In response to highly publicized failures of information service providers ChoicePoint and LexisNexis, Bank of America, and credit card payment processor CardSystems Solutions, to protect consumers' personal information from security breaches, a number of bills have been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives (for example, the H.R. 3374, the Consumer Notification and Financial Data Protection Act of 2005) and the U.S. Senate (e.g., S. 1332, the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005) to deal with this perceived threat. H.R. 3374 would require "financial institutions" to establish data security safeguards, including procedures to be followed in the case of breaches of data security, that are already encompassed by the information security guidelines and data security breach procedures imposed by banks and other financial institutions by federal regulators. Although arguments could be made that the "guidelines" and other "guidance" issued by bank regulators, are not "the same" as a specific federal statute that mandates such procedures, the stronger argument is that federal guidelines have the same practical effect as a law, and that until those guidelines are shown to be inadequate - and there has been an insufficient amount of time since their promulgation to demonstrate such inadequacy - there is no demonstrable need for federal legislation that specifically applies to financial institutions. In fact, S. 1332, a bill of much broader scope than H.R. 3374, specifically exempts financial institutions that are subject to the data protection requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bililey Act. Also, federal bank regulators will argue that imposing standards and procedures by means of "guidelines" rather than "law" permits flexibility in an area where technological changes occur rapidly and one size does not fit all.
Should a federal law be enacted that applies to financial institutions, banks would be well advised to make certain, through their own efforts and those of their trade associations, that,
- the standards and requirements of any such law are no more stringent than those that are imposed currently by federal guidelines;
- enforcement of such law does not include enforcement by state regulators or private citizens; and
- such law preempt any state law with respect to the same subject matter.
If an "onerous" federal law is to be enacted, it should at least constitute a single national standard for all banks to follow, rather than the "crazy quilt" of sate laws that were permitted by Gramm-Leach-Bliley in the area of privacy.
On the other hand, there is a benefit to a federal law that imposes obligations on non-financial institution data security processors and other technology service providers to banks, to adopt data security measures with respect to personally identifiable information of consumers and procedures to promptly and effectively deal with failures of such data security measures. Although the Guidelines adopted by federal regulators under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act require each financial institution to "require its service providers by contract to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives" of the Guidelines, it is the primary responsibility of the bank, not federal regulators, to impose these responsibilities on vendors and to monitor the vendors on a continuous basis to ensure compliance. Except to the extent that state law imposes a similar requirement (as is the case in California), vendors have room to "maneuver" in the course of contract negotiations in arguing over contractual language that the bank might think is necessary to protect it. Some vendors, especially those that deal with smaller banks, use the lack of sophistication of the bank and/or the vendor's unequal bargaining power, to engineer less-than-full protection for the bank in this area. Some vendors even attempt to shift the cost of compliance with the G-L-B guidelines onto the bank. If vendors are mandated by federal law to meet essentially the same data protection and notification-of-breach standards as are their bank customers, this would remove most of the bargaining power from the vendor to negotiate anything less than full compliance. Also, many vendors currently attempt to limit their liability for breaches of their contractual duties to the bank by imposing contractual limitations and/or exclusions on remedies and damages. This would be more difficult for vendors to negotiate if what they are trying to impose on the bank is a limitation or exclusion of damages or liability for the vendor's violation of law. It is customary that each party to the contract fully indemnify the other party for all violations of law. It may not always remove the issue from the bargaining table, but it should make it much more difficult for a vendor to "take a stand" on this issue, at least if it intends to represent financial institutions.
---Kevin Funnell





