Senator Chris Dodd has been "mulling" over the need for legislation to rescue borrowers who may have been "victims" of predatory lending practices and now, thanks to the fact that their adjustable rate loans are adjusting, risk default and foreclosure. Forbearance by legislative fiat may be in order, according to Dodd. He's not in favor of bailing out the bad-boy lenders, however. They can stew in their own juices.
According to a recent article in Knowledge@Wharton, Dodd's proposal, and similar forbearance and borrower relief measures being floated by Sen. Hillary Clinton and consumer advocacy groups, are unsound. In fact, in the opinion of professors at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, the bailout of any of the participants in this "risky business" is a bad idea.
Not so fast, say Wharton faculty who have studied the mortgage
market and past government bailouts. "I think that for the moment, they
should probably leave it alone," says Joseph Gyourko,
professor of real estate and finance at Wharton, warning that bailouts
can make people more reckless in the future. "We don't want to
introduce moral hazard .... We don't understand this very well right
now, so any regulation is probably going to be wrong or imprecise."
In fact, he says, the market is already correcting the problem.
Lenders have dramatically cut their offerings of the most hazardous
products --such as loans that require no down payment or proof of the
borrower's income, or those which allow borrowers to decide for
themselves how much to pay each month.
Ken Thomas, a lecturer on finance at Wharton, argues that people and
institutions that make risky choices are usually best left to suffer
the consequences. "When we had the last big financial meltdown with
stocks in 2001, did we consider bailing out those who lost money in the
dot-com crash?" he asks. "We try to have markets regulate, not the
government. Markets do a much better job."
The Wharton wonks also point out that the economic factors that have led to the current subprime mortgage lending sector woes are not likely to be repeated.
Wharton real estate professor Todd Sinai
describes the situation as a "perfect storm," given that three things
had to happen for the subprime market to tank: Borrowers' incomes had
to drop, interest rates had to rise and housing prices had to fall. "It
is extremely rare that all three things happen," he says.
[...]
But is the situation really bad enough to demand government
intervention? "We just don't know," says Sinai. "Delinquency is a long
way from default," he notes, arguing that many troubled borrowers may
eventually get caught up without government help. In the past, he adds,
lenders have typically preferred to help borrowers avoid foreclosure,
often by re-negotiating loan terms. It is not certain that will happen
this time, because over the past decade increasing numbers of loans
have been passed to investors in mortgage-backed securities,
potentially making lender-backed workouts more difficult. "I think a
wait-and-see attitude is appropriate," he says.
The professors also take on a false analogy that has been irritating me since I first heard it several weeks ago: that if the government can spend billions to bailout savings and loan depositors, it can bail out victims of predatory lenders.
In that case, the government worried about the ripple effects on the
economy and the millions of innocent depositors. Unlike the subprime
borrowers, though, the S&L depositors had not chosen to make risky
bets: They had merely put their money in the bank.
"I don't think they are comparable at all," Gyourko says, comparing the S&L crisis to the subprime meltdown. So
far, only about 20 subprime lenders have failed. And because subprime
loans are packed into mortgaged-backed securities and traded on the
secondary market, losses will be diluted among investors worldwide
rather than concentrated in the institutions that originated the loans.
"You certainly do not want to bail out the lenders," Gyourko says,
arguing that the marketplace will curb risky behavior on its own. "The
markets are telling lenders, 'You know, if you issue loans like those
again, it's going to be very, very costly.'"
Agreed.
Ken Thomas points out a delicious irony in the current clamor by consumer advocacy groups for a clamp down on subprime lenders.
"The fact is that some of these same groups that are pushing [for
restrictions on issuance of subprime loans] are the same groups that
pushed banks to make more loans" to the poor, Thomas says.
Harking back to the S&L bailout, I recall sitting in the audience at the California Savings and Loan League's Annual Convention in 1983 when the General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board stood at a lectern and berated S&L executives for being a pack of wimps. "You need to take more risk to earn greater income. You need to make more acquisition, development and construction loans. You've got the power. Use it!"
Well, they used it. Five years later the FHLBB officials suffered severe amnesia about their prior cheerleading-for-risk-taking bloviations.
The Wharton professors sum up with some fundamental lessons.
The main lesson to be learned from the subprime crisis may be that
borrowers need to know more about the risky products they are offered.
"One of the things that's wrong here is the issue of full information,"
Summers says, adding that "every subprime lender should be required to
have a statement of the particular terms that is unambiguous."
Thomas agrees: "I'm always in favor of better disclosure." Gyourko
notes that "if there's any case for regulation, it's for better
information for borrowers." New regulations, for example, could require
that loan applicants be told in clearer terms exactly how their monthly
payments will rise if prevailing interest rates go up.
Subprime lenders knew they faced risks with products such as
interest-only mortgages, Sinai says. With a standard mortgage, part of
every monthly payment reduces principal. As the loan balance shrinks
and housing prices rise, the lender has a growing assurance the
property can be sold in foreclosure for enough to cover the debt. But
that is not the case when the borrower pays only interest.
Subprime lenders knew the risks they were taking, as did investors,
such as hedge funds, that bought securities based on subprime loans,
according to Sinai. Lenders' and investors' willingness to take on
these risks was good for borrowers who might otherwise not have been
able to get mortgages. But, he argues, there's no reason for government
to bail out businesses that lost money on bets they took willingly.
Spoken like true free market advocates. My only problem with "full disclosure" as a modus operandi is my oft-repeated question as to how do you dumb down the disclosures enough to make the borrowers understand the risks "sufficiently"? Certainly, it's not by having lawyers draft the disclosures. Moreover, where is the line crossed between "good salesmanship" and "fraud" when the borrower is viewed as being a dolt needing special governmental protection? Are these loans ever appropriate for borrowers with below-average incomes and education? Can a mortage loan originator ever sell one of these loans to an applicant of below-average income, education or intelligence?
What about a "suitability" standard, imposed by law? The Wharton professors are less than impressed.
Some consumer groups are pushing for new rules requiring that
lenders match borrowers only to those products that are suitable for
them. A borrower with an income that is not likely to rise would thus
not be given a loan that could require much larger monthly payments a
couple of years down the road. This would be similar to the suitability
standardsfor stock brokers and financial advisors. A broker, for
example, can be suspended or barred from the business for pushing a
retiree on a small fixed income to speculate in stock options or other
high-risk investments.
But this might not work as well in the mortgage industry, says Jack
Guttentag, emeritus professor of finance at Wharton. In a March 17
guest column in The Washington Post, he wrote: "What has made
the suitability standard workable in the securities industry is that
the short-term interest of brokers in selling unsuitable securities is
usually overruled by their long-term interest in maintaining a roster
of satisfied clients.... In the mortgage market, in contrast,
client-oriented loan providers are the minority group." Most providers
do not have long-term relationships with borrowers or count on repeat
business, he wrote.
In addition, as we've asked in the past, does Congress really expect that a loan officer could also perform competently as a borrower's financial adviser? If it does, order me a round of whatever those boys and girls are drinking.