the settlement long enough for the SCOTUS to render a decision. There does not appear from the kinked article to be any order from Dimon that Trotman do anything, but, then, that's what subordinates are for: read the CEO's mind and "get 'er done" while retaining deniability for those residing at the top of Mt. Olympus.

The harder nut to crack for Mr. Trotman may likely be proving the causal connection between his decision to be an honorable man and not to breach his fiduciary duties, and his subsequent termination by Chase. It's impossible to determine that connection solely from the linked article, although I assume that the "substantial evidence" referenced by Trotman's lawyers indicates that they think that they can carry the water on that claim. The man worked for Chase for 19 years, received a "meets expectations" review shortly after the incident (although Chase substantially cut his bonus from the previous year, in which he received the same rating), then six months later received a mid-year performance rating of "poor" and was fired 14 days later without being provided an opportunity to improve. On its face, it looks like there might be fire with this smoke.

On the other hand, we haven't seen Chase's formal responsive pleading. In one press report, a Chase spokesperson told a reporter that Trotman 's position was eliminated in a "reorganization of markets." That spokesperson also claimed that Chase would "fight this in court." I guess that beats fighting it in the streets.

Obviously, it's too early to tell what the outcome of this lawsuit might be. The smart money in these situations is on a cash settlement with nondisparagement and confidentiality provisions in the settlement agreement, so that the "reputational risk" is mitigated and the whole sordid affair is swept under a rug.

Still. When it comes to picking a champion inducer of the gag reflex, it's often tough to choose between Big Banking and Big Government.

Poison "IvI"

*Kevin LaCroix discussed a recent federal district court decision that adds to the number of court rulings that the "Insured versus Insured" (IvI) exclusion in banks' D&O insurance policies does not preclude officers and directors of a failed bank from making a claim for coverage under the policy based upon claims of the FDIC as receiver against them for their alleged acts and omissions as officers and directors of the bank. This issue has come to the forefront again as a result of the waive of (mostly community) bank failures following the economic collapse of 2008. As was the case in the previous wave of savings and loan and bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s, insurance companies have attempted to invoke the exclusion in order to deny liability, arguing that the FDIC as receiver "steps into the shoes of the failed bank."

(As a side note, my Contracts professor in law school asserted that insurance companies have a very simple business model: Collect Premiums. Deny Liability.)

Kevin explains the exclusion in the specific policy.

The IvI Exclusion provided in pertinent part that the policy does not provide coverage for any claim against an Insured “brought by or on behalf of any Insured or Company [including the Bank] in any capacity.” The exclusion had a carve-back that preserved coverage for “a Claim that is a derivative action brought or maintained on behalf of the Company by one or more persons who are not Directors or Officers and who bring and maintain such Claim without the solicitation, assistance or active participation of any Director or Officer.”

The insurance company in the case discussed by Kevin asserted that the IvI barred coverage for claims asserted by the FDIC since the FDIC was itself the "Insured." The judge denied the motion for summary judgment filed by the insurance company and granted the FDIC and defendants' motion of summary judgment on the basis that the exclusion was "ambiguous" and could not, therefore, be used as a basis to deny coverage.

Judge Guilford went on to note that “the insurance company has the ability, as a repeat party to these contracts, to ensure that ambiguities are eliminated over time.” The insurer “had the opportunity to make clear in the Policy that the IvI Exclusion applied to the FDIC-R, and it could have done so with a simple statement.” Judge Guilford noted that, in fact, the carrier “provides an optional regulatory exclusion – not included on the policy here – that explicitly names the FDIC.”

Without thrashing through the weeds in a manner that would interest lawyers rather than bankers (and the lawyers can read the opinion via the link provided by Kevin), the takeaways for officers and directors are as follows:

• Read your policy and obtain professional, independent help to ensure that you understand it and that you get the best possible protection. As the court points out, the "regulatory exclusion" could have left the defendants high and dry if the insurance company had inserted it in the policy, Understand what could bite you in the nether regions and shop around if you have to.
• Get the protection you need before you need it. Your best opportunity to obtain the most favorable policy will be when things are going swimmingly, not when you're taking on water faster than you can bail out the dinghy.
• While the trend of court decisions appears to be in favor of the insureds and against the insurer on the issue of IvI in the context of FDIC receivership claims against former officers and directors, the issue is far from settled. Kevin points out that contrary rulings do exist (one in the Northern District of Georgia, one of the less favorable regions to be from if you plan to run a bank into a ditch) and that there appears to be questionable reasoning in some of the favorable rulings. Therefore, expect insurers to continue to litigate the issue until doing so will open the door to a can of whoop-ass sanctions and a complete failure to pass the lying-with-a-straight-face test.

*Photo's Source: Barrett Insurance Agency

Undue Process

For Patrick Adams, justice has been both delayed and, now, denied.

Regular readers of this blog are familiar with Mr. Adams protracted fight with the OCC, and I won't regurgitate the history of the conflict. In my most recent post, I criticized the repeated failure of the Comptroller of the Currency to render a timely decision in the OCC's enforcement action against Mr. Adams as required by applicable law. An administrative law judge had determined that the OCC's enforcement action against Mr. Adams was not supportable on the basis of applicable law and the factual record, and the OCC had appealed the ALJ's decision to the Comptroller, who repeatedly extended the deadline for his rendering of a final decision, notwithstanding the fact that the applicable statute does not provide for such extensions.

On September 30th, the Comptroller rendered a decision in which he determined that the ALJ was completely wrong on the law and that even though the ALJ's finding of fact were "inadequate" for the Comptroller to be able to reach a "final findings of fact," they were sufficiently adequate for the Comptroller to allege (as he does on page 67) that a trier of fact could have determined that Mr. Adams should be sanctioned with civil money penalties. After spending 67 pages rejecting the exoneration of Mr. Adams by an independent trier of law and fact, the Comptroller then concludes that it is not going to send the matter back down to the ALJ in order to determine an "adequate basis" for a final finding of facts. Instead, the Comptroller dismissed the charges and sanctions against Mr. Adams in the exercise of his "plenary authority over remedies."

In other words, the ALJ was flat wrong and the defendant is guilty as initially charged, but what the heck: we made him spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to defend himself against charges that we weren't able to prove before an independent judge, he's been de facto ostracized from the banking business anyway, and we'd likely lose before an objective federal district court judge if we sanctioned him in final agency action, so why give him a reason to appeal?

Some former federal bank regulatory counsel have suggested to me that the OCC is twisting and spinning the official record in a CYA effort to impede a claim by Mr. Adams for his attorneys fees and costs as a "prevailing party" under the Equal Access to Justice Act. That may or may not be the case. What is clear is that there's an inherent flaw in a system that purports to afford due process to defendants but in which the prosecutor and judge are the same person. In such a system, the fairness of the outcome depends entirely on the personal and professional integrity of the ultimate decision-maker.

If this case proves anything, it proves that the system needs some serious legislative refinements.

More On A Higher Standard For Bank Directors

Kevin LaCroix has some further thoughts on John Gorman's criticism of the proposal of FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo and certain academics that bank officers and directors should be held to a different (i.e., more stringent) fiduciary standard than officers and directors of other types of corporations. After discussing John Gorman's criticism of Tarullo's proposal (discussed here), LaCroix also discusses recent decisions by a federal district court judge in Georgia and the Georgia Supreme Court, the upshot of which is that while bank officers and directors (in Georgia, at least) are entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule, there may be some basis for holding them liable for ordinary negligence (as opposed to the higher "gross negligence" liability standard that is the "default" standard under FIRREA and the effective standard if the business judgment rule is applied). Kevin is concerned.

It should be emphasized that the academics’ proposal to hold bank directors to a higher standard was limited just to directors of systemically important financial institutions. I share the concerns John Gorman expressed in his American Banker article about this proposal. However, I have additional concerns, which is that there are already theories floating around that bank directors should be held to a different standard than directors of other companies, as shown by Judge Thrash’s remarks in the Buckhead Community Bank case. My concern is that if the idea were accepted that directors of systemically important banks should be held to have expanded fiduciary duties, the idea would quickly expand beyond just systemically important institutions and be applied to many , most, or even all bank directors, without regard to whether or not their institution is systemically important.

This was the same concern I expressed in my earlier post, and it's comforting to know that other observers share your concern about "trickle down" liability.

Kevin is particularly concerned about the spate of litigation directed against officers and directors of failed banks by the FDIC. The FDIC has been attempting to whittle away the business judgment rule wherever possible. The long-range implications are troubling.

There undoubtedly are meritorious lawsuits filed against bank directors, particularly where there is evidence of self-dealing or complete abdication of responsibility. Just the same, the overall level of litigation aimed at bank directors is both excessive and socially inefficient, particularly with respect to the litigation that so often follows after banks’ failures. So often the failed bank lawsuit allegations consist of little more than scapegoating and hindsight second-guessing. Creating a liability regime that would encourage further litigation and expand the potential liabilities of bank directors would accomplish little except enlarging the litigation burden that prospective directors would have to consider before accepting a seat on a bank board.

There is no question that prospective directors of financial institutions (especially community banks) have to think long and hard about the potential liability before agreeing to accept a board seat. For an increasing number of otherwise qualified candidates, the decision may be that if you don't have "a dog in the hunt" (a substantial financial investment in the bank), the benefits of being on the board do not outweigh the risks if (God forbid!) "something bad happens."

Tarullo Intrigued

John Gorman wrote commentary in the American Banker last week that ought to add to community bank directors' already high level of angst. Gorman discussed a recent speech by Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo, in which Tarullo spoke favorably of a paper by two law school professors (the road to hell is paved with such papers) in which the good professors argue that directors of too big to fail banks should be held to a higher fiduciary duty than bank directors are held today. The focus of the professors was on the implied duty of "board oversight" of bank operations. The professors' paper "proposed board oversight responsibility for the level of risk-taking by an institution, and the application of a simple negligence standard to this board responsibility."

Shareholder loss and/or systemic harm in the traditional sense — decline in stock price or bankruptcy, for example — would not be required for a stockholder to sue the board. Rather, the triggering event would be a "significant loss" at the firm resulting from an alleged breach of a board's risk oversight responsibilities. (The example given is the $6 billion "London Whale" trading loss incurred by JPMorgan Chase.) Judges would determine if the board-approved risk management processes, including its assessment of the appropriate level of risk and potential risk outcomes, were reasonable. This broadened fiduciary duty would apply only to those firms "capable of imposing systemic loss."

As Gorman points out, the duty of "oversight" is an adjunct to the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of due care. The business judgment rule (discussed here) generally protects directors from judicial second-guessing as long as they aren't "grossly negligent." As it has been previously interpreted in most jurisdictions, the duty of oversight does not generally provide a sustainable basis for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty unless the directors of the bank , in effect, simply ignored red flags. The professors want to change all that for systemically important financial institutions.

Gorman notes the problem with this approach.

Broadening a board's fiduciary responsibilities with respect to risk oversight would expose a board to liability for good faith judgments as to risk management, and would require boards to function in a management capacity. This would be expensive and inefficient, and would undoubtedly discourage capable persons from serving on bank boards. It will also ultimately be ineffective — risk and adverse risk outcomes cannot be eliminated, just as the business cycle has not and cannot be eliminated. Altering the fiduciary duty of oversight to require board "ownership" of risk management, would merely provide a prima facie basis for the filing of a lawsuit against many boards. As we know from the current corporate litigation environment, shareholder lawsuits that are not dismissed are settled (the risk that a judge or jury will rule against them and impose personal liability, is one that a board absolutely will not assume), and the primary beneficiaries of legal settlements seem to be the attorneys.

Many community bank directors who read this might be tempted to shrug it off. After all, if the enhanced duty of oversight applies only to the systemically important, why should I worry? Because as experience informs us, these heightened duties inevitably trickle down to the rest of the banks, even the "too small to save." And it is a director of the too small to save that is most at risk of the FDIC pursuing litigation against him or her if the bank fails. The too big to fail don't fail. Their directors may face litigation from shareholders, but they've got the policy coverage and financial heft to protect the directors. Community bank directors don't have that near certainty. The only certainty they have is that if failure occurs, the FDIC will push every theory available to find a breach of fiduciary duty and a pot of gold at the end of the D&O policy rainbow.

It's nice that Mr. Tarullo is intrigued by this new theory. However, let's hope that his attention span is short and that his focus soon turns elsewhere. Like to regulatory relief, for example.

Shaming The Shameless

While we're sure it's merely a coincidence, hot on the heels of the letter that Rep. Pete Sessions sent to the Treasury Department's Inspector General that complained about the repeated failure of the Comptroller of the Currency to issue a final decision in the case of Patrick Adams, the Comptroller raised his middle finger to the requirements of 12 USC 1818(h) issued yet another extension of the deadline to issue a final decision, this time extending the date of decision from August 13 to September 30. As one observer pointed out, at least this time the Comptroller gave himself a deadline to issue a final decision. Whether he "sticks to it" remains to be seen.

Mr. Adams' plight has generated some interesting email. Customarily, private practitioners are most harsh in their indictment of the sort of cavalier nose-thumbing at the requirements of federal law by those whose job it is to enforce it that we've seen demonstrated in this case. However, former enforcement attorneys, such former OCC attorney Robert Serino, whose concerns about Mr. Adams were highlighted in the post linked above, have also expressed their displeasure with the way the regulator has ignored the requirements of fundamental fairness (and, as noted above, the deadlines set by federal statute). One former regional counsel for a federal bank regulatory agency wrote to complain about the "shameless arrogance" displayed by the federal government in this case and to assert that in his decades both in government service and on the other side of the table from the government, he had "never seen any type of enforcement action instituted against an individual that remotely resembles the OCC action against Mr. Adams."

Frankly, neither has anyone else with whom I've spoken about Patrick Adams, including former OCC counsel. It's not only questionable conduct, it's almost inexplicable. I say "almost," because after decades of my own experiences with federal regulatory attorneys and enforcement personnel, and after some of the spittle spewed my way in the last few years in reaction to blog posts by a couple of Erik Dorfs currently at home in the bowels of the Mother Ship, nothing much really surprises me anymore.