While I'm not a big fan of all of the year-end roundups that have been saturating the main stream media lately, I did get a kick out of a recent opinion piece in the Houston Business Journal, entitled "Roll up the TARP to ring in the new." Obviously, the Journal thinks that somebody needs to stab TARP in the face with a rusty nail file and let it bleed out. It's not that the editorial writer thought that TARP was such a bad idea, or that taxpayers aren't getting a decent return on the TARP money that banks have paid back ($62 for every US citizen "and apparently fresh pocket money for the Obama administration"). Instead, he or she thinks that TARP is a classic case of an originally clean concept sullied through the gentle ministrations of Uncle Samuel.
The TARP money, ironically, morphed into its own special kind of
toxic asset. The Obama administration poisoned TARP by making the
episode a profoundly unpleasant political experience.
At the end of the day in 2009, the public roller-coaster ride in the
TARP arena shapes up as a classic example of the standard good news/bad
news scenario.
The good news: A highly controversial policy of government
intervention during a dire stretch in the economic life of the nation
appears to have worked well.
The bad news: The government set a template of political
overreaching and posturing likely to scare off financial institutions
from participating in government partnerships in the future.
That "bad news" view got support from another quarter recently. According to an article in yesterday's Housing Wire, most banks think that TARP did absolutely nothing to help them.
...[A] bank survey completed by the Bank Administration Institute (BAI) claims only 12% of respondents feel the program positively impacted their operations.
The BAI & Finacle Bank Executive Index tracked the opinion of
banking executives from the top 100 financial institutions in the
United States. The executives, who staff commercial and savings banks,
as well as credit unions, filled out an online survey regarding
questions on the overall health of the economy as well as factors that
improve customer satisfaction.
All-in-all, TARP appears to be regarded by many of those involved in the banking industry as a program that helped avert a disaster, but that could have done so much more for financial institutions if only the government hadn't screwed it up, which the federal government has a god-given talent for doing. As for us, we think that any time a massive government program is created and doesn't bring forth plagues of locusts or the overnight deaths of every first born male infant in every household in the country, that's a definite success.
I'm traveling to visit family for the holidays and will be "off the air." Have a wonderful holiday week.
Winter's Night --Thomas Merton
When, in the dark, the frost cracks on the window
The children awaken, and whisper.
One says the moonlight grated like a skate
Across the freezing river.
Another hears the starlight breaking like a knifeblade
Upon the silent, steelbright pond.
They say the trees are stiller than the frozen water
From waiting for a shouting light, a heavenly message.
Yet it is far from Christmas, when a star
Sang in the pane, as brittle as their innocence!
For now the light of early Lent
Glitters upon the icy step -
"We have wept letters to our patron saints,
(The children say) yet slept before they ended."
Oh, is there in this night no sound of strings, of singers!
None coming from the wedding, no, nor
Bridegroom's messenger?
(The sleepy virgins stir, and trim their lamps.)
The moonlight rings upon the ice as sudden as a footstep;
Starlight clinks upon the dooryard stone, too like a latch,
And the children are again, awake,
And all call out in whispers to their guardian angels.
In the Bleak Midwinter, Glouscester Cahthedral Choir
President Obama has been jawboning the nations largest banks about doing more of that good old small business lending that will pull our economy up by its bootstraps and right out of the deep funk in which it currently wallows. All you have to do is lend, and we shall be saved, is his line, and he's sticking to it. A couple of the big bank executives who weren't "snowed in" and actually made it to last week's meeting at the White House told the president that they'd start taking a harder look at loan applications to make certain that they weren't throwing any wheat away with the chaff. Nobody really believes big bankers when they say things like that, and the president had berated them all as a pack of "fat cats" in a recent "Sixty Minutes" interview, so the entire back-and-forth seemed like so much political theater, designed for public consumption and accomplishing little of practical value.
Today, the president met with representatives of community bankers and his tone was much more conciliatory.
Meeting with 12 executives representing small banks,
President Barack Obama vowed Tuesday to press federal agencies to "cut
some of the regulatory red tape" that may be limiting the ability of
community bankers to lend more as the economy recovers.
"Some small bankers still have some regulatory constraints," Obama
explained in remarks made in conjunction with the meeting. "In some
ways, the pendulum may have swung too much in the direction of not
lending after decades of too much of a focus on getting money out the
door."
Alain Sherter of BNet did a good job last week of laying out the case for the importance of community banks and the small businesses they serve. No lap dog of the corporate elite, Sherter called on the White House "to do something" for the little guys after bailing out so many of the "fat cats." On the surface, at least, the White House appears to be concerned about "doing something"
At least the bankers were able to press home to the president (and have reported in the business press) what many of us have been seeing on a daily basis for many moons.
Small bankers discussed concerns that bank examiners are pressuring them to hike their capital, effectively restricting their ability to
lend more at the same time that small businesses are cutting back on
their borrowing, said Chris Cole, regulatory counsel at the Independent
Community Bankers of America.
Cole points out two basic problems with a proposed remedy of "make more loans." First, it's difficult to lend more when you're required by examiners to write down the value of assets (especially commercial real estate loans), increase loss reserves, and increase capital. That's exactly what bank examiners have been doing, which, regardless of your view as to whether that's prudent regulation or counter-cyclical craziness, means that banks who suffer from such regulatory tough loved simply don't have the money to increase lending to small businesses. Second, small businesses are cutting back on their borrowing because their businesses are suffering. Examiners are also "encouraging" bankers to toughen underwriting standards and to dump bad borrowers, neither of which courses of action is a game plan for increasing lending to small businesses.
Many observers are skeptical that meetings like the one today with "The One" will actually change anything. As ABC reported this afternoon, the president claims that his office doesn't necessarily get the respect it thinks it deserves when dealing with the federal banking agencies.
“[W]e don’t have direct influence over our independent regulators.”
Perhaps not "direct influence" (although that is debatable), but certainly while those agencies publicly (and privately) bridle at political pressure, at the same time they factor it into most of the critical decisions they make. If the president is serious about cutting red tape, he can accomplish something. However, don't bet on it. A safer bet is that community banks will continue to suffer under the regulatory lash and lending to small businesses will continue to flounder.
In July, we noted that while other broken Eastern cities that tried to blame their economic decline on the nefarious mortgage lending practices of banks with deep pockets were being handed their heads by judges who followed both the law's letter and its intent (as opposed to using a lawsuit as an excuse to make economic and social policy), the City of Baltimore was "hanging in there," albeit by the skin of its teeth. An interested reader sent word recently that that skin appears to be sloughing off.
Baltimore sued Wells Fargo, alleging that its "racially discriminatory mortgage lending practices" had led to "a wave of foreclosures" that had devastated the city and cost it "millions of dollars." While one federal district court judge denied Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss the city's complaint, we observed that "[s]urviving a motion to dismiss is a long way from proving your claims at trial by a preponderance of the evidence." Last week, another federal judge now hearing the case raised serious doubts about whether the case would even make it to trial.
A federal judge raised doubts Monday about the city's ability to prove huge financial losses from houses left vacant by Wells Fargo foreclosures, the latest development in a landmark civil suit alleging
a pattern of racially based, discriminatory lending by the mortgage
broker.
U.S. District Judge J. Frederick Motz said he might pare the case, if not outright dismiss it.
"Should we go down that road? ... It's going to cost a lot of people a
lot of money, including the taxpayers," said Motz, who took over the
case in August after the previous judge discovered a conflict of
interest.
Imagine that: someone actually considering that political theater that hasn't a snowball's chance in Baghdad of producing any financial reward for the plaintiff city is costing a bundle for the city's taxpayers whose anger it seeks to stoke. Judge Motz observed that it's extremely difficult to prove that the practices of Wells Fargo, even if the allegations of the city in this respect are true, directly caused the tens of millions of dollars in economic consequences that are claimed by the city. If you can't prove causation, you don't have a case.
There are as many as 30,000 vacant properties throughout Baltimore, and
Motz suggested that trying to gauge the citywide consequences of one
vacant property on a street that has nine more is futile.
"Why have the expense? I can tell you now it's silly," said Motz,
who also acknowledged that the "deterioration of the inner city" is
"shocking" and "disturbing."
That deterioration is as disturbing in Baltimore as it is in Cleveland and Birmingham, two other cities that filed similar lawsuits and had them dismissed by the courts. You can see the attraction of these lawsuits for political "leaders." If they can blame bad old banks for all their woes, they don't have to face up to the real causes.
Since 1970, according to the
Census, Baltimore lost more than 84 percent of its manufacturing jobs.
It now ranks as the nation's 15th poorest major city, with a poverty
rate that has remained steady at 20 percent, in one of the wealthiest
states.
The devastated neighborhoods of Baltimore's inner city were a long time in the making. To have prevented them would have taken foresight, imagination, and political courage. To renew them now will likely take a transcendent power. It's extremely doubtful that that any useful solutions will be forthcoming from a political class that wants to pick the pockets of banks like Wells Fargo that, though hardly standing as paragons of virtue, aren't the root cause of what ails Baltimore and cities like it. These lawsuits are just a very expensive diversion. The only "winners" are the trial lawyers.
Having hit two personal milestones this year, my sixtieth
birthday and my thirty-fifth year practicing law, I figured it was past time to
begin doing honest work. So, I talked two old and dear friends of mine, John Walker and Tom
Bieging, both lawyers (although John’s been a business executive,
consultant, and “recovering lawyer” for almost eighteen years now), into
joining me to form a business to try to do seriously what I have been trying to
do semi-seriously through this blog for the past five years: educating those
who want to be educated about the banking law and other areas at the
intersection of the business of banking and the law that governs banking.
We’ve called our educational and consulting firm “Bank Business Advisors, LLC,”
due mainly to the fact that we’re not very original, but also to the fact that
it accurately describes the nature of our business. To better pursue our goal
of educating others, we formed a joint venture with a business that has been
around for a few years and that aims to be the one-stop shop for banking
informationand education, Bankerstuff.com.
They’ve become proficient at the delivery of content andwebinars on topics of interest to bankers, and we’re pleased
to be able to add our offering to their product mix. Our venture will
deliver co-branded webinars under the name BankLawStuff.
Sure, the word “stuff” sounds awfully informal for three old codgers, but then,
none of the three of us would be accused of being overly formal. In addition,
it gets the point across.
While the three principals of Bank Business Advisors intend
to be actively involved in presenting many of the webinars, we also intend to
use other speakers who we believe are capable of delivering expert and timely
content to our intended audience. Our intent in delivering these webinarsandother
educational information concerning banking law is to give our listeners
something of real value to take away from each webinar, something that is the
result not only of the experience and expertise of the presenters, but of their
willingness to share that experience and expertise with the listener and to
tell the listener what they really think about the issues. BankLawStuff isn’t
intended to be a “tease” or a “come on” for another business. It’s intended to
be a stand-alone service. Therefore, we’ll try to make the content worth the
cost.
The first webinar, scheduled for January 7th, is on the
subject “Responding
to an Enforcement Action” and will be given by Joseph Lynyak III, a former
FDIC attorney and currently a partner in the Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.,
offices of Venable LLP. For bankers, especially regional and community bankers,
it’s a timely topic, and Joe knows his “stuff.”
Other webinars are scheduled, and readers may find one or
more of them to be of interest. Certainly, we hope that they do.
FinCri Advisor (free registration required) continues its exploration of D&O policies for bank officers and directors and the defenses that carriers are raising to avoid having to actually defend the directors and officers. As my Contracts professor told his class during my first semester of law school, insurance companies exist by collecting premiums and denying liability.
Among the defenses raised by insurance companies are the following:
Requiring "warranty letters" at the time of, and as a condition to issuing, the policy, then raising "breach of warranty" defenses when a claim is made. As Jenner & Block partner Matt Jacobs advises, when it comes to a request for a warranty letter, banks should just say "No."
"Insured-vs.inured" exclusions, which insurance companies are attempting to use to deny claims filed by the FDIC against officers and directors it has removed. Jacobs advises that banks should negotiate as many carve-outs as possible at the time the policy is issued.
Jacobs discusses the landmine presented by the "warranty letter."
Most D&O policies, he adds,
include two severability provisions that limits application of
exclusions due to prior knowledge and also apply to representations in
the application. A warranty letter might override these severability
provisions.
"The bank, when it is out buying the coverage, needs to obtain full
severability on the application," Jacobs urges. "That means that the
white hat director who does not have the knowledge will not lose
coverage. The contract is a separate contract for each director."
Jacobs also suggests that banks include a clause that says the policy
cannot be rescinded as to independent directors, important given that
rescissions could be asserted even for small omissions. "That's a big
issue, and it became a bigger issue with all these financial fraud
claims" during the crisis, he adds.
If your carrier is adamant about including a warranty letter, and your
broker says no other insurer is available, revise and narrow the
language, Jacobs says. For instance, make it clear that the only
applicable knowledge is something material that would trigger only a
catastrophic claim at the top layer. "There are ways to limit their
draconian effect," he says.
This is an issue that is critical, especially to banks in troubled condition. However, reviewing your policy after your bank is already on the brink (or over the brink) of serious difficulties can be like checking the lifeboats for leaks after you've hit the iceberg. The time to deal with these issues is at the time the bank is shopping for a policy. It's also critical at that time to (1) get expert advice before you apply, and certainly before you accept the policy, and (2) explore as many options as you can with your broker if the first carrier you contact proposes these potentially disastrous provisions and won't back off.
NOTE: Posting will be unpredictable for the rest of the month. That should be a relief to the reader who e-mailed to tell me that I was posting too much. Apparently, terrorists were torturing him by forcing him to read every single one.
According to Stacy Kaper, reporting in today's American Banker (paid subscription required), Barney Frank worked out a compromise late yesterday with moderate Democrats that appears to roll back the attempt by more liberal Democrats to restrict the OCC's power to preempt state law. Under Frank's original bill, "the OCC would have only been able to preempt state consumer laws on a
case by case basis when it interfered with the business of banking. The
standard was meant to repeal the agency's sweeping 2004 preemption
rules, returning it to the so-called 'Barnett standard' established by
the 1996 Supreme Court case of Barnett V. Nelson." According to Ms. Kaper, Frank agreed to amend his bill to effectively preserve the OCC's current power to preempt state law.
Under the deal reached between House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank and [Illinois Rep. Melissa] Bean, the OCC could preempt a state consumer protection law by simply writing a letter or issuing a ruling. It would reaffirm the deference given to the OCC’s rulings by the courts.
It would also allow the agency to preempt all equivalent state
standards at once. For example, if the OCC were to preempt an Indiana
credit card disclosure law, it could apply the same standard to other
credit card disclosure laws with similar language.
The bill would also lower the threshold required for the OCC to
preempt state standards by saying that it can override any law that
"prevents, significantly interferes with, or materially interferes" the
business of banking.
That's certainly a set-back for consumer advocates and state regulators, who had high hopes that the juggernaut of OCC world domination would be somehow forced to grind to a halt. In the messy world of legislation-making, the sausage that results sometimes is not very appealing to those with refined tastes.
Frank also agreed to a legislative maneuver that makes the preemption power provision almost bullet proof.
Bean succeeded in convincing Frank to adopt the bulk of her proposal to broaden preemption and roll it into the Massachusetts Democrat’s
manager’s amendment. By incorporating it as part of the base text
without requiring a separate vote solely on that provision, the move
virtually guarantees that her preemption language will stick.
Ms. Kaper also reported that there were further signs of compromise by Frank and the managers of this legislation with moderates, which may mean that a piece of legislation might be worked out with which banks could actually live.
During the negotiations, moderate Democrats also succeeded in convincing House leaders to consider other amendments during debate, including a measure by Rep. Walt Minnick, D-Idaho, that would substitute the creation of a new consumer agency with a proposal that would let a council of existing federal regulators jointly write new safety and soundness standards and consumer protections.
We'll have to see what amendments are actually adopted (as opposed to merely debated) and what eventually passes both houses of Congress, but if that change is as good as it sounds and makes its way into the final bill, it might address the concerns of commercial bankers who were "fixin' to open up a can of All-American whoop-ass" on Frank's bill over the single issue of the new "Consumer Financial Protection Czar." I think bankers might be able to live with a council of existing regulators who write protections. At least, you wouldn't have a newly created federal potentate with an axe to grind, and each type of bank's primary federal regulator would be able to have input as to its "constituents'" concerns. It would be nice if the new council also includes representatives of state regulators, so all interested parties have a seat at the table. Again, we'll need to see the final language before we get too excited.
The House will also consider an amendment by a group of moderates that would alter the definition of a major swap participant in derivatives legislation to better protect end-users.
The new manager’s amendment from Frank will also take steps to
address another big concern of bankers and modify a provision from
Reps. Brad Miller, D-N.C. andDennis Moore,
D-Kans., that would have required secured creditors to take a 20%
haircut in resolutions of firms that pose a risk to the economy.
Under revised language to be included in Frank's manager's
amendment, the haircut would be reduced to 10% and apply only to
short-term lending of 30 days or less. It would also explicitly exempt
any debt secured by government entities including the Federal Home Loan banks, the government-sponsored enterprises, the Federal Housing Administration and Treasury securities.
The 20% haircut is an idea that was launched by Sheila Bair and roundly criticized by experienced expert observers. Bair recently claimed that the 20% haircut "would rarely be used" and that it was designed to target "short-term secured funding." Critics, including long-time bank consultant Bert Ely, publicly warned that the original legislative language would also apply to long-term secured lending and would, in effect, make it nearly impossible for even small financial firms to get long-term secured funding. It sounds like the latest compromises will address the critics' concerns.
If this spirit of constructive compromise keeps up, there's no telling what might happen. Something might actually get passed that will satisfy no one but harm few. That's about the best you can hope for when Congress is in full action mode.
The US House of Representatives began debate today on a massive financial institutions reform bill. It, and the hundreds of amendments that have already been helpfully proposed to improve it, are designed to avoid any repetition of the current woes in which we currently wallow. They will prevent such bad occurrences in the future by creating powerful new federal bureaucracies, and giving more power to certain existing federal bureaucracies (while stripping other bureaucracies of power). Human nature can be changed by powerful central governmental apparatus, or at the very least its baser nature can be effectively restrained by those in power in the epicenter of probity and moral rectitude: Washington, D.C. That's the theory, at any rate, history be damned.
Regional and community bankers are not drinking the Kool-Aid. Neither are their trade associations. A call went out this week from the Texas Bankers Association for bankers to contact their representatives to advise them that bankers are dead-set against the enactment of this legislation. The TBA prepared a Power Point presentation to support this call to arms. It was obviously prepared by Texans, since one of the speakers uses the term "fixin' to" (as in "I'm fixin' to kick your scrawny buttocks, Hoss"). Nevertheless, even Yankee bankers should be able to cut through the twang and catch the drift of the warnings issued. Time is short. Start working the phones. Tell the paragons of principle that 2010 is only a year away. As one old hand says, "They're counting noses and PAC contributions."
Personally, the most horrifying (and, therefore, most effective) scare tactic contained in the presentation is the mental image of Elizabeth Warren as "Consumer Financial Protection Czar." Since she's had a history of histrionics while blogging about banks and their evil ways, bankers can expect her to do everything possible to drive them out of business if she's anointed by "The One," which is expected should the office be created.
As a bloodsucking vampire whose fangs are securely fastened to the neck of the proletariat, I find that prospect sufficiently disturbing to motivate me to contact my local representative, even though I know that person to be reliably reactionary and luminously Luddite when it comes to progressive legislative proposals of any stripe. Nonetheless, it's always satisfying for the booted and horsed classes to commiserate among themselves when the masses rise to impinge our hereditary privileges.
There is speculation in the banking industry that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation could start holding more two-for-one sales, so to speak, for failing banks....[S]ome deals to come in Georgia might involve the bundling of a relatively
desirable bank with another bank that is either in an undesirable
location geographically or that has so little franchise value it is
unlikely to be acquired alone in an FDIC-assisted transaction.
[...]
The failed bank-version of a two-for-one auction is known as a “linked bid.”
Thus far, most "linked bank transactions" have involved related institutions, such as those owned by a single holding company. The "new paradigm" will assemble unrelated institutions into one bid package.
While reporter J. Scott Trubey correctly observes that "bundling banks" reduces "pressure on the resources of regulators and eliminates multiple troubled banks at once," there are advantages for a buyer, as well, particularly for a buyer that may be an acquisition group currently on the outside looking in or that owns a relatively small bank and wants to build a franchise through failed bank acquisitions. Multi-bank deals can open up the bidding process to a larger pool of bidders who are looking to pump substantial amounts of fresh capital into a new franchise and to employ a management team that can handle the consolidation, integration, and troubled asset management and workout tasks that such deals require. The Southwest Plan transactions of the late 1980s in Texas were classic blueprints for packaging groups of failed banks together based upon various factors (geographic location, for example, or similarity of asset mix) and having a larger pool of interested bidders from which to draw.
While the linked article focuses on Georgia (the elephant graveyard of banks thus far in the current meltdown), there are other geographic clusters that may make sense for such bundling, including Illinois, California, Florida, parts of the Northeast, the Northwest, the upper Midwest, and the Southwest (perhaps a New Mexico/Colorado/Arizona bundle or one centered in Colorado and encompassing a number of surrounding states). The possibilities for bundling are large, and if the 130 institutions that have failed thus far are only roughly twenty percent of what's heading down the pike, the FDIC is doing the right thing by considering this alternative. Currently, it might merit only a small squib in a regional business paper, but it's a flashing neon sign to those of us looking for glimmers of hope that there may be solid opportunities to make silk purses out of sows' ears.
As The Wall Street Journal's weekend edition reported (paid subscription required), political influence might buy a bad bank time, but it can't cure what ails it.
Federal regulators on Friday seized AmTrust Bank, a battered Cleveland thrift kept alive this year after local politicians pleaded with the government for a second chance.
[...]
...AmTrust benefited from the advocacy of politicians, including Rep. Steven LaTourette (R., Ohio), who pleaded with Treasury and White House officials not to kill a second Cleveland bank. Cleveland's Democratic mayor, Frank Jackson -- a critic of National City's forced sale -- also sought to protect AmTrust.
At the same time, regulators were hoping that federal rescue programs being rolled out would stem the number of seized banks.
The OTS and FDIC eventually agreed to plans by AmTrust to aggressively shrink its balance sheet, sell branches, and thicken its capital cushions, according to people familiar with the matter.
The "shrinkage" plan didn't work. On the other hand, unnamed sources "close to AmTrust" told a tale that sounds like it's straight out of Texas circa 1985.
People close to AmTrust blame federal regulators for some of the troubles. In recent months, OTS examiners demanded that AmTrust write down the value of loans far more aggressively than bank officials thought necessary, these people say.
The OTS also required AmTrust to beef up its reserves to levels that executives regarded as excessive, these people said.
The requirements triggered more losses. Deteriorating finances prompted regulators' complaints about AmTrust's health to amplify from "a gradual drumbeat ... to a crescendo," said a person close to the company.
AmTrust officials say they were perplexed, especially after regulators earlier blessed the company's turnaround plans. "There's no way loans could have been worth X nine months ago and are worth a tiny fraction of that today," said the person close to the company.
Once the regulators decide that a bank is doomed, the "mark-to-depressed-market" scythe starts swinging, the death spiral starts, and you can't pull back on the joystick. You're headed straight into the ground. Those of us who've been through this recently (and many more times in the past) know that as a bank lawyer in such a situation, you're nothing more than an oncologist whose patient is going to die and there's nothing you can do other than comfort it on the way out.
The OTS didn't cause AmTrust to fail. Bad loans and the worst recession since the 1930s caused the failure. Monday morning quarterbacks can argue until the end of time whether the OTS hastened the failure or delayed the failure (or, ironically, both), what the right call in this case should have been, and when it should have been made. One thing is certain, and it's a point that Paul Jackson at Housing Wire has been making since this bank failure blitz first started: the current crop of failures are costing the FDIC more losses-per-failed-bank than the last time we went through this process. This one will cost the FDIC an estimated $2 billion.
AmTrust's deterioration over the past year likely resulted in the bank
selling for a lower price than it would have fetched if the thrift had
been seized earlier, said people familiar with the government-led
auction.
Given that result, one more thing is certain: the next politician that shows up at the doorstep of a federal bank regulator requesting that the regulator give a bank more time to work out of its troubled condition will likely be given the AmTrust example and politely shown the door.
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While I'm not a big fan of all of the year-end roundups that have been saturating the main stream media lately, I did get a kick out of a recent opinion piece in the Houston Business Journal, entitled "Roll up the TARP to ring in the new." Obviously, the Journal thinks that somebody needs to stab TARP in the face with a rusty nail file and let it bleed out. It's not that the editorial writer thought that TARP was such a bad idea, or that taxpayers aren't getting a decent return on the TARP money that banks have paid back ($62 for every US citizen "and apparently fresh pocket money for the Obama administration"). Instead, he or she thinks that TARP is a classic case of an originally clean concept sullied through the gentle ministrations of Uncle Samuel.
