Bank Lawyer's Blog

Pot, Meet Kettle

Since shortly after the onset of the financial meltdown and housing market collapse in 2008, a populist narrative has been that mortgage lenders and servicers have deprived defaulting borrowers of their rights by "robo-signing" documents and outright fraudulent manufacturing of note and mortgage assignments and similar practices in foreclosure actions. The narrative has a factual basis.

However, not all of the fraud may have been perpetrated by lenders. Recently, allegations have been made that at least one Florida lawyer falsified note assignments to make it appear that the notes had been assigned to a bank other than the one that initiated the foreclosure proceedings.

The allegations against Kalogianis center on promissory notes, the document in which a borrower promises to repay the lender. Promissory notes often change hands as mortgages are sold and resold. Many lenders went out of business after the housing crash. Because it was not always clear whom a borrower owed, promissory notes often were stamped with a "blank endorsement'' — whoever the promissory note was endorsed to would be legally entitled to foreclose and collect any money due.

"It's like a blank check,'' Weid­ner said.

In cases defended by Kalogianis, the companies seeking to foreclose said they filed promissory notes with blank endorsements. But at some point, the motion says, the notes in four of the cases were altered to show they had been endorsed by "Bank of New York, as trustee.''

In the fifth case, a blank endorsement was altered to show Wells Fargo had signed it, the motion says.

One company, BAC, lost its case against a Kalogianis client in 2014 when Kalogianis argued at trial that only Bank of New York could foreclose because it was the one that had endorsed the promissory note. (The case has since been reopened.)

Kalogianis denies the allegations and asserts that the lender falsified documentation and "was trying to 'turn the tables'' on him rather than lose the case."

"It is the plaintiff's own improper conduct … that should be reviewed,'' he said.

Another impediment for the lender is that there is no eyewitness who saw the alteration of the assignments, and there exists no clerk's office video which would reveal the alteration. The lender asserts that it must have been Kalogianis who altered the assignments because no other person who might have had access to the documents had a motive to falsify it. I'm not sure that's a winner. Remember, just like on "Cops," all suspects are presumed innocent until found guilty in a court of law. Moreover, if Kalogianis can prove his allegations that the lender engaged in other document fraud, then a judge could determine that any falsification of the assignments to show the Bank of New York as the assignee may just as well have been made by the lender rather than Kalogianis, perhaps as a desperate "Hail Mary" maneuver.

The Tampa Bay Times reporter does devote considerable space to recounting the colorful history of Mr. Kalogianis, including a couple of previous ethical complaints, his unsuccessful run for US Congress, and the fact that he worked his way through law school as a male stripper. So many of us worked our way through law school as strippers that I fail to see what bearing that might have on the lender's allegations.

Other than the allegations of a couple of clients of Kalogianis, both of whom alleged that the lender in their cases had "committed fraud," there is no similar recounting of the colorful past of the lender or any of its legal counsel. Perhaps they are all Carmelite nuns and monks who spent their law school years and beyond grappling with the dark night of the soul and had no time or inclination for strip bars or the US Congress, nearly identical fora in the popular imagination.

Certainly, the lender's motion in this case might be more persuasive if, as was the case with a motion brought by another foreclosing lender against Kalogianis, he was allegedly caught on camera.

This week, Bayview Loan Servicing, which is foreclosing on a Kalogianis' client on behalf of Bank of America, obtained a video of a man it says is Kalogianis looking at court files in the Pasco clerk's office. The video appears to show him removing a small object from an accordion folder, stamping a page in a court file and returning the object to the folder.

Kalogianis' attorney's defense is "nothing to see here" and "I'm rubber, you're glue, whatever you say bounces off me and sticks to you."

"I can't see anything incriminating other than a lawyer doing a diligent search, going through files looking for mortgage fraud,'' Cohen said of the video. "After all, it would not be unusual to find mortgage fraud on the part of Bank of America and its legal agents in that they've already stipulated to being responsible for tampering with evidence resulting in payment of billions of dollars of fines to avoid a possible criminal prosecution.''

Cohen said that Kalogianis has won "many cases'' in which promissory notes had not been stamped or signed by any lender.

"Why in the world would he want to do something that could potentially hurt his client by putting a stamp on a note?'' Cohen asked "Simply stated, there was no need for Constantine to stamp anything to win the case.''

Forging or altering public records, including court records, can be a felony punishable by up to five years in prison.

As I have discussed many times in the past, the last point is important. Anyone, lender, borrower, or their respective counsel, who falsifies public records ought to get the book thrown at them from a criminal law perspective. Winning or losing a foreclosure case should be collateral damage. At this point, we have nothing to judge but allegations and press reports, but we'll be following this one to see what, if anything, shakes out.

The Devil You Know

Writing in the latest issue of The Atlantic, Bethany McLean gives a fairly balanced treatment of the oft-whipped payday lending business, and asks the very intelligent question, "If you get rid of it, will anything better replace it?"

After noting that payday lenders serve almost 15% of American households, and that the typical customer is a white woman age 25 to 44, she also points the problems faced by those typical customers, many of whom live paycheck to paycheck, as a result of the typical payday loan.

The entire amount—the fee plus the sum that was borrowed—is generally due all at once, at the end of the term. (Borrowers give the lender access to their bank account when they take out the loan.) But because many borrowers can’t pay it all back at once, they roll the loan into a new one, and end up in what the industry’s many critics call a debt trap, with gargantuan fees piling up.

McLean states "a key truth" about all small, short-term loans: "they are expensive for lenders to make." Payday loan borrowers are not "price sensitive" because "[t]he typical payday-loan consumer is too desperate, too unsophisticated, or too exhausted from being treated with disrespect by traditional lenders to engage in price shopping." With price competition being "inelastic" and with fees being so high, you would expect to see the business "awash in profits," yet studies of the industry show that the profit margin is less than 10%, which is less than one-third of the profit margin of the consumer-financial-services industry as whole. This is because default rates are high. The people who pay high fees for short-term loans don't have access to other alternative sources of credit because they are lousy credit risks, and on a $300 loan, payday lenders can't afford to underwrite them as they do more "conventional loans. An even bigger drag on profitability is overhead. Lots of storefronts, high employee turnover rates, and overall lousy efficiency.

The CFPB's proposed rules for the business would require underwriting to ensure sufficient verified income to ensure repayment (as well as living expenses) without either default or repeated re-borrowing. The latter is the aspect of payday lending that most disturbs its critics, who feel that payday lenders "trap" borrowers in never-ending cycles of re-borrowing. However, McLean supports the payday lending industry's supporters' contention that these requirements would put all payday lenders out of business, and she asks whether or not that's a good thing.

Emergency credit can be a lifeline, after all. And while stories about the payday-lending industry’s individual victims are horrible, the research on its effect at a more macro level is limited and highly ambiguous. One study shows that payday lending makes local communities more resilient; another says it increases personal bankruptcies; and so on.

[...]

If most payday-lending customers ultimately need to fall back on financial support from family members, or on bankruptcy, then perhaps the industry should be eliminated, because it merely makes the inevitable more painful. Yet some consumers do use payday loans just as the industry markets them—as a short-term emergency source of cash, one that won’t be there if the payday-lending industry goes away. The argument that payday lending shouldn’t exist would be easy if there were widespread, affordable sources of small-dollar loans. But thus far, there are not.

She discusses the desire of consumer advocates like Sheila Bair and Richard Cordray to strong-arm banks and credit unions into the business, at much lower rates. On the other hand, she rightly observes that Bair's foray in 2007-2008 to entice banks into the mix was a crashing failure because, as even dim bulbs like this blogger noted at the time, you can't make any money on them at 36% (the consumer advocate's favorite annual percentage rate cap). McLean also notes the perversity of the subsequent FDIC and OCC guidelines about the risks of small-dollar lending that drove Wells Fargo and U.S. Bankcorp to drop the business entirely. Even credit unions, which (need we point this out?) DON'T PAY TAXES, can't figure out a way to make payday lending work for them, at least not on a scale that will replace the current payday-loan-office-on-every-corner industry model and service the targeted market.

Although McLean suggests that Colorado has done some "out-of-the-box" thinking about payday lending (thinking apparently done prior to the legalization of recreational marijuana use), it's not likely to satisfy the industry's critics (like Cordray & Co.) because it actually leaves the industry in place. Sure, it's a much smaller industry, one that charges 42% less in fees, and one whose loans default less frequently, but it still actually exists, making all those icky payday loans to people that The Care Bair and King Richard need to protect from themselves because they're all just too dense to do it alone. True believers will never rest until Michael Corleone and his crew step back into the role they were born to play: real-life loan sharks and knee-cappers. If that happens, McLean will not be rooting from the sidelines.

Outrage is easy, and outrage is warranted—but maybe payday lenders shouldn’t be its main target. The problem isn’t just that people who desperately need a $350 loan can’t get it at an affordable rate, but that a growing number of people need that loan in the first place.

That last sentence is especially cogent, but a topic for another day, and a different blog.

Residential Mortgage Lending: The Bloom Is Off The Rose For More Than Just The Big Banks

My friend, Colorado community and mortgage banker Pat Dalrymple's, latest "Banker's Hours" column in the PostIndependent Citizen Telegram again struck a chord with me. With permission, here it is, in case it also hits home with you:

We hear that the TBTF (Too Big to Fail) banks are getting out of the mortgage business. Can this really be true? Weren’t they reputed to be the culprits in the recent Great Recession that was reportedly triggered by all of the toxic mortgages they originated?

Well, they haven’t left the building entirely, but they’re not in residence like they once were. Here are some fairly dramatic stats:

Wells-Fargo, the nation’s No. 1 mortgage originator, funded $125 billion in mortgage loans during the fourth quarter of 2012. During the same period in 2015, that number was down to $47 billion.

Chase, the second ranking lender, did $51 billion in the last three months of 2012. In 2015, that number had shrunk to just under $23 billion. These are dramatic swings in banking, and show major ramp down of what was once a core business.

And it’s not just the big guys that are backing away from the iconic American Dream of financing home ownership. In 2007 banks made 74 percent of home loans in the country. By 2014, their share had dropped to 52 percent. At the same time, the share of nonbanks, which includes online lenders like Quicken Loans, had increased from 23 percent to 43 percent.

What’s happened? Just business; mortgage lending isn’t as profitable for banks as it once was. Interest margins on home loans held in portfolio are thinner than other lending lines. Since the Great Meltdown, the private bond market has virtually dried up for mortgage-backed securities. The cost of originating mortgages has skyrocketed, and regulatory risk has become, in the eyes of some former mortgage lenders, intolerable.

The increased cost of doing business is graphically demonstrated by the fourth quarter of 2015: Net gain on mortgages originated was down 60 percent, from $1,238 per loan to just $493. This is because lenders spent billions on re-tooling for the new RESPA-Truth in Lending disclosure protocol mandated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that came online in October of last year.

As for regulatory risk, we’ve all heard of the multi-billion-dollar fines levied against the big banks for their role in originating and packaging the famous rotten mortgages that were at the root of the financial crisis. But the risk for banks is ongoing.

For example, PHH — a nonbank mortgage originator, seventh largest in the country last year at $37.57 billion — was just hit with a $109 million fine, which is certainly an attention getter. But the way it happened has lenders shaking in their Guccis. It was alleged that PHH had illegally taken kickbacks from mortgage insurers through customer referrals. The case went to an administrative law judge, who suggested a fine of $6 million.

To appreciate this story, we need to understand what an administrative law judge is. This person is trained in the law, but isn’t a real judge, as in a courtroom. Rather, he or she is employed by the agency bringing the charge. People who have been subjected to this process have likened it to walking into the Godfather’s study, who says, “Don’t worry about a thing, Joey, my consigliere here will give you a fair and impartial hearing.”

In the PHH case, the capo of the CFPB interpreted the law differently than it had been heretofore applied, so he must have said, “Geno, you were too soft on them.” He decided that the violations went back much further than the tame judge deemed, way back even before the CFPB was created, and increased the fine up to the $109 million.

Think the Mob has a long memory?

All of these factors are making big lenders think twice about being in the business. It may be the slack will be picked up by small banks, credit unions and online lenders. The jury’s out on that question.

False Promise

Former FDIC Chairman Bill Isaac once called Franken Dodd "the worst piece of financial legislation in modern history" and blasted the law's "Durbin amendment," in particular, as "pure and simple, special-interest politics."

I think the Durbin amendment is really a terrible precedent," Isaac says. "It weakens the banking industry at a time when we need it strong, and the folks who supported the Durbin amendment should be ashamed of themselves."

The subsequent cap placed on interchange fees by the FRB in response to Turban Durbin's amendment caused many bankers and credit union executives, and their trade group representatives, to predict that the only result would be to fatten the pockets of retailers at the expense of both financial institutions and their customers. Over five years down the road, that dire prediction appears to have been spot on, according to a recent opinion piece in the American Banker by the CEOs of the ICBA, CUNA, and NAFCU (people who sometimes are at each others throats on bank vs. credit union issues).

The price controls lawmakers were able to impose on those providing electronic payment options have resulted in an $8 billion annual handout to retailers that they have not passed on to consumers. Five years after the Federal Reserve issued a rule to implement the amendment, retailers have kept most of this revenue — an estimated $32 billion — for themselves.

While Congress may have thought this legislation would provide a benefit to consumers, data from a survey of merchants contained in a recent Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond study indicates that the amendment is simply not working as intended. The report found that "few merchants are found to reduce prices or debit restrictions as debit costs decrease." This just reinforces the argument that the Durbin amendment is essentially a merchant handout from Congress.

Consumer research echoes the reality that retailers are not passing on this revenue in the form of savings for customers. In September, Phoenix Marketing International conducted its fourth annual survey of nearly 2,000 consumers and found that the vast majority of shoppers have not experienced a price drop at the point of sale. In fact, in each of the 15 categories measured, at least 92% of shoppers reported that prices rose or stayed the same over the past year.

The authors further assert that the retailers' trade association claims of several years ago that retailers were passing along the savings to customers, and, more recently, that the fee reduction benefited banks and credit unions, as bald-faced lies.

A study released last week by the Credit Union National Association reported estimated reduced revenue of $1.1 billion for credit unions resulting from Dodd-Frank's regulatory costs, all of which the report attributed to the swipe fee provision. Real data in the form of costs of processing changes and declining fees since 2011 debunks claims that credit unions and small banks below $10 billion in assets are not feeling the pinch. Further, there has been a decline in the interchange rate since the price controls went into effect. It continues to remain around 4 or 5 cents below where it was pre-Durbin, according to a survey by the National Association of Federal Credit Unions.

The authors conclude that rather than trying to blow smoke up the nether regions of financial institutions and consumers, perhaps retailers' time would be better spent figuring out ways to pass along the savings on interchange fees to consumers. Don't believe that conclusion any more than you should the retailers' claims. What financial institutions really want is the repeal of the Durban amendment and the Fed's limit on interchange fees. That won't happen in 2016, but perhaps the next Pontifex Maximus of the Disunited States of America can spare a moment from building "the greatest border wall of all time, a wall that will make the Great Wall of China look like Tom Sawyer's picket fence" to promote some Republican-sponsored legislation to benefit community banks and credit unions for a change, instead of the Wal Marts and Home Depots of the world.

Yes, I know: and perhaps pigs will sprout wings.

Rent-a-Charter vs. Strategic Alliance

In June 2004, I wrote a post about schemes by non-bank lenders, especially payday lenders, to "partner" with banks and thrifts in ways that would allow the non-banks to use the bank's or thrift's status to "preemept" "inconvenient state laws, such as those pesky usury limits. As I said at the time:

Apparently, the state-chartered banks involved in this practice are counting on the continued lack of objection by the FDIC, and the continued sympathy of state banking regulators who are eager to increase the number of state-chartered institutions that they regulate. In my opinion, this is a risky course.

I also pointed out at the time that national banks and federal savings banks could rest assured that their primary federal regulator would be scrutinizing their business arrangements with non-banks like Elizabeth Warren looking under her bed every night for a bad banker looking to steal all the cash she has hidden in the sock that she keeps under her pillow.

According to a recent client alert from Chapman and Cutler LLP, this bad old idea not only refuses to die, but has engendered state officials to take action to stop it in its tracks. While the alert discusses the State of Pennsylvania going after payday lenders who've aligned themselves with Native American tribes (which has been a problematic marriage for quite some time), it has wider implications for similar arrangements. In this instance, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania alleged that the "true lender" for regulatory purposes was not a bank in Delaware that would have been exempt from Pennsylvania usury limits and licensing requirements but the non-bank website "originator" that did most of the origination work and derived most of the economic benefits from the loans. The authors note that in other jurisdictions, the court decisions have not been in lockstep on the issue of preemption, arrangements like the one challenged here are likely always to put the lenders in the regulatory crosshairs.

No clear rule has emerged although regulatory challenges almost certainly are more likely to be made when excessive interest rates and/or abusive sales or collection practices are involved. In this case, the loans imposed interest rates of 200% to 300%.

The alert notes that even though the court's decision involved only a motion to dismiss Pennsylvania's action, and that is a long way from a judgment on the merits, the red flags for financial institutions involved in such relationships are clear "because it demonstrates that plaintiffs will continue to raise the “true lender” theory and courts will not necessarily dismiss at an early stage (for failure to state a claim upon relief can be granted) “true lender” claims solely because a bank is the named lender on the loans, at least where there are allegations that the originating bank does not have substantive duties or an economic interest in the program."

In order to mitigate the risk of claims based on the “true lender” doctrine, companies that engage in internet-based lending programs through an arrangement with one or more banks should consider how the programs are structured. For example, consideration should be given to operations where the bank has substantive duties and/or an economic interest in the program or loans. We are aware that some internet-based lending programs are considering structural changes of this nature.

The firm also advises institutions to make certain that they comply with regulatory guidance governing relationships with service providers. They cite FIL-9-2016 and related FDIC guidance. I'd also suggest taking a look at the OCC's Bulletin 2013-29.

Or, for a change of pace, a bank considering one of these schemes might decide to take its entire capital to The Bellagio in Vegas, walk up to nearest roulette wheel, and lay it all on "00." I mean, if you like dancing along the razor's edge with insured deposits, you might as well go all-in. Plus, you get free booze as long as your money lasts. To hedge your bet, you might want to hold back enough to buy a one-way ticket to Havana (regular flights from the States start soon) just in case that method of income-generation doesn't work out as well as a strategic alliance with a non-bank payday lender.

A Generation Later Rapidly Approaches

My last post, on small banks and credit unions doing "good works" for the communities they serve, prompted this email from the CEO of a community bank in the Midwest:

I recently read a quote from Margaret Thatcher where she said that if all the Good Samaritan had was good intentions he would not be remembered. He also had money. When privately owned banks go away, taking prosperous small businesses with them, who will remember a generation later? Very sad.

That post also prompted a credit union executive to unsubscribe from the blog, on the basis, I presume, that I ended mu post with "Merry Christmas" as opposed to "Happy Festivus."

While I didn't intend to anger or depress anyone, my community banking correspondent is correct to be pessimistic. The number of banks is decreasing rapidly, and the evidence is coming from all quarters.

Minnesota Business Magazine asks if the regulatory burden is "killing small banks" and answers itself in the affirmative.

In banking, numbers tell the story. If so, these numbers have the making of a tragedy: In 2000 there were 513 community banks in Minnesota. Now we have 332, a drop of 35% in just 15 years. What’s going on?  There are two factors at play according to Joe Witt, president of the Minnesota Bankers Association. One is increased competition from large players like Wal-Mart entering the financial services industry and from tax-exempt organizations like credit unions. “Right off the top they’ve got a 30% or 40% operating cost advantage,” says Witt.

But the dominant factor that is causing small banks to sell out or close shop is what Witt calls the “cumulative effect” of government regulations.

[...]

The problem with adding regulation isn’t that small banks can’t adhere to the standards, it’s that they simply can’t keep up.

“We are getting paddled and beaten in terms of additional compliance responsibilities,” says Bill Patient, vice president of compliance at BankCherokee in St. Paul. “Everyone is in the same playing field and working with the same regulations.”

Patient says that beyond just the sheer pages of new documents, the hardest part for small banks is spending time to understand new rules and regulations. Compliance officers must sort through the new laws to figure out what they mean, how the rules work with current regulations and which rules apply to their institution. Many small banks have no compliance officers on staff, and the increased workload can be devastating for small institutions.

The article also notes other factors, like the difficulty of making a buck in banking with narrow interest rate margins and the Fed's artificially low rates, as well as the dearth of new charters since 2008 to replace banks failing or merging. Nevertheless, bankers believe its the regulatory burden that is the major factor driving the trend, a trend that has seen the annual rate of decrease in the number of banks in Minnesota double post-Dodd-Frank from 2% to 4%.

Several years ago Witt sent a letter outlining his concerns to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In the letter he quoted a banker who said, ”We used to do banking in compliance with the laws and regulations. Now we do compliance and hope that it allows us to do some banking.”

The magazine echoes my correspondent in its view of the collateral damage from this incredibly shrinking universe of community banking.

Losing community banks isn’t simply about less choice for consumers. In rural communities, the local bank can be the lifeblood of the town, and being a small town bank might not be worthwhile anymore, says David Reiling, president of Sunrise Banks in Minneapolis. “There’s a lot more risk and the return may be uncertain at best.”

Clamping Down On Class Action Legal Fees

A potentially disturbing warning has come out of California (paid subscription required): class action plaintiffs' attorneys' fees might [shudder] come to be based upon actual work done. While this isn't disturbing to American banks and other businesses who've been victimized by subject to class action lawsuits in which the plaintiffs are rewarded with a Pez dispenser and a signed copy of "Transcendental Meditation The Trump Way," while their attorneys rake in bazillions a tidy sum, it must be disconcerting to the vultures lawyers who run class-action firms. We'll try to say a prayer for all of them (my preference would be "Lead all souls to heaven, especially those most in need of thy mercy").

Typically, attorneys who represent plaintiffs in class actions—like employees accusing a company of discrimination, or customers claiming a product misled them—are paid a percentage of any money recovered for their clients. The payouts, which nationally average about 25% of the collected funds, can be substantial.

But a Berkeley, Calif., lawyer who has waged a decadeslong crusade to reduce class-action fees is pushing to pay lawyers based only on the hours they put into a case.

“Every dollar class lawyers get for their fee is a dollar the class doesn’t get for recovery,” the lawyer, Lawrence Schonbrun, said.

He lost his fight in two lower courts, but the Supreme Court of California decided earlier this year to consider the issue and could rule in the coming months. Mr. Schonbrun argues that California case law requires the hourly method to be applied, an interpretation that others dispute.

[...]

The California appeal stems from a 2004 wage-and-hour class action against staffing firm Robert Half. In 2013, a judge approved a $19 million settlement on behalf of 4,000 employees, who said they were denied overtime pay and other benefits. Using the percentage method, $6.33 million was slated for the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

Mr. Schonbrun, who represents one of the employees, is trying to convince the court that the lawyers should instead be paid according to the amount of work they put in.

But the plaintiffs’ lawyers say in a court filing that if their percentage-based fee is overturned, “class counsel will be less inclined to take on complex class action suits against large, well-financed institutions.” They haven’t been paid while the appeal works its way through the courts. Robert Half said it doesn’t have a stake in the fee dispute.

Being less inclined to take on complex class action suits against large, well-financed institutions" is a bad thing?

The CFPB would think so. Last month, it proposed to ban arbitration provisions that would prevent consumer financial class action lawsuits. The political left ant the trial lawyers' bar in this country have been making whoopee together for years, so that's to be expected. On the other hand, if trial lawyers only get paid for the actual hours they work, that still will act as a deterrent to class action lawsuits no matter what the CFPB does regarding arbitration provisions. I mean, why would a lawyer want to only get paid for what he or she actually does? Are you kidding me??

Before we get all misty-eyed about the folks who are taking this fight to the California Supreme Court, however, let's drill down a bit deeper into their motivation.

Mr. Schonbrun, who began his fight against high fees in the late 1990s, is part of an active field of so-called fee objectors, who step into class actions to challenge the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.

Such objectors sometimes make side deals with plaintiffs’ lawyers looking to avoid prolonging a lawsuit, and they can be paid as much as $1 million, those familiar with the practice say. Mr. Schonbrun said he has filed objections in 150 cases and in some instances received more than $100,000 for his role in reducing a fee.

You read that right: some of the professional "fee objectors" cut deals with class action lawyers to ease up in return for the payment of some cold, hard cash. All sides of the bar in this struggle make hard examples of "soft and cuddly."

As usual, the people getting the short end of the stick are the plaintiffs.

Theodore Case, an American Airlines pilot in Atlanta who has been a plaintiff in a class-action labor dispute for more than 12 years, said he unsuccessfully fought against his lawyers to reduce their fee request of $15.5 million, based on a 30% calculation of a settlement. When paying a percentage, “the only people it benefits is the attorneys,” said Mr. Case, who received about $113,700 of the settlement money.

Disparate Impact: Full Speed Ahead

The successor to the infamous Thomas Perez at the US Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, Vanita Gupta, has served fair warning that (as we predicted) the folks who run Justice intend to use the recent SCOTUS decision that validated "disparate impact" in the fair housing arena to pursue the statistically-proven racist scum in the quest to ensure that every one who wants one can get a home loan. She thinks that disparate impact discrimination is part and parcel with much broader abuses, like cops killing racial minorities and otherwise profiling minorities for disparate law enforcement abuse. America is racist, and Gupta's gonna root out racism wherever she can find the statistics to make her case.

“High-profile incidents across the country have thrust us into a national dialogue over the use of excessive force, racial profiling and stereotyping, officer and public safety and a festering lack of trust between police departments and the communities they service, particularly low-income communities of color,” said Gupta.

“But underneath so much of the unrest that we’ve seen in Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore; New York; and cities across America," she said, "lies a foundation of systemic inequalities and discriminatory biases, built up over decades, not days."

She specifically pointed to lack of credit in affected communities as a root cause of this year’s troubles.

“To break down barriers to opportunity we must protect the rights of people to borrow money without bias or discrimination,” said Gupta. “Discrimination is a multiplying force. It can have a devastating domino effect on a person’s future economic prospects. And that is why equal access to credit is a fundamental part of our work. Credit provides the means for families to own a home, to buy cars so they can get to work, and to increase their earnings so they can invest in their own future.”

“Credit enables people to uplift their lives and build a brighter future,” said Gupta.

That's right: systemic racism in American society is rooted in a lack of credit availability for racial minorities, according to Gupta. If the federal government can ensure that every citizen can get credit, this country can overcome more serious problems which are the result of the "multiplying force" of that credit discrimination. How do they plan to do that? Suing banks on the basis of statistical analyses founded on flawed assumptions and squeezing cash out of them is only the tip of the enforcement iceberg. Gupta has much more "robust" remedies in mind.

“Whether mandating that a bank open a branch in a neighborhood neglected for years or requiring an auto lender to limit the discretion of its dealers, we recognize the value of resolutions that extend beyond the distribution of dollars,” said Gupta.

Of course, at the same time, Justice will use Operation Choke Point to drive payday lenders, auto title lenders, and other "high risk/high reward" lenders out of the market. That will leave all those great "small loan" programs that the FDIC tried to "encourage" banks to make a few years ago and that never gained traction because banks couldn't charge enough (most programs had a maximum APR of 36%) to justify the cost of administration and the serious problem of nonpayment. You can bet your life that they'll be resurrected, along with more creative solutions in the great game of credit redistribution.

 And, of course, two guys named Guido and Louis (The Lip) will always be available on local the street corner to take care of the needs of the needy in an extra-judicial manner.

Are we having fun yet?

Class Action Chum

Financial institutions and class action lawyers mix as well as Donald Trump and Carly Fiorina, so the latest news from Ballard Spahr about a new "coalition" of sharks in Sin City is bound to cause bankers everywhere to break out in a nasty rash.

Approximately 50 cases have been filed recently in Nevada state and federal courts against furnishers of information and credit reporting agencies (CRAs) for alleged Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) violations. It appears that consumer rights attorneys have teamed up with consumer bankruptcy firms to monitor credit reports over the course of a debtor’s bankruptcy case and then sue creditors and CRAs after discharge if the debtor’s credit report inaccurately reports debts after the bankruptcy.

As the alert notes, individuals who alleged that they have been harmed by the inaccurate reporting of a debt  that has been discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding have a private cause of action under the FCRA against a creditor that failed to report to the credit bureaus that the debt had been discharged. Of course, the class action attorneys make a nice pile of cash, which has absolutely nothing to do with the matter. It's all about getting "justice" for the debtor.

Banks and credit unions will need to take this trend into account, and ensure that their reporting policies and procedures are hyper-vigilant so that inaccurate reporting to the credit bureaus does not occur. While this has been the case for some time in theory, in practice some institutions appear to have been relying on the theory that if the error is inadvertent, they might get a pass if they correct it as soon as they become aware of it. The "flurry" of new lawsuits makes it clear that the sharks are circling, that reporting inaccuracies are "chum," and that the the plea of "no harm, no foul" will be drowned out by the screams emanating from the bank's dismemberment by a veritable "sharknado" of vicious hammerheads and, perhaps, a few oversize "great whites."

Deja Vu, All Over Again

Here we go again.

The city of Oakland, California is the latest municipality to sue one of the nation’s largest banks, accusing Wells Fargo (WFC) of allegedly steering minority borrowers into higher-cost loans, which caused rampant foreclosures and neighborhood blight.

According to a Reuters report, Oakland filed suit against Wells Fargo in a Northern California federal court, stating that Wells Fargo violated the Fair Housing Act by “targeting minorities” with high-cost loans, despite their ability to qualify for lower cost loans.

[...]

The lawsuit said many of the loans ended in foreclosure because Wells refused to refinance them on the same terms it granted to white borrowers.

The lawsuit said Wells steered minorities into various types of "predatory loans," including those with high interest rates, balloon payments and large prepayment penalties.

As is the case with all of these lawsuits, the bank said that it would "vigorously defend itself." I hope that vigorous defense includes a cage match involving Ronda Rousey, but that's likely too much to hope for.

Although a number of these suits have continued to drag on, the linked article notes the more customary outcome when the bank does not settle.

Wells Fargo secured a victory in court, when a U.S. District Judge dismissed a lawsuit brought against the lender by Cook County, Illinois, which also accused the bank of predatory lending

Yes, dismissal by the court is often the result. However, as we noted a couple of years ago, cities keep bringing these meritless suits because they think that they can squeeze a settlement out of big banks on the banks would rather settle quickly and reduce the reputational damage than pay trial lawyers, which no one in their right mind wants to do for any length of time. Also, as our prior post observed, the US Justice Department under the current administration has on occasion jumped into the fray on the side of the cities and helped to pummel the banks. That may stop in 2017, but there's still a lot of blood to be spilled before then.

Unfortunately, the more settlements that occur, the more municipalities pile on. Five years ago I alleged that the lesson to be learned was to never settle. I still believe that is the best approach to stopping this municipal extortion. On the other hand, it's not my bank being sued and it''s not my money being spent.