Bank Lawyer's Blog

A Change of Policy, But Only in Two States

While the epic "Yo Mamma" wars between banks and credit unions have been well-documented (and often lamented) on this blog, I have no explanation for the recent activities of Chase Bank and Huntington Bank, as outlined in a recent article in Credit Union Times.

As many as 30 credit unions in West Virginia and Ohio have been scrambling to establish new correspondent vendors after a regional and national bank terminated their accounts over the past few weeks.

The $1.4 billion Volunteer Corporate CU and the $3.7 billion Corporate One FCU both reported the closed accounts, and in both cases said members reported the banks cited Bank Security Act and money laundering risk.

Charlie Thomas, VolCorp’s senior vice president of West Virginia operations, said the Nashville, Tenn.-based corporate first became aware of the terminated correspondent relationships in late March when a member called, asking for assistance. He said the two banks were the Columbus, Ohio-based Huntington Bank and New York-based Chase Bank.

[...]

Thomas said a letter he’d seen from Huntington to a credit union said the decision to terminate the business relationship was the result of regulatory requirements, “some of which may be new or been amended since the credit union opened its account.” The decision reflected a change in bank wide strategy, and was not a reflection on the credit union, the letter added.

The two banks aren't providing a more detailed explanation and the Fed refuses to comment to reporters on the matter, including indicating whether the banks were directed to close the accounts by their primary regulators because of BSA concerns. Speculation includes the theory that the banks are trying to reduce volatility of deposits, but other observers note that those banks are so large that the 30 banks would be but a blip on the radar screen. Also, why only banks in those two states? Is there some massive money laundering risk suddenly emerging from coal country? Are moonshiners now allied with Mexican drug cartels and laundering massive amounts of illicit cash through these credit unions?

This may be worth following. Or, it may not be. If anything interesting pops, I'll post.

A Bad Idea That Refuses To Die

Even though municipalities like San Bernardino have come to their senses and dropped a make-your-investment-banker-rich-quick scheme to seize underwater mortgages from mortgage lenders and wrote down the principal balances, the scheme refuses to completely die. I guess we'll have to use holy water, garlic, mirrors, fire, crucifixes and wooden stakes to stamp it out. In the interim, SIFMA continues to publicly pummel it.

In a recent post on its Pennsylvania + Wall blog, SIFMA's Timothy Cameron reiterates why those municipalities still considering this likely unconstitutional scheme to abandon it.

The proposals being touted target a very narrow slice of homeowners – those that are in private-label MBS and who are current on their existing mortgages, have good credit, and ideally don’t have existing home equity loans or other liens on the property. Those who are behind on their mortgage payments or have poor credit (which is the vast majority of homeowners needing help) will get no relief.

Within the small pool of qualifying homeowners, the proposal, on its face, will substantially undervalue their homes. In one example, the mortgage that investors would get paid $160,000 for is refinanced shortly thereafter for $190,000, with much of the additional $30,000 going to the plan’s backers after costs and a kickback to the municipality are accounted for. This is not fair compensation, since the amount paid is well below the face value of the taken note, and significant profits accrue to private parties.

In addition to the legal issues, the use of eminent domain will also be immensely destructive to U.S. mortgage markets in general and to specific communities using eminent domain, in particular. If the sanctity of the contractual relationship between a borrower and a creditor is undermined by the use of eminent domain, both lenders and investors will be reluctant to provide funding in the future. The result will be a significant contraction of credit availability, particularly in communities that have exercised eminent domain to seize loans. It will be much harder to get a loan: any loans that are granted will likely require much larger down payments, stronger credit scores and higher interest rates to compensate for this new and unprecedented risk. This contraction of credit availability would likely serve to halt any recovery in the municipality’s housing market, and could further depress housing values in the cities using eminent domain.

The last reason may be the most telling. Good luck with the future availability of affordable residential mortgage credit in your soon-to-be dustbowl of a community if you enact this scheme. The investment fund gets wealthy, of course, which is the impetus for this half-baked plan. All to help, but not so much, a narrow slice of the community.

Bad ideas never die. They never seem to fade away, either, unfortunately.

Gimme A Break! Nobody Actually Believed Us!

To answer a reader's question, yes, I did get a kick out of the argument by S&P's lawyers (paid subscription required) that statements by S&P "about independence and objectivity are 'puffery' and were never meant to be taken at face value by investors."

Standard & Poor's responded formally on Monday to the civil lawsuit that the Justice Department filed against the company on Feb. 4 in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.

The federal government says that the rating firm committed fraud when it allegedly misrepresented its ratings as independent and objective.

In its formal defense filed Monday, S&P pointed to two earlier court decisions where judges ruled that such statements by the firm were puffery and therefore can't form the basis for a fraud claim.

[...]

"Even if it's a viable legal argument, it's a pretty unattractive argument for S&P to be putting forward since they're basically in the business of charging clients for their reputation," said Samuel Buell, a law professor at Duke University and a former federal prosecutor. "What they're saying here is, 'When we're talking to investors about our own reputation, we're engaging in meaningless puffery.' "

"That's the whole point of the rating agencies, their seal of approval," Mr. Buell said.

It's hard to argue with Professor Buell about that.

Predictably, this all drove Larry Doyle over the edge.

In conclusion, the statement made by S&P’s lawyer is the equivalent of throwing another log on the fire that is incinerating any sense of meaningful integrity within the Wall Street-Washington conspiracy.

Puff . . . puff . . . up in smoke!

You may want to do the same with any credit ratings that cross your desk from S&P and its industry brethren at Moody’s and Fitch.

As hard as this is to believe, I'm going to say that the provision of Dodd-Frank that requires the regulators to figure out an alternative to the rating agencies is justified, not merely by the facts, but by the damning words flowing from the rating agencies and their mouthpieces. The problem is, thus far, no one has figured out what that alternative might be.

One option on the table is a proposal by Sen. Al Franken (D., Minn.) to create a board that would assign rating firms to rate deals. "As this lawsuit unfolds, it only becomes more clear that the credit rating industry is in need of serious reform, and that the American people and our economy are still at risk as a result of the conflict of interest in the industry," Mr. Franken said in a statement.

Wait a minute: I just agreed with Al Franken. Don't tell anyone. This moment may pass.

Uh, oh. I think Hell just froze over.

FDIC's Take On FFIEC's Social Media Guidance

I ran across an interview recently that the FDIC's Elizabeth Khalil gave to InfoSecurity's Tracy Kitten about the FFIEC's proposed guidance on social media. Among my take-aways are the following:

• The push for the guidance came from smaller banks that wanted the regulators to give them some free advice. We all understand the fact that because small banks have less money available to pay for expensive lawyers, they look to leverage off of every free resource they can glom onto. Trade associations aren't free, but if you're paying your dues, you look to them to give you your money's worth. Since banks pay the federal bank regulators assessments, they want some bang for those bucks, as well. I get it.
• While Ms. Khalil mentioned "reputational risk" as the second major risk of the three she discussed ("compliance issues" was number one and "third party risk" was the third), I think reputational risk layers through much of the regulators' concerns. For example, misuse of consumers' personal information may be a compliance risk issue, and a Facebook vulnerability to hackers is a third-party risk. However, they both can impact the bank's reputation. Bad things that happen in a bank's social media endeavors often pose a reputational risk as an additional risk, and that's a safety and soundness concern which, in turn, is a regulatory compliance concern.
• None of what's in the guidance is new, and banks that are already engaged in social media activities should already be familiar with the elements of the guidance. If they're not, they better become familiar in a hurry and hope that no one notices.
• Due diligence on third party service providers that you intend to use is critical. The due diligence needs to be ongoing. A third party's faux pas can bite the bank in the backside as well as the third party. Monitoring is essential.
• As is the case with online banking security, the regulators encourage banks to educate consumers on social media risks. For example, the regulators will look favorably on a bank educating its social media users on the risk of fraudulent bank sites, how to recognize the real deal from the fraudster, and that they should never give up personal information over social media. 
• Whether or not a bank is actively using social media to interface with current or potential customers, it needs to have a social media use policy. The bank's employees are using social media, and other people may be saying bad things about you in cyberspace. The bank should have a policy that deals with these issues.

The final guidance is expected to be out in the near future (the comment period closed March 25th), depending on the nature of the comments received.Interested bankers should keep their eyes peeled (although, don't hold your breath).

I'll be giving a breakout session on social media compliance on July 3, 2013 at CUNA’s America’s Credit Union Conference in New York City. If you're a reader and are attending that conference, say hello.

Florida Continues To Pummel Stern

Nearly two years ago, we noted that the Florida Bar had filed a complaint against former Florida Foreclosure King David J. Stern over alleged ethical lapses related to the meltdown of his foreclosure mill firm in the wake of a robosigning scandal. The wheels of justice grind exceedingly slowly (at least, they do in The Sunshine State), but last week, the Bar filed another whopper against Stern.

It took two years, but the Florida Bar has finally dropped a doozey of a complaint against former foreclosure king David J. Stern.

The 80-page complaint includes 17 counts or charges that Stern violated the Bar’s rules of professional conduct. The Bar alleges that Stern failed to properly supervise lawyers and non-lawyers at his firm and failed to halt regular violations of Bar rules.

The article summarizes the allegations made in the long complaint. Most have them appear to have been made public previously.

According to the newspaper, neither Stern nor his attorneys could be reached for comment (although another article states that Stern's lawyer, Jeffrey Tew, "told the newspaper Thursday that Stern has done nothing to warrant discipline"). Unfortunately for Stern, a former nemesis was ready and willing to pipe up with an opinion.

Former assistant state attorney general Theresa Edwards, who investigated Stern several years ago before being fired by the AG's office, said she thinks the bar should have acted sooner. (Contacted by the newspaper, the Bar declined, through a spokeswoman, to comment.)

"Considering the amount of money he's made, his bar license will be of little concern to him," said Edwards, who is now in private practice.

Biting off more than you can chew, then trying to gulp it down by cutting corners, appears, in retrospect, to have been a bad business plan. Then again, perhaps Ms. Edwards is correct. Perhaps he's made so much money that he won't care what the state does with his law license.

We'll see. At this rate, it may be another two years before this plays out. By that time, only crackpot bloggers may even remember who Stern was.

Scapegoating 101

The 20/20 hindsight afforded members of Congress when judging the alleged failures of the independent foreclosure reviews that we discussed last night also graces the peepers of the Government Accountability Office.

The independent foreclosure reviews abruptly ended by regulators in January failed from a lack of objectivity, oversight and consistency in the loan sampling process, said Lawrance Evans, director of financial markets and community investment for the Government Accountability Office.

[...]

Despite having a large portion of the funds already in the mail to homeowners, Evans says GAO’s probe into how the IFR was handled is far from complete.

He told lawmakers GAO plans to conduct more studies on how regulators came up with the $8.5 billion settlement figure when there is no data to show how that number was chosen or exact calculations on how many homeowners were, in fact, harmed by foreclosures.

He pointed out that "regulators’ statistical sampling approach did not include mechanisms to allow the regulators to monitor consultants’ progress toward finding as many harmed borrowers as possible."

Without data on how many borrowers were actually harmed, the GAO representative says his office wants answers on how the compensation figures were determined by the OCC and Federal Reserve.

In other words, the beat(ing) will go on.

And On.

And on.

While that's going on, the regulators are going all passive-aggressive by asking Congress to clarify that the regulators have the power to take enforcement action directly against independent contractors for banks. Because, you know, if the regulators require banks, as part of related enforcement orders, to hire independent consultants to perform very expensive services in order to comply with the enforcement orders, and the lack of clear, or even consistent, instructions on what the criteria and processes should be to perform those services leads to later criticism of the regulators over those services, well, then, regulators must be able to blame somebody, and looking in the mirror is simply out of the question (vampires cannot see their own reflections). Thus, the regulators must be able to blame the independent contractors and pursue them via enforcement processes that give the regulators a leg up on the object of their (lack of ) affection. Just like banks.

The independent contractors are reacting badly to the regulators' reaction (paid subscription required).

"I'm not sure having the regulators regulate consultants would make them more independent," said Jon Winick, president of bank advisory firm Clark Street Capital. "A better idea is to have the regulators hire the consultant then."

That would be a good alternative, except then the regulators would be responsible for the consultants' performance (or lack thereof), and we can't have that. They must be able to blame either the banks, the consultants, or both. That's not possible if the regulators are in a position to bear any responsibility.

"To me, the whole thing about the consultants is just more scapegoating," said Walter Moeling 4th, a partner at the Bryan Cave law office.

Man, I'm glad I'm not as cynical as Walt. Personally, I think this is all just a legitimate disagreement among well-intentioned people who are not worried about covering their own backsides, deflecting blame, or promoting themselves at the expense of others, but only about trying to "do the right thing."

Second-Guessing the Second Guessers

Every once in awhile, the blustering blunderbuss known as Senator Liz ("She-Reams-For-Sport") Warren fires a scattershot salvo that strikes a worthy target. You know, like when Dick Cheney shot a lawyer in the face.

The other day, Princess Rides-Bankers-Like-A-Burro was grilling some representatives of the big-time independent foreclosure review firms at a hearing that only Democrats attended (so you know it wasn't going to be pro-banker) and, as related by Larry Doyle, she struck oil.

Senator Warren: I just want to take a look at the Independent Foreclosure Review Payment Agreement details. I think you’ve probably all seen this one page agreement that lists all of the things that the banks did wrong and then boxes for how many people fall into each category and how much money they’re going to be paid. Is that right? You’ve all seen this? [Panel indicates they have seen it.]

And this was put out – who put this out? I think this is put out by the OCC and Federal Reserve. Is that right? As part of the settlement details. So I just want to ask you about this.

It has some pretty amazing categories here. The first category is about service members who were protected by Federal law whose homes were unlawfully foreclosed. It’s got people who were current on their payments whose homes were foreclosed. It’s got people who were performing all of the requirements under a modification who lost their homes to foreclosure.

And it tells how many people fall into each category and how much money the people in that category will receive. And, it ultimately resolves what will happen to 3,949,896 families.

So the question I have is having resolved this nearly 4 million families, who put the people, the families, into each of these boxes. Is that what your firms did. Mr. Ryan?

Owen Ryan, Partner, Deloitte & Touche LLP: No, Senator, we did not.

Senator Warren: So who put them in.

Ryan: I’m not sure how that schedule is prepared. I saw it for the first time yesterday.

Senator Warren: Mr. Flanagan?

James Flanagan, Leader, U.S. Financial Services Practice, Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP: Same response. We were not involved in the accumulation of that information.

Senator Warren: Mr. Alt?

Konrad Alt, Managing Director, Promontory Financial Group: Senator, I’ve seen the schedule but I’m not familiar with the basis for its preparation.

Senator Warren: So let me understand this. You ran the independent reviews, right. That’s what you got paid to do. And yet, I presume, the only one left is the banks must have put them in these boxes and you made no independent review of their going into these boxes. You were not asked to do that? Mr. Alt.

Alt: No Senator, we were not asked to do that.

Senator Warren: Mr. Flanagan. 

Flanagan: No we were not.

Senator Warren: Mr. Ryan.

Ryan: We were not Senator.

Senator Warren: So that leaves us with the banks that broke the law were then the banks that decided how many people lost their homes because of their lawbreaking. And, as a result, how many people would collect money in each of these categories. Is that right Mr. Alt?

Alt: Senator, I’m not familiar with the basis for the scheduling. 

Senator Warren: So far as you know, there’s no independent review of the banks’ analysis…you looked at 100,000 cases and the banks have now put 4 million people into categories and resolved finally how much they will get from this review by the OCC and the Federal Reserve.

Sweet!

As Mr. Doyle put it, "Bang up job on behalf of the American taxpayer from these individuals and their firms charged with an independent review of this settlement process. NOT!!"

But here's a word in defense of the consulting firms: when Mr. Alt said that it wasn't in the scope of their duties, he was not kidding. As one of my readers, a bank lawyer, advised me, the entire review process was FUBAR from the get-go.

I saw it up close and it was an absolute Rube Goldberg process with the scope, criteria and objectives changing constantly. Regulatory example 1001 of do as I say, not as I do.

It's always easy to use 20/20 hindsight to bash people, of course. However, since the regulators love to do it to bankers, I guess turnabout is fair play.

Dancing With The Bear: The Softshoe Shuffle Continues

My posts concerning former bank CEO Patrick Adams and his long, hard, expensive fight to clear his name encouraged one reader to send me a copy of a decision from a couple of months ago that involved another bank officer (actually, the Chairman of a bank) who has been slugging it out with the OCC (and in this case, the Fed) four the last four years over an attempt by the regulators to oust him from his position with the bank. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in his favor and sent the case back to the banking agencies with some pretty caustic comments.

The entire opinion is an interesting read, but here's a synopsis, paraphrased from one prepared by my correspondent.

Louis DeNaples, was a director and controlling shareholder of a national bank and two bank holding companies.  In 2008, Pennsylvania state prosecutors charged him with perjury.  But the charges were later withdrawn pursuant to an agreement in which Mr. DeNaples agreed, among other things, to release claims against the state based on irregularities in the underlying grand jury proceeding.  Thereafter, the state court expunged the entire prosecution.  The Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board, however, concluded that Mr. DeNaples had violated Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which prohibits a person from participating in a regulated financial institution after entering into a “pretrial diversion or similar program” with respect to certain criminal offenses, including perjury.  The agencies thus issued cease-and-desist orders directing Mr. DeNaples to resign from his positions, and to divest his shares, in the regulated institutions.

Mr. DeNaples appealed, arguing, among other things, that (1) his agreement for withdrawal of the perjury charges was not a “pretrial diversion or similar program,” and in any event (2) Section 19 does not apply to expunged convictions.  A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit unanimously agreed on both counts.

First, the Court held that the banking agencies’ interpretations of Section 19 are not entitled to Chevron deference.  The panel adopted DeNaples' argument that no deference is warranted for any part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act because multiple agencies enforce it, creating the potential for inconsistent agency interpretations, as occurred in this case.

Next, the Court held that the agencies had applied inconsistent and overbroad definitions of the term “pretrial diversion or similar program,” essentially capturing any situation where a person supplies a “quid pro quo for the prosecutor’s withdrawal of charges.”  The panel explained that pretrial diversion generally refers to a discrete program that seeks some offender- or community-oriented outcome such as treatment, rehabilitation, or restitution.  The Court, moreover, adopted the argument of DeNaples' lawyers that the agencies on remand must consider the meaning of “pretrial diversion” under state law, which they adamantly refused to do in the earlier cease-and-desist proceedings.

Finally, the Court agreed with DeNaples that the OCC’s and the Board’s positions on the impact of expungement were both internally inconsistent and at odds with a published FDIC policy statement.  In a stunning rebuke of the agencies, the panel criticized their positions as “bizarre,” “untenable,” “unpredictable,” and a “scattergun approach,” and said that reconciling their views “is like trying to draw a two-dimensional shape on the surface of a grapefruit.”

Trying to draw a two-dimensional shape on the surface of a grapefruit. For four years. A worthy endeavor, no?

Incidentally, the lead counsel for DeNaples (at leas, the lawyer named in the opinion) is Howard Cayne, a well-known D.C. banking law litigator who, like your trusty bloviator, has "danced with the bear" on previous occasions. The man must have a high tolerance for pain. As must Mr. DeNaples.

 

Tighten Up! No, Loosen Up!

The Obama administration’s recent call for mortgage lenders to loosen underwriting standards on residential mortgage loans to less-than-“Qualified Mortgagors” as long as the FHA (i.e., the American taxpayer) is taking most of the risk of default, generated some pretty strong reaction from the usual suspects.

"If that were to come to pass, that would open the flood-gates to highly excessive risk and would send us right back on the same path we were just trying to recover from," said Ed Pinto, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and former top executive at mortgage giant Fannie Mae.

[…]

"There's always a tension that you have to take seriously between providing clarity and rules of the road and not giving any opportunity to restart the kind of irresponsible lending that we saw in the mid-2000s," said a senior administration official who was not authorized to speak on the record.

Ya’ think?

The administration is also purportedly urging the Justice Department to ease up on lenders who make loans in accordance with the administration-encouraged looser and goosier FHA underwriting critera. The FHA also claims that it hopes to encourage "by example" Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to follow along. It's as if the subprime meltdown never occurred and Dodd-Frank was never passed, except for the fact that the federal banking regulators, including the CFPB, are taking a directly contrary approach to mortgage underwriting. Moreover, loan originators live in mortal fear of Freddie and Fannie repurchase requests, which have been massive, since those two publicly-controlled giants are the conventional residential mortgage market.

This whip-saw of inconsistency evidences a major example of cognitive dissonance.

Private reaction from bankers and bank lawyers with whom I attended the recent Texas Bankers Association Annual Legal Conference in Austin, Texas, was even more derisive.  Much time during that conference was spent parsing the nuances of “Qualified Mortgages” and “Qualified Residential Mortgages,” which will make qualifying for a residential mortgage loan much more difficult for many potential homeowners. In addition, the plethora of new regulations being spewed out by the CFPB makes consumer lending, including making single family mortgage loans, riskier and more expensive. The bottom line for a number of community bankers is that they will be making few, if any, residential mortgage loans, at least not directly. In addition, bankers who decide to make residential mortgage loans are definitely not crazy about making anything other than loans that will fall under the QM safe harbor.

I would say that it’s amazing that the administration could talk so glibly out of both sides of its mouth, except that it’s not at all amazing. It’s what these cynical, pandering clowns do as naturally as breathing in oxygen and exhaling carbon dioxide.

Interview With The Bank Lawyer

Crystal Gimesh, who, among her other duties, blogs for NContracts, a vendor management and contract management solutions company, asked to interview me for her blog. I assumed that she must be hard up for material, but she seemed like a very nice person, and wasn't threatening me with career-ending sanctions like certain other readers, so I agreed. The interview questions were some of the best I've experienced and I had a blast answering them. The best part? I can merely link to her interview post instead having to actually write my own post tonight.

Crystal: the beer's on me.