Last Thursday in the US Court of Federal Claims, Astoria Federal Savings won a $435,770,000 breach of contract claim against the United States government. The decision is here. The decision in the Astoria case is one in a line of so-called Winstar decisions, named after the first plaintiff to win one of these cases at the Supreme Court level in 1996. Read here if you're interested.
These cases arise out of the failures of savings and loan institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (since merged into the FDIC) in the 1980S. Initially, the FSLIC and the banking regulators allowed a healthy thrift to "merge" with (actually acquire the deposits and "good assets" of) the insolvent thrift and add the "negative net worth" of that thrift to the healthy bank's capital in the form of an intangible asset called "supervisory goodwill." The regulators permitted the healthy bank to write off (amortize) the "supervisory goodwill" against future earnings over a period of 40 years. Certain other "forbearances" were also granted the bank. The acquiring bank was allowed to use the additional "capital" to grow the bank, thereby "earning its way" out of the problems of the insolvent thrift and helping the FDIC from having to pay off the insolvent institution's insured depositors. There were later variations on this plan, most prominently in connection with the "Southwest Plan" formulated in the late 1980S, but the crucial factor in all these transactions was that "forbearances" were granted by the banking regulators to the acquiring banks that allowed them to avoid certain regulatory requirements that would otherwise have applied to their operations.
In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which mandated strict new capital requirements for financial institutions. In implementing FIRREA, the banking regulators took the position that they had no ability to continue the forbearances previously granted to the acquiring banks, and the Government revoked them. In the case of "supervisory goodwill," this meant that the acquiring banks could no longer treat supervisory goodwill as an asset amortizable over 40 years, but one that must be written off over a much shorter time frame prescribed by FIRREA. Obviously, this caused the banks who had purchased the insolvent institutions to have to raise new capital quickly, often on unfavorable terms, in order not to be in violation of new, higher capital requirements. Many (most) of these banks sued the US Government for breach of contract.
In the vast majority of the cases, the banks have won, if not all the damages that they sought, then billions of dollars. They have been opposed at every step by the US Government, which has routinely appealed the decisions, and, although in some cases it has succeeded on appeal in whittling down the damages to some degree, it has not succeeded in avoiding the liability of the government for its breach of contract. Yet, on and on it fights.
It is my view that the US Government fights this war of attrition not because it expects to win, but because it hopes (with some justification, given the length of time these cases have lasted) to defuse the publicity they will receive when adverse decisions are finally rendered and all appeals are exhausted. In other words, like all good bureaucrats, they wish to postpone and defer the assumption of responsibility for unpleasant decisions. Rather than sitting down at a table to negotiate a reasonable settlement and thereby avoid years of litigation costs (in time and money), the preferred alternative is protracted litigation. If a court tells the Government what it must pay, then no government official can be criticized by any other official (or politician or reporter) for "giving away" too much. After all, what are litigation costs to a party when it's the taxpayer who foots that party's bill?
Of course, the Government would argue that it is saving the public treasury a net amount by lowering the damage amounts. I think, based solely on my having been involved in the savings and loan "bailouts" and their aftermath, and my nearly 30 years as a bank and savings and loan attorney, that the Government could have settled many of these cases for less than the total amount of damages the plaintiffs ultimately will win without the years of litigation costs. However, by the time anyone gets around to totaling up the "net savings" to see whether the Government did a "good" job or a "bad" one by litigating these cases as it has, there will no one left who will accept responsibility or, perhaps, who really cares.
The primary beneficiaries of this protracted litigation are, of course, the plaintiffs' counsel. Most of them are paid on an hourly basis and the longer and more difficult the case, the more money they make. An obstinate opponent with bad law on its side and with the US Treasury available to fund a judgment against it is a trial lawyer's dream. When the dust finally settles, the last man standing will be a plaintiff's lawyer.
Is this a great country or what?
Of course, that's just my opinion. I could be wrong.