Bank Lawyer's Blog

Rent Seeking "Reform"

In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. responds to a New York Times editorial that claimed that President Obama has been frustrated throughout his two terms by the "political dysfunction" caused by a recalcitrant Republican-led Congress. In his response, Jenkins touches upon a subject near and dear to community bankers and, not coincidentally, to the author of this rag sheet.

If Mr. Obama was “deeply frustrated,” the reason was the American people’s lack of support for his agenda. And what the Times calls his regulatory strategy would better be described as unbridled rent seeking.

That’s the term economists use for exercising government power to create private gains for political purposes. Consider:

Mr. Obama’s bank policy dramatically consolidated the banking industry, which the government routinely sues for billions of dollars, with the proceeds partly distributed to Democratic activist groups.

His consumer-finance agency manufactured fake evidence of racism against wholesale auto lenders in order to facilitate a billion-dollar shakedown.

His airline policy, urged by labor unions, led to a major-carrier oligopoly, with rising fares and profits.

His FDA is seeking to extinguish small e-cigarette makers for the benefit of Big Tobacco and Big Pharma (whose smoking-cessation franchise is threatened by cheap and relatively safe electronic cigarettes).

His National Labor Relations Board, by undermining the power of independent franchisees, is working to cartelize the fast-food industry for the benefit of organized labor.

We could go on. Mr. Obama’s own Council of Economic Advisers complains about the increasing cartelization of the U.S. economy—as if this were not a natural output of regulation. In a much-noted Harvard Business Review piece this spring, James Bessen, an economist, lawyer and software entrepreneur, cites increased “political rent seeking” to explain the puzzle of rising corporate profits in the absence of job creation and economic growth.

The truth is, government playing neutral arbiter over the private economy doesn’t produce rents. A stable and predictable regulatory system produces only mingy or non-existent rents.

Jenkins' allegation that "rent seeking" regulatory "reform" that has resulted in thousands of pages of new regulations that burden banks big and small, as well as pushing the envelope on "disparate impact" and other theories designed to squeeze blood and money out of banks through regulatory enforcement actions, is leading to the "caterlization" of the U.S. economy in general and the U.S. banking system in particular, strikes a chord in many ears It's not the only reason for the consolidation of the banking business, but it's one of them, and a not insignificant one.

As to the ideologues who deny any regulatory burden exists, or if does exist, isn't having a negative effect on community banks (based, I assume, upon Vladimr Lenin's assertion that "A lie told often enough becomes the truth"), the House Financial Services Committee recently published a raft of contrary opinions from the folks on the firing line. Read 'em and weep.

As to where the community banking business, and the country in general, are headed, I have to agree with the conclusion of the CEO of a Mid-Western community bank, communicated to me in an email this weekend: "This doesn't end well."

No, it doesn't. Unless, of course, you're a rent seeker.

No Light At The End Of The Tunnel

Investment banker (and former OTS official) C.K. Lee has been keeping his finger on the pulse of the financial institution capital markets for years, and when it comes to the future of de novo banks, the outlook, to him, looks grim. It's not just due to the hostile attitude of the FDIC, FRB and OCC (although Lee notes that hostility as a factor), it's because of the difficulty of raising capital.

“The barriers to entry are high, not just on the regulatory side but with raising capital.”

It's not the big banks that are having trouble, it's the little guys. The results of those troubles are stark.

The firm estimates it’s raised about $700 million in investment capital for banks in the last six or seven years. Two investment groups they’ve put together recently are in North Texas.

Lee is a former official at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and was regional director of the Office of Thrift Supervision’s Western region. He said in the past three years, about one-third of banks located in the Dallas-Fort Worth area with less than $5 billion in assets have been consolidated. But the biggest shift has been seen at the smallest end of the market, where the smallest businesses go if they can’t get a line of credit at the giant firms.

There were 3,255 banks with less than $100 million in assets in 2003, making up more than 43 percent of all community banks. By 2014, however, there were 1,919 of these firms, making up less than one third of community banks, according a report from the Brookings Institution published in December.

Before 2011, about 3 percent of all banks would merge or be acquired each year. But Lee said recently they are above a 4 percent clip.

So, not only are their many, many fewer little banks today than 13 years ago, but they are merging at a faster rate than even five years ago. As the big get bigger and the small disappear altogether, the consequences for the economy are troublesome.

“A big part of the decline in small business creation in this country over the last six or seven years is because smaller, community banks are going out of business, not necessarily through failure but consolidation,” Lee said. “We are shocked at the level of consolidation that we’ve seen.”

Small businesses have been the nation's biggest job creators and small community banks have been their biggest source of financing. Therefore, the rapid decline in the number of small community banks has hampered job creation. Perhaps that has contributed to the fact that the recovery of the economy from the 2008 recession has been the slowest recovery from a recession since 1949.

Like many of us who serve the community banking business, Lee ends with a common theme: the federal financial regulatory regime has not been helpful.

But Lee insists regulators need to allow banks to keep up with other industries that are seeing a boom in start-ups.

“I just think the regulatory machine is going to be 20 years behind,” Lee said. “I just think we are making a mistake as a country if we’re going to let a lot of really good banks walk off into the sunset.”

So do I, but I won't hold my breath that such a mistake will ever be admitted, much less corrected. On the other hand, geniuses like Lizzie Warren think the U.S. Post Office will pick up the slack.

Come November, I don't expect that the attitude of those with their hands on the levers of power will improve, whichever of the two eminently qualified candidates for the possessor of the nuclear codes grabs the grass crown.

Conflating A Little With A Lot

A friend of mine, a business consultant and "recovering lawyer," once told me that there wasn't a damned thing you could tell lawyers, because they thought they knew it all. This helps explain why his sojourn into the world of business consulting for law firms was so short. Another reason might have been what a boss of his once told him: "You not only don't suffer fools gladly, you don't suffer them AT ALL."

Being of the same temperament, I "feel his pain."

In an article in the March-April 1996 issue of the Harvard Business Review, entitled "Making the Most of the Best," Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business professors James Brian Quinn, Philip Anderson and Sidney Finklestein, expressed similar views, albeit with less exasperation. Of course, they didn't have to live with lawyers 24/7/365, either.

Because professionals have specialized knowledge and have been trained as an elite, they often tend to regard their judgment in other realms as sacrosanct as well. Professionals generally hesitate to subordinate themselves to others or to support organizational goals not completely congruous with their special viewpoint. That is why most professional firms operate as partnerships and not as hierarchies, and why it is difficult for them to adopt a uniform strategy.

The good professors were talking about doctors, accountants, investment bankers, management consultants and similar professionals, not merely lawyers. They all risk suffering from the twin dysfunctional traits of arrogance and hubris, the deadly combination embodied in its Platonic ideal form by THE GREATEST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE EVER (aka "The Orange Man").

"I know a lot about a little, therefore, I know a lot about everything."

Or, as my friend less generously puts it: "Mix equal parts of arrogance and ignorance and you've got yourself a law firm."

Of course, you could have said the same for an accounting firm, a medical practice, or a business consulting firm. Nevertheless, singling out and picking on lawyers is simply more fun, isn't it?

Yeah, I thought you'd say that.

And while we're on the topic of a human being that wears a live animal for a hairpiece, let's not forget that if He-Who-Knows-More-Than-His-Generals is elevated to Bloviator-in-Chief in a few months, a side benefit for bankers might be that one of the biggest "Native American" burrs under the saddle of the banking biz might finally be forced out of public life and back on to the reservation. At least, that's the hope of Homer Simpson.

Everybody Gets A Trophy

A few years ago, I featured the face-palming antics of Gen Y job candidates, including those interviewing for jobs with commercial banks. At the time, I asked "How much worse could Gen Y be?" Apparently, much worse. In fact, when it comes to generational cluelessness, Gen Y's joystick is frozen in the forward position and the plane is augering into the frozen tundra at 32 feet-per-second squared.

Just before turning out the office lights and grabbing a (first) Shiner Bock this past Friday evening, I received an email from a client who's a senior level bank executive for a large bank in Texas. Attached to her email was a link to what is obviously intended to be a comedy "training video" that ostensibly seeks to educate Boomer and Gen X employers on the right ways and wrong ways of dealing with the future of the American workforce. My correspondent assured me that, while the laughs are real, she has personally experienced two interactions with a member of The Not-So-Greatest Generation that were almost identical to scenes enacted in the video.

I share it with other bankers (and credit union officers) who might find it both humorous and sadly realistic.

Here's hoping we can stave off crippling the economy and allowing China to take over. At least, until I pop the final aneurysm and finally see the light at the end of the tunnel. Après moi le déluge.

Credit Unions and Community Banks Both Face "Shrinkage"

In his recent email newsletter (email [email protected] for a subscription), credit union consultant Marvin Umholtz discusses the fact that credit unions face the same problem of "shrinkage" that we have discussed on this blog for some time with respect to the community banking industry. Not surprisingly, both segments of the financial services industry suffer from the same disease: crushing regulation.

On July 8^th the Editor In Chief for the Credit Union Journal, Lisa Freeman, launched an initiative exploring reader attitudes about the a serious question of whether 74% of the credit union industry is “too small to survive” www.cujournal.com/news/opinions/forget-about-too-big-to-fail-for-cus-its-too-small-to-survive-1026267-1.html. The massive regulatory burden, much of it sourced by the federal government, had been identified as the primary culprit. There are other reasons why credit unions merger or liquidate, however, the burgeoning compliance burden stands out.

 

According to the NCUA’s statistics at March 31, 2016 the number of federally insured credit unions dropped below 6,000 for the first time in history. This correspondent believes that by 2021 there will be fewer than 600 federally insured credit unions – and they all will be multi-billions in assets because they will have to be large enough to cope with the Dodd-Frank Act’s and the FFIEC’s compliance-driven culture that it is now too-late to stop. An advancing avalanche of costly and complex rules are already in the federal pipeline. Among the next to hit will be the Military Lending Act Rule on October 3, 2016 that will upend the way consumer loans are granted.

 

Just by itself, the rogue CFPB has been a rulemaking nightmare. In a July 13th letter to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the American Bankers Association (ABA) and the Consumer Bankers Association (CBA) urged OIRA to reform the “generic clearance process” in federal rulemaking so that the CFPB doesn’t end-run procedures to make policy without having to follow the rules. The CFPB intended to use this stealth approach to make policy-related data collections for overdraft rules www.aba.com/Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/cl-PRA-ConsumerEngage2016.pdf.

 

The CFPB also plans to add 37 new data collection fields for the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data reporting by mortgage loan originating financial institutions. The CFPB and the other FFIEC-member agencies, including the NCUA, are expected to double-down on fair lending compliance; and the disputed and controversial disparate impact theory has been terribly abused by the CFPB, the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in recent years http://bankingjournal.aba.com/2016/07/associations-challenge-huds-disparate-impact-rule.

 

The credit unions should not expect any relief from the CFPB’s oppressive rulemaking. Regardless of which political party wins the White House, credit unions will not receive exemptions from the CFPB’s rules. Exemptions by charter or asset size are incompatible with the DNA of the agency.

 

The U.S. Treasury’s FinCEN has demonstrated its ever-expanding expectations for cybersecurity, as well as for the PATRIOT Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, and for the anti-money laundering compliance. The U.S. Treasury and its FinCEN unit are determined to cut off terrorist financing, and that would for the closing off of the weakest links – including smaller credit unions. The U.S. Treasury Department wants fewer open doors in which cyber-criminals and terrorist bad actors might enter and deploy the U.S financial system.

 

The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s current expected credit losses methodology (CECL) will be phased in over several years, but credit union leaders have been encouraged to start working on CECL compliance now because it is that complicated.

 

The awful economy, with its low interest rates and diminished interest rate margins, has been particularly stressful for leaders at smaller financial institutions. As was said in the July 16, 2016 edition of The Economist the “Buttonwood” opinion essay was entitled, “Slow Suffocation: The financial system isn’t designed to cope with low or negative rates.” The op-ed concluded, “The irony is that low rates were initially devised as a policy to save the financial sector, and through the mechanism of higher lending, the rest of the economy. Many voters protested about the bailing out of the very institutions that caused the crisis. Those protesters can take only cold comfort that the same policies are now slowly suffocating the industry.”

 

The NCUA’s and the state credit union supervisory authorities’ examiners will be scrutinizing credit risk management and interest rate risk management – translated by examiners to mean having appropriate policies, practices, technologies, modeling, and testing – that all must be upgraded. Examiners will be tougher on strategic planning and governance compliance. Capital planning and succession planning will also be on examiners’ “deep look” list.

 

Operational risks like resiliency and internal controls are a big compliance concern at smaller credit unions with fewer staff and uninvolved boards of directors. The credit union industry has experienced too many stories about fraud and criminality, especially at smaller credit unions. The Office of Financial Research (OFR) has huge plans to digitally “tag” every financial service provider and every financial transaction such that both the provider and the transaction can be tracked globally.

 

The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) is “double-counted” as an asset by the credit union and by the NCUA. The NCUA has the actual possession of the credit union’s 1% deposit. The NCUSIF structure and funding needs to more closely resemble that of the Federal deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Congress is unlikely to allow credit unions to continue paying a fraction of the cost compared to banks for the “full faith and credit of the U.S. Government.” That will have costs associated with it, as well. Plus, it is a political dilemma of great magnitude for both the NCUA Board and for credit unions of all sizes.

 

Small credit unions might not be directly involve in taxi medallion loans, however, do the math. The drop in loan values in those taxi medallion loans and related participation loans add up to large numbers. The NCUA will seek out large credit unions to “buy” those bad loans via mergers and purchase and assumptions, but the costs to the NCUSIF could be substantial. And the actual financial status of the Temporary Corporate Credit Union Stabilization Fund (TCCUSF) won’t be known until 2021. The TCCUSF’s health is very dependent upon the health of the U.S. economy. Many smaller credit unions won’t be around in 2021 to find out the TCCUSF’s ultimate fate.

 

And for leaders at credit unions of all sizes the challenges listed by this correspondent should be viewed as merely the tip of the iceberg. There has existed a dynamic since before the financial crisis that favored larger organizations. The federal government is making it impossible to be small. And the asset sized definition of “small” will grow every year between now and 2021, and it will grow ever more rapidly. Is $100 million small? Is $1 billion small? Is $10 billion in assets small? The federally-mandated regulatory compliance burden is crushing Main Street’s credit unions while the compliance hurdles to jump are being set ever-higher. Strategically speaking, the time to plan for it and act on the emerging situation is now.

Some short-sighted community bankers might think that dwindling numbers of their tax-exempt competitors is good news. Unfortunately, this isn't a case of "I don't need to run faster than the bear, I just need to run faster than you." While the old adage that "some day you eat the bear, and some day the bear eats you" might hold true in some areas of life, in the case of regulatory burden, the bear is coming to claim both credit unions and community banks. It's an equal opportunity exterminator.

I've been harping about community banks and credit unions making common cause for some time. While some efforts in that direction have been, and are continuing to be, made, thus far, I don't see the results. Time's a wastin'.

The Marijuana Minefiled Continues To Claim Banks

No matter how many times commentators like this curmudgeon warn banks that decide to dip their toes in the toxic waters of banking marijuana businesses, some banks not only don't "get it," they don't get it that they don't get it. At least, they don't until the regulators whack them upside the head.

The latest slow learner is apparently Millennium Bank, a small ($73 million) bank in Des Plaines, Illinois. According to the American Banker's Kevin Wack (paid subscription required), in March 2016, that bank entered into a consent order with the FDIC and Illinois banking authorities that "a source familiar with the matter" claimed "stemmed from the bank's involvement in serving pot businesses." As consultant Steven Kemmerling notes, there is no "template" for banks serving marijuana businesses to navigate the mysterious waters of the FinCEN "guidance" issued in March 2014, which purported to give financial institutions a path to serving marijuana businesses that were engaged in state-legal, federal-illegal activities. The consent order itself does not mention marijuana, and its numerous requirements could be interpreted as an indictment that the bank in question did not have even a basic BSA program required to meet applicable law and regulation. Kemmerling anticipates additional consent orders "as regulators continue to refi9ne how to safely bank marijuana." In other words, the smoke has not yet cleared on how to break federal criminal laws without, you know, getting your writs slapped.

The fact that the consent order (found here) nowhere uses the word "marijuana" indicates that the bank regulators are not anxious to admit that they are tacitly permitting (according to the article by Mr. Wack) 301 banks to engage in activities that are literally illegal. As Alabama Law Professor Julie Anderson Hill pointed out in an excellent law review article that we discussed last year, the regulators who fudge on these activities face another potential risk.

If the Federal Reserve provided payment services to a cannabis credit co-op, the Federal Reserve and its employees would be engaging in money laundering. They might also be conspiring to manufacture and distribute marijuana, aiding and abetting the manufacture and distribution of marijuana, and acting as accessories after the fact for the manufacture and distribution of marijuana. 

When marijuana advocates ask the bank regulators for "clarification," they are praying for rain in Death Valley. What's needed is action from the US Congress, action that would make banking state-legal marijuana businesses also legal under federal law. At that point, more "clarification" on BSA procedures might actually be useful. Don't expect Congressional action this year.

Incidentally, all those banks that are chomping at the bit to get their hands on drug money might want to consider the long-term effects of legalized recreation marijuana use. Trail blazer Colorado is experiencing some kick back from being the Mile High State.

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I am giving a one-hour webinar for BankersHub on July 19 on the banking and credit union regulators' expectations for technology service agreements. You can find information here.

Pot, Meet Kettle

Since shortly after the onset of the financial meltdown and housing market collapse in 2008, a populist narrative has been that mortgage lenders and servicers have deprived defaulting borrowers of their rights by "robo-signing" documents and outright fraudulent manufacturing of note and mortgage assignments and similar practices in foreclosure actions. The narrative has a factual basis.

However, not all of the fraud may have been perpetrated by lenders. Recently, allegations have been made that at least one Florida lawyer falsified note assignments to make it appear that the notes had been assigned to a bank other than the one that initiated the foreclosure proceedings.

The allegations against Kalogianis center on promissory notes, the document in which a borrower promises to repay the lender. Promissory notes often change hands as mortgages are sold and resold. Many lenders went out of business after the housing crash. Because it was not always clear whom a borrower owed, promissory notes often were stamped with a "blank endorsement'' — whoever the promissory note was endorsed to would be legally entitled to foreclose and collect any money due.

"It's like a blank check,'' Weid­ner said.

In cases defended by Kalogianis, the companies seeking to foreclose said they filed promissory notes with blank endorsements. But at some point, the motion says, the notes in four of the cases were altered to show they had been endorsed by "Bank of New York, as trustee.''

In the fifth case, a blank endorsement was altered to show Wells Fargo had signed it, the motion says.

One company, BAC, lost its case against a Kalogianis client in 2014 when Kalogianis argued at trial that only Bank of New York could foreclose because it was the one that had endorsed the promissory note. (The case has since been reopened.)

Kalogianis denies the allegations and asserts that the lender falsified documentation and "was trying to 'turn the tables'' on him rather than lose the case."

"It is the plaintiff's own improper conduct … that should be reviewed,'' he said.

Another impediment for the lender is that there is no eyewitness who saw the alteration of the assignments, and there exists no clerk's office video which would reveal the alteration. The lender asserts that it must have been Kalogianis who altered the assignments because no other person who might have had access to the documents had a motive to falsify it. I'm not sure that's a winner. Remember, just like on "Cops," all suspects are presumed innocent until found guilty in a court of law. Moreover, if Kalogianis can prove his allegations that the lender engaged in other document fraud, then a judge could determine that any falsification of the assignments to show the Bank of New York as the assignee may just as well have been made by the lender rather than Kalogianis, perhaps as a desperate "Hail Mary" maneuver.

The Tampa Bay Times reporter does devote considerable space to recounting the colorful history of Mr. Kalogianis, including a couple of previous ethical complaints, his unsuccessful run for US Congress, and the fact that he worked his way through law school as a male stripper. So many of us worked our way through law school as strippers that I fail to see what bearing that might have on the lender's allegations.

Other than the allegations of a couple of clients of Kalogianis, both of whom alleged that the lender in their cases had "committed fraud," there is no similar recounting of the colorful past of the lender or any of its legal counsel. Perhaps they are all Carmelite nuns and monks who spent their law school years and beyond grappling with the dark night of the soul and had no time or inclination for strip bars or the US Congress, nearly identical fora in the popular imagination.

Certainly, the lender's motion in this case might be more persuasive if, as was the case with a motion brought by another foreclosing lender against Kalogianis, he was allegedly caught on camera.

This week, Bayview Loan Servicing, which is foreclosing on a Kalogianis' client on behalf of Bank of America, obtained a video of a man it says is Kalogianis looking at court files in the Pasco clerk's office. The video appears to show him removing a small object from an accordion folder, stamping a page in a court file and returning the object to the folder.

Kalogianis' attorney's defense is "nothing to see here" and "I'm rubber, you're glue, whatever you say bounces off me and sticks to you."

"I can't see anything incriminating other than a lawyer doing a diligent search, going through files looking for mortgage fraud,'' Cohen said of the video. "After all, it would not be unusual to find mortgage fraud on the part of Bank of America and its legal agents in that they've already stipulated to being responsible for tampering with evidence resulting in payment of billions of dollars of fines to avoid a possible criminal prosecution.''

Cohen said that Kalogianis has won "many cases'' in which promissory notes had not been stamped or signed by any lender.

"Why in the world would he want to do something that could potentially hurt his client by putting a stamp on a note?'' Cohen asked "Simply stated, there was no need for Constantine to stamp anything to win the case.''

Forging or altering public records, including court records, can be a felony punishable by up to five years in prison.

As I have discussed many times in the past, the last point is important. Anyone, lender, borrower, or their respective counsel, who falsifies public records ought to get the book thrown at them from a criminal law perspective. Winning or losing a foreclosure case should be collateral damage. At this point, we have nothing to judge but allegations and press reports, but we'll be following this one to see what, if anything, shakes out.

The CFPB's Worst Nightmare: The US Constitution

A couple of months ago, we discussed the possibility that a case involving the CFPB and PHH Mortgage might go against the CFPB, including a potential finding that the CFPB's very existence (as created by the Franken-Dodd Monster) is unconstitutional. The prior blog post linked to a Forbes article by former White House official Susan Dudley in which Ms. Dudley listed the various arguments on which a finding of unconstitutionality could be based.

Long-time bank lawyer (and current Dorsey & Whitney partner) Joe Lynyak gave his analysis of the same topic in an article in the Westlaw Journal's "Bank and Lender Liability" entitled "The Constitutionality of the CFPB —An Exegesis." That's an imposing title, but at only four pages, it's worth a read, especially if, like this blogger, you've been wishing upon a star that the CFPB might, at best, take a long walk off a short pier, or, at worst, get its extremely large, flapping wings clipped.

Joe lists a number of the same arguments against the CFPB that Ms. Dudley also discussed, including:

• All authority is vested in a single director with extraordinarily broad power, no oversight by a board or commission, and tenure that can be shortened only by removal by the president "for cause."
• Unique existence as a bureau" within the Federal Reserve, an independent entity whose budget (and, therefore, the CFPB's budget, which the Federal Reserve is mandated to fund) is immune from Congressional oversight or control or, for that matter, any oversight or control by the FRB.
• "Broad administrative authority to examine and supervise a wide range of consumer financial firms, with administrative hearing authority to enforce orders requiring corrective measures. Favorable hearing determinations by an administrative judge can be summarily reversed by the director."
• The ability of the bureau to exercise such broad enforcement authority over any "unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice," which "need not be illegal; instead, it may be merely unfair in the view of the bureau."
• The ability of the CFPB ignore the due process rights of people and entities subject to its jurisdiction by regulating via enforcement orders — a practice that in many cases obviates the responsibility to extend the protections afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act (the In every instance
  governmental agency power has remained subject to acceptable levels of oversight by the three branches of the federal government —at least until now. APA affords the opportunity for public comments and dialogue prior to the exercise of an
  agency rulemaking)."
• The CFPB's"position that statutes of limitation do not apply to its enforcement activities, with the result being that targeted institutions have been sanctioned for conduct occurring well beyond the five-year federal agency statute of limitations governing agency enforcement actions that seek monetary penalties."

As to the PHH case, Joe does what many weak-kneed commentators often fail to do: he offers an actual opinion.

As to whether the CFPB’s current structure can withstand a constitutional challenge¸ it is suggested that the correct answer to that question is no. Although the necessities of a federal agency’s administrative mission concededly require flexibility, in the CFPB’s case the outer parameters of permissible agency boundaries have been far exceeded.

A review of the somewhat patchwork set of judicial decisions addressing this issue indicates that courts balance several factors against an infringement on the president’s right to dismiss agency officials without cause.

[...]

In light of the clear efforts of consumer proponents of the CFPB to statutorily insulate the bureau from any meaningful oversight, it is very probable that the CFPB will be found to be unconstitutionally structured.

After dropping that "hot sports opinion" on his audience, he then offers some insight into what festivities might ensue as supporters and opponents of The Adjustment Bureau attempt to either resurrect it or to decapitate it, drive a stake through its heart, and set the remains on fire.

Importantly, should the CFPB’s structure be struck down, the bureau’s prior actions and interpretative pronouncements (now spanning more than five years in length) arguably will become void. Also (and absent judicial mischief that might create a solution to the absence of a reasonable degree of executive oversight), any corrective measures to remedy a constitutional infirmity relating to the CFPB must be considered and adopted by Congress.

Finally, if the CFPB is found to be operating on a constitutionally infirm basis, legislative efforts to defend the bureau will encounter an interesting role reversal.

In the past few years, critics of the CFPB have attempted to amend the bureau’s statutory structure. These attempts have been soundly defeated by supporters who have effectively filibustered any such efforts. (The most frequent attempts for statutory changes have involved proposing a commission form of agency governance, as well as imposing congressional oversight through the budget process.)

Even though it might be relatively simple to minimally modify the CFPB’s structure in order to pass constitutional muster, opponents of the bureau could filibuster any attempt to cure the statutory difficulties without obtaining the concessions demanded by critics. Although this result seems highly likely if the CFPB is found to be unconstitutional, the belief that the bureau has brought about a paradigm shift in consumer protection may prevent consumer advocates from both anticipating this result and compromising sooner rather than later.

I'd pay for tickets and movie theater popcorn prices just to see all that unfold.

On Independence Day, it's pleasant to contemplate the possible demise of a tyrannical overlord, especially one whose minions clothe themselves in the mantle of "doing god's work," the US Constitution be damned.

B of A Questions New Lawyer Salary Increases

Last week, we made an obscure reference to the fact that some of the nation's largest law firms have opted to raise the starting base salaries of their new associates from $160,000 per year to $180,000 per year. While many law school graduates come roaring out of the chute with a Mt. Everest of debt and an ant-hill's worth of job prospects (the result of what has been, for a number of years, a law school shell game), the nation's largest law firms still fight over the top students from the elite law schools, and for those lucky few, the pickings are rich and the competition is fierce. Apparently, the brain trusts that maneuver our private practice Titanics between the icebergs of fatal hubris and a wised-up corporate clientele decided that the time had come to butter their babies' biscuits with more moolah. Like lemmings, where a few go, the rest will surely follow.

Who would have thought that the initial push-back from clients would have come from a sector of the economy not known for being the first to any "space" but the feeding trough: big banks?

Bank of America Corp.’s top lawyer recently sent an email to a group of law firms calling the increases in associate lawyer pay unjustified, making it clear the bank wouldn’t help firms absorb the cost.

“While we respect the firms’ judgment about what best serves their long-term competitive interests, we are aware of no market-driven basis for such an increase and do not expect to bear the costs of the firms’ decisions,” David Leitch, Bank of America’s global general counsel, wrote in the email, reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

A Bank of America spokesman declined to comment.

The linked article from The Wall Street Journal discussed other aspects of standard big law firm business practices that have annoyed clients. Among those is training inexperienced lawyers on the client's tab by billing them at rates that give clients sticker shock.

The chief litigation officer for a Fortune 100 company said $180,000 for a first-year isn’t justified, pointing by way of comparison to a lawyer in the company’s litigation department with 20 years of experience who doesn’t make that much money. “Why would we ever think a first-year associate is worth that?” the lawyer said, adding that they recently denied a firm’s request to charge $400 an hour for a first-year.

In the normal course of a lawyer's career, she or he should become much more efficient as she or he becomes more experienced. In addition to paying an hourly rate that seems excessive, the clients may also pay for more hours that it will take the "newbie" to complete the task. Apparently, the "chief litigation officer" who was cited thinks that it's the law firm's job to bear the cost of training the new lawyers until such time as their experience level permits them to deliver "value" for the buck(s) charged. If the firm wants to pay a new lawyer 15 grand a month, that's its business. If the firm expects to pass that cost along to the client, it appears that Bank of America and other large purchasers of Big Law legal services are saying "fuggedaboutit.!"

The article also discusses ways in which big banks and other businesses have been working in recent years to staunch the bleeding of outside legal costs. This discussion might be of interest to community and regional banks, as well. In addition to trimming the number of firms used, the clients have explored alternatives to traditional hourly billing.

Historically, law firms charged their clients in only one way: by the hour. While many in-house lawyers grumbled about the arrangements, saying they encouraged inefficiency and led to eye-popping bills, they mostly paid them.

But within the last decade or so, companies have pushed back. They now routinely demand “flat-fee” arrangements for a single piece of work, like a lawsuit or a transaction. And many have stopped paying for photocopies and legal research, items that were once rubber-stamped.

In-house lawyers have also ramped-up their resistance to paying for the most junior lawyers, often saying they won’t pay for first- and second-year lawyers even if they are staffed on assignments. Such lawyers, the thinking goes, are too often billed out at hundreds an hour to perform relatively menial tasks, like reviewing documents.

As another large corporate general counsel puts it, what ultimately matters is the "value" delivered by the lawyer to the client. Is the result and/or the advice worth what the client pays for it? Regardless of a lawyer's hourly rate or law firm compensation, when the client gets the monthly bill, does he or she think they have been "well served" by that lawyer? Obviously, that's a business judgment call; however, if the sentiments expressed in the linked article are any indication, many business clients are going to be appraising the "value" of inexperienced, but highly paid, lawyers with a critical eye, especially regarding first year lawyers who may be billing at an hourly rate commensurate with that of a lawyer in a smaller firm with, literally, decades more experience in the subject matter.

Countrywide: Closed For Good

Maybe it's the fact that in another six months or so, the regime change here in the Land of the Free will lead many of the the current crop of enforcers in D.C. out the revolving door and into the loving arms of Big Law, where those wet behind the ears begin the learning curve with 15 grand a month of pocket money. Maybe it's the fact that they knew all along that they were pushing the envelope and, when called on it, they simply shrugged, smiled, and said "Ya' got me!" Whatever the reason, the U.S. Justice Department appears to be throwing in the towel several years earlier than my initial expectation, as a result of the US Second Court of Appeals decision that squashed the Justice Department's fraud claims against Bank of America that arose out of the former Countrywide Mortgage's so-called "Hustle" subprime loan program.

According to The Wall Street Journal, this week, the Justice Department sent letters to various former officers of Countrywide, including the infamous Angelo Mozilo (aka "The Tan Man"), that told them that Justice would do some justice by not filing any civil law suits against them.

Government lawyers sent letters within the past week to Mr. Mozilo and other Countrywide executives advising that the investigations against them were closed, and thanking them for their cooperation, these people said.

“We are pleased to see this investigation concluded without any further claim against Mr. Mozilo,” said his lawyer David Siegel.

I'll bet they are pleased. Mr. Siegel was sufficiently courteous to refrain from thanking the Justice Department back for providing years of legal work for defense counsel that has now resulted in the close of the investigation without criminal charges or civil lawsuits being pursued. For litigation attorneys, this is called "stroking the long ball." And, as ESPN's Sport Center loved to tell us, "Chicks dig the long ball."

To the "Occupy [Insert Venue Here]" crowd, this latest outrage will be further proof that the system is rigged in favor of fat cats and the bureaucrats who stroke them. On the other hand, those of us with actual experience in this area saw this coming years ago. From a September 22, 2009 blog post that discussed the outlook for folks like Angelo ever doing the perp walk:

Unlike the last round, when the savings and loan industry went into a tailspin, proving that CEOs and other senior executives knew about and encouraged, much less actively participated in, the fraud is tougher to prove in connection with the subprime mortgage mess. I recall a number of instances involving failed Texas thrifts in the late 1980s where there was ample evidence that thrift owners and senior executives were swapping dead horses for dead cows, making stock loans to an owner of another thrift to purchase 100% of the stock in his own S&L in return for the borrower causing his S&L to purchase a bunch of participation interests in the lender's portfolio of exquisitely ripe carcasses known as acquisition and development loans (in which the lender funded 100% of the acquisition and developments costs AND all of the interest reserve, leaving the borrower with as much equity in the collateral as a US congressperson's integrity). This time around, the CEO's and Chairman's muddy paw prints aren't stamped all over the lender's records.

"The problem is finding the executives' fingerprints on the consumer files," said Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne State University. "Angelo Mozilo may have set the tone at Countrywide, but there is no way you're going to find his fingerprints on any of those mortgages."

Even Marg Helgenberger of CSI couldn't find enough CEO DNA in these files to make a case. I'd like to watch her try, though.

If you want to become completely bent out of shape about the relative lack of suffering inflicted on Wall Street and its cronies over their role in the meltdown, consider the fact that no one in Congress has had their wrists slapped, either. Barney Frank and Friend-of-Angelo Chris Dodd even managed to get their names emblazoned on a piece of "financial reform" legislation for all eternity, masking for future generations (who seem to have short memories in any event) the major roles those two actors played in the drama. When it comes to skating, it seems to me that most of the culprits had their blades finely honed.

Let's hope that the late British physician, Havelock Ellis, was wrong when he said “Every society has the criminals that it deserves.”