In the midst of his customary withering flame roasting of the Obama administration, columnist Mark Steyn mocked a particularly telling pronouncement by an economic "expert" at the highest levels of the federal government. Steyn skewered the White House for trumpeting the sale of the Treasury Department's stock in Chrysler to Fiat as a way to lower the federal deficit. Steyn observed that if that's the way to prosperity, then "[i]f every business in the U.S. were to be nationalized and sold to foreigners to cover another three hours’ worth of debt, this summer’s 'Recovery Summer' would be going even more gangbusters."
I’d ask one of Obama’s egghead economists to explain it to you simpletons, but unfortunately they’ve all resigned and returned to cozy sinecures in academia. The latest is chief economic adviser Austan Goolsbee, the genius who in 2007, just before the subprime hit the fan, wrote in the New York Times that this exciting new form of home “ownership” was an “innovation” that had “opened doors to the excluded” and was part of an “incredible flowering of new types of home loans.”
Where have all the flowers gone? Not to worry. By now, some organization of which you’re a member has already booked Professor Goolsbee to give an after-dinner speech at your annual meeting where you’ll be privileged to get a glimpse of his boundless expertise for a mere six-figure speaking fee.
Those of us who represent directors and officers of failed banks are well aware that the FDIC is pursuing those individuals on the theory that they were grossly negligent in not anticipating the economic meltdown and in not building a banking business plan that could have withstood the fix we've been in these last few years, and the fix in which we're likely to wallow for at least a few years more (or, if we're unlucky, for a lot longer than that). Thus far, the FDIC appears to have focused most of its efforts on low-hanging fruit, folks who could have taken Warren Buffet's entire net worth and blown it on a three-hour spree at a "Gentlemen's Club." There are some of those folks out there, as there are in any business; however, all of them were approved to man the helm of their own Titanics by federal banking regulators, including, in many cases, the FDIC.
With hundreds of bank failures so far and hundreds more to come, eventually the FDIC will be drilling down to the bedrock of former officers and directors who simply were in the wrong business at the wrong time, and who will be judged with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight. Meanwhile, guys like Goolsbee get a pass on their blatant errors in judgment, based on the fact that they're fallible human beings, albeit sometimes spectacularly so. In other words, most of us, including the people who regulated the banks that failed and, theoretically, had access to data and high level economic analyses that the average community bank did not, didn't see this train coming down the tracks and when they finally did see it coming, they didn't really understand how bad it was going to get (including our beloved Care Bear).
Or did they? A few years ago, not long after Lehman collapsed and sparked the panic that led to TARP, McCain abandoning the campaign trail to look lost in D.C., and the change we'd been waiting for swiftly arriving, a retired federal banking official contacted me to tell me that not only did the federal banking regulators have folks who knew that the end had to come soon and that it would not be pretty, but when those folks tried to sound the alarm, they were slapped down like unruly children (before the age of entitlement outlawed slap-downs). In his case, he claimed that he'd issued repeated warnings of the impending crisis starting in 2003, and twice briefed the head of that federal banking agency, once in 2005 and again in 2006. Not only was he told to shut up about it, he was "effectively removed" from his position and forbidden from publishing any analyses for two years. How do you like them apples?
You hear stuff like that and you wonder who was grossly negligent? Of course, no one likes a Cassandra, and they are seldom, if ever, heeded, especially if the doom-sayer's counterparts are saying "What, Me Worry?" On the other hand, if federal banking agencies were privy to analyses generated by their own employees that said that they needed to start stepping on the brakes of this careening car before it runs into a ditch (or off a cliff, as it turned out) and they suppressed those analyses and muzzled the employees who tried to sound the alarm, how much more culpable for the resulting failures are those bureaucrats than are community bankers who didn't know such analyses existed?
Congress and the federal banking regulators have been working over time since this crisis began to make certain that the spotlight of shame remains firmly fixed elsewhere (other than the OTS, the weakest scapegoat of the bunch, which has been made a burnt offering to an angry political god). Shouldn't someone investigate the investigators to see who knew what, when they knew it, and what they did about it (or, rather, failed to do about it) when they knew it?
Yes, I do know what the term "fat chance" means.