Bank Lawyer's Blog

Save Me From Myself

Marvin Umholtz's latest CU Strategic Hot Topics email newsletter contains a lengthy discussion of a position paper issued late last month by the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), which calls on the CFPB to restrict bank and credit union overdraft fees to the "reasonable and proportional" standard applied to credit card penalty fees by the terms of CARD Act, notwithstanding the fact that there is no express statutory requirement to apply such a limitation to overdraft fees. The NCLC argues that the CFPB has such authority by virtue of its ability to ban "unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices."

Of particular interest to Marvin, and to me, is the use of behavioral economic theory (previously discussed here) as support for the argument that overdraft fees are inherently "abusive" and "unfair."

This correspondent found of particular interest the NCLC white paper’s discussion about how the CFPB should leverage unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices authorities to price-control overdraft fees. It argued that overdraft fees were inherently unfair because they were not avoidable by a reasonable consumer. The NCLC said, “Accordingly, the analysis should take into [account] consumers’ likely knowledge gaps and their optimism bias, which has been shown by behavioral economics research. The information differential between banks and consumers is stark. As discussed in Sections II and III.B, supra, banks use sophisticated systems to keep track of consumers’ transactions and maximize overdrafts. In contrast, behavioral economics research shows that consumers are over-optimistic and tend to discount the likelihood of negative events. Nor do they have the capacity to quickly and accurately assess the risks associated with such contingencies. This gives banks the opportunity to attract consumers with, for example, a promise of ‘free checking,’ while at the same time charging high fees for overdrafts and engaging practices to maximize them that will far outstrip any savings from lack of a monthly maintenance fee. As a result, overdrafts and their associated fees may not be reasonably avoidable by consumers – especially the lower-income consumers who bear the brunt of these fees.” The NCLC’s anti-bank rhetoric is specious and mean-spirited.

Behavioral economics assumes that many consumers are uninformed and irrational and that consumers make systemic mistakes in their choice of credit products. Rather than let people make their own decisions behavioral economists believe that a central regulator should adopt policies designed to address that ignorance and irrationality. Behaviorists use these premises to justify big government intervention in the market to prevent consumers from harming themselves. The NCLC’s anti-overdraft narrative is reliant on this everyone-is-a-victim belief.

I couldn't have said it better myself. And now, I don't have to.

Marvin continues:

As the NCLC points out, the Dodd-Frank Act defines a practice as abusive if the CFPB finds that it (1) Materially interferes with a consumer’s ability to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or (2) Takes unreasonable advantage of – (A) A consumer's lack of understanding of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; (B) A consumer’s inability to protect his or her own interests when selecting or using a product or service; or (C) The consumer’s reliance on a covered person [the financial services provider].  The NCLC white paper came to the simple conclusion that due to the inherent nature of overdrafts they were abusive.  NCLC wrote, “When choosing a bank or type of account, consumers cannot be expected to be able to know or compare how banks process transactions or what steps the bank will do to induce overdrafts.  The way in which transactions are processed by a bank is a complicated matter that consumers cannot reasonably understand.  Again, banks take advantage of the consumer’s reliance that the bank will not engage in activities to deliberately trip them into incurring overdrafts and being charged overdraft fees.”  Why does the empowering of the CFPB to make arbitrary and capricious “abusive” findings remind this correspondent of the in loco parentis “ability to repay” determination in other Dodd-Frank Act-mandated CFPB rules?  Apparently the ideologically questionable behavioral economists at the CFPB will know “abusive” when they see it.  Do the CFPB behavioral economists have any respect for individual rights – like the right to make one’s own decisions even if mistaken?

I think that the answer to that question is "No." Or, perhaps, "Hell, No!"

None of this should come as a surprise. Liz Warren's purpose in birthing the idea for the CFPB was to create a powerful independent federal agency, free from most oversight and any chance of "regulatory capture," to decide whether consumer financial products and services were "safe" for consumers. In other words, the basis for the CFPB is a belief in the use of the Nanny State to protect the proles from themselves because the state knows what's best for them even when they don't. Behavioral economic theory is the bedrock on which this house of cards is built. Moreover, the CFPB has been manipulating statistics in its war on overdraft fees for some time.

Get used to it, folks, because barring a "counter revolution," this is only the beginning.

You Have Nothing To Lose But Your Chains

The latest edition of Ballard Spahr's "CFPB Monitor" starts off with an article by Barbara Mishkin about how CFPB employees have voted to unionize. Apparently, getting starting salaries of $173,000, plus tuition for courses in basic banking law, are not enough for the employees of the most powerful, poorly regulated federal government agency created since Joe Stalin went to (not) meet his (nonexistent) maker. No, their backsides are severely chapped over heinous office accommodations. It seems that the CFPB is in the process of renovating its Intergalactic Headquarters, aka, "The Death Star," and while that renovation is taking place, the "proles" are being asked to place their posteriors in...<gasp>...Dilbert-like "open space." Their current office space is sufficiently annoying, since more than one person has to share a private office, but cubicles???? Them's fightin' words, Pilgrims!

One "source" claimed that CFPB employees are worried about noise levels. Heck, they carry a pretty big stick, so why don't they learn to talk (and walk) softly?

Look, I understand that when you're threatening to lock and load on some beat-down community bank that issued a disclosure statement that said "may" instead of "will," and, therefore, was massively "deceptive," or you're telling an auto loan lender that if a dealer from which it buys paper ever causes emotional pain to a buyer's pet parakeet, the lender is on the hook for the vet's bill, you would be sensitive about cross-talk. Obviously, you need to keep the brow beating appropriately segmented. I mean, look what happened when Bugs Moran encroached on Al Capione's space. It wasn't pretty, and those guys were mere amateurs when it comes to wielding a Tommy Gun.

Now that the CFPB employees are represented by a union, though, I'm certain that office space is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to workers' demands.

The union’s president is reported as having said that, in addition to workspace concerns, CFPB employees are concerned about travel policies and benefits, work schedules, reviews, promotions and alternative work schedules.  The report describes CFPB staffers as having “grown frustrated in recent months after putting in grueling hours as they raced to meet statutory deadlines” under Dodd-Frank.

I can imagine that working until 5:30 and even 6:00 pm can be wearisome if you have to do it day-after-day-after-day-my-god-will-this-never-freakin'-end!It wwould be suicide-induing if you had to grind it out in open space.

In the words of the last person to make the absolute best use of every second of every working day (and, especially, of every night) he spent in D.C, once intoned, "I feel your pain."

There Ain't No "There," There

Last week, an article by Andy Peters in the American Banker hit a nerve. It profiled a California bank that had tried to make small dollar loans work as an alternative to payday lending, but had decided to give up the effort.

One PacificCoast Bank in Oakland, Calif., is regrouping as it looks to battle payday lenders in the San Francisco Bay area.

The $282 million-asset thrift recently pulled the plug on its One Pac Pal loan, which it tailored to offer low-income clients short-term credit at reasonable rates and terms. The program, which began 18 months earlier, lost too much money, says Kat Taylor, One PacificCoast's chief executive.

"We have not yet found an economically sustainable product that's sufficient to save enough people" from payday lenders, she says.

I hate to say "I told you so," but...Oh, who am I kidding. I TOLD YOU SO!From August 1, 2007:

In June, when the FDIC issued its final Affordable Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair was pressing commercial banks to compete with payday lenders for the "Mini Me" loan biz, even banks in states like North Carolina, which kicked out the bottom feeders, were rolling their eyeballs in disdain at the prospect of rushing in to fill the breach. Among other problems, the Guidelines "encourage" banks to cap the APR at 36 percent.

[...]

The North Carolina banks banks profiled in the linked article didn't believe that there was enough bang for the buck to justify dipping their toes in the shallow water. Even the lone credit union that offered a payday loan-like product wasn't making any money on it because it was barred by state law from charging more than an 18% APR and it was actually requiring the loan to be paid back in 90 days. If it had only rolled the loan over (and over and over) and neglected to comply with the usury laws, it might, like Madonna, have been able to "get into the groove" and make some real payday lender-like money.

Lyndsey Medsker, spokesperson for the Community Financial Services Association of America, which, according to another article, represents about 60 percent of the payday loan industry, said the 36% annual percentage rate cap was a non-starter for commercial banks.

"There's an effort to cap loans at 36 percent annual rate, which the FDIC guidelines suggest. How that works into two- week loans is $1.38 per $100," she says. "I know payday lenders can't make money on that, so banks couldn't possibly either."

Mr. Peters' latest article also quotes a consultant as correctly noting that at the same time these loans pose a high risk of nonpayment, they bear a high regulatory compliance risk and, because credit scores must be thrown out the window (or reliance on them reduced), a high underwriting risk. Peters also notes that the FDIC ended its small dollar loan pilot program in 2009 because banks couldn't make a return sufficient to cover the risk.

One PacificCoast bank's experience is in line with the consistent experience of other FDIC-insured banks who've tried to beat payday lenders at their own game over the past six years. Basic business principles don't change. However, they've never ceased to be ignored in the service of an ideological agenda, one which holds that payday loans are evil because they have high fees that "trap" poor people in a never-ending spiral of debt, people who are too stupid and/or unsophisticated and/or desperate to think for themselves, and who must be protected from their inherent deficiencies by those who know better. Guys like Recess Richie and the Payday Slayers.

It's obvious that trying to use traditional banks as payday lending alternatives is not going to work. Unless, of course, you let them earn the same return that payday lenders earn.Which kind of thwarts the "higher purpose," doesn't it?

That's right Liz, reality bites.

Camden Fine Fires Off A Fine Salvo

In  recent opinion piece for Bloomberg News, ICBA CEO Camden Fine was in fine fettle, ranting about his favorite topic: new regulatory burdens are strangling community while the largest banks are doing just fine, thank you very much. Among his salient points are the following:

The megabanks are benefiting from what Bloomberg View calculated is an $83 billion annual taxpayer subsidy, the value of implicit guarantees by the U.S. Treasury. Bloomberg View was correct to characterize the too-big-to-fail subsidy as “a major driver of the largest banks’ profits.”

Perversely, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. data show that large banks have both the lowest credit quality and the lowest cost of funds in the industry. Community banks rank the highest in both categories even though they have had to compete for years against the megabanks’ access to cheaper money in pricing loans. In addition, community banks must compete against the big lenders’ lower comparative costs in handling regulatory paperwork.

While Cam complains that this is "morally wrong," I suspect that in a nation overrun with Pontius Pilates who sneer in the throes of their born-again relativism "What is 'truth'?," appealing to "morality" as a behavior influencer will have as much impact on Congress as a stern talking to by Pope Francis would have on Charlie Sheen. More effective on the morally challenged is likely to be his economic arguments.

Community banks should be putting their capital to work in the small towns, rural communities and middle-class urban enclaves they know well. Instead, they are focusing too many of their precious human resources on onerous paperwork and time-consuming compliance measures.

Community banks are the source of almost 60 percent of all small-business loans of less than $1 million, as well as mortgage and consumer loans tailored to the needs of their local communities. Large banking organizations with more than $50 billion in assets hold almost 40 percent of outstanding small loans to businesses, according to the Federal Reserve, but loans to small businesses aren’t a significant portion of large-bank lending. Small-business loans represent less than 5 percent of the large banks’ total domestic lending.

Cam outlines five specific steps Congress and the federal regulators could take to help community banks (and credit unions, for that matter, although Cam would choke on his own tongue before admitting it). They include:

• Easing up on some of the more onerous residential mortgage lending and servicing rules.
• Eliminating the requirement that community banks report on every new small business loan application.
• Requiring a cost-benefit analysis for all new regulations and prohibiting the issuance of any regulation where the cost exceeds the benefit.
• Raising the threshold to $350 million in assets for the requirement for an audit of a bank's internal controls.
• Eliminating the annual requirement for sending no-change privacy policies.

These are all helpful suggestions, but  I'm frankly surprised that he didn't also call for the carpet bombing of CFPB's D.C. headquarters and insist that Jamie Dimon's king-size bed be short-sheeted. Oh well, the year is not even half over. There's still time to get down to the really important stuff.

Charlie Munger: A Favorite Curmudgeon

Warren Buffet's long-time running buddy, Charlie Munger, agrees with Cam Fine about one thing: it's time to break up (or at least "simplify") the big banks.

In an interview with CNN at Berkshire Hathaway's annual meeting, Munger, who is Warren Buffett's chief lieutenant, said he thinks the big banks are still too complicated and dangerous for the economy. But he doesn't think a recently proposed bill by Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter, which has gotten praise from others who want to rein in big banks, is the answer.

"I think if you increase the capital requirements and let them do what they want, they will just get in trouble again," says Munger.

Munger's preferred prescription sounds like a stricter version of the Volcker Rule, which was meant to limit risky trading at the banks and was included in Dodd-Frank, but has yet to be implemented. He would force the banks to get out of their business of underwriting and trading derivatives, financial contracts that allow you to speculate, some say hedge, on commodities, interest rates, and other things. About a year ago, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) announced it had lost billions on a credit derivative hedge that had not worked out as expected.

As CNN reporter Stephen Gandel notes, Munger's words carry additional weight, because he's calling for action against banks like Wells Fargo and Bank of America, institutions in which Berkshire Hathaway has sizable investments.

Munger thinks that big banks should be more heavily regulated, and that more regulation will be just what the profit doctor ordered. "By getting out of risky businesses, banks may end up giving back much less of their bull market gains in the down years" He thinks that banks should stick to their knitting, lending. "The ideal bank is pretty boring." I agree.

Gandel thinks that if Munger actually believes that more regulation and smaller size lead to greater profits, then he has a fiduciary duty to Berkshire's shareholders to press banks like Bank of America to pare down their size and accept tighter regulation (instead of unleashing the lobbyists on Congress).Munger thinks that's the job of the regulators. I'd argue it's the role of Congress, but I'd also agree with Munger that Berkshire Hathaway isn't going to persuade Bank of America to accept being broken up or buried under an avalanche of more regulation.

Munger said he and Buffett make investment decisions based on the world they are in, not what they wished it to be, which is fair.

Like Buffet, Munger has always pretty much said what he thinks. As he ages, he's not becoming any less candid. It makes for an interesting interview.

The OCC Takes A Body Shot

Housing Wire's Jacob Gaffney was kind enough to turn readers on to a recent snark-fest by John Stewart, in which he turned the heat up on both MERS and the OCC. It's a rare day when you have an audience howling over financial esoteria. For those, like yours truly, who missed this segment, enjoy!

The Daily Show with Jon Stewart	Mon - Thurs 11p / 10c
Residential Evil
www.thedailyshow.com
Daily Show Full Episodes Indecision Political Humor The Daily Show on Facebook

The CU-Bank War Is Getting Ugly

Crying "The Time Is Right To Tax," commercial bankers are upping the thermostat on state and federal regulators to "level the playing field" by eliminating the tax exempt status of credit unions. According to the ABA Banking Journal, in a recent panel discussion at the American Bankers Association's 2013 Government Relations Summit, bankers of all stripes, including a CEO of a bank that was once a credit union, took the position that in this time when Congress and just about every state legislature is looking for ways to raise revenues without raising tax rates, the opportunity exists to convince legislators that tax exempt status for the credit union industry is an idea whose time has passed.

Panel member Ken Kies, managing director of the Federal Policy Group lobbying consultancy, spent years in Washington tax-writing roles, and believes banks could pursue a change.

"Frankly," said Kies, who's working with ABA, "I'm not sure that the environment has ever been better than it is today."

Kies indicated that no one should think that "not taxed" means "never to be taxed." History has not only seen many attempts to subject tax-exempt organizations to federal tax, but success in those attempts. Today's congressional urge towards tax reform, even on a revenue-neutral basis, could be the factor that pushes credit union taxation into reality.

In 1986, tax legislation pulled Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations under the tax umbrella, reflected Kies. And a year later, the TIAA/CREF benefits organization likewise got shifted. And savings institutions lost their tax-favored status decades ago, and remain a viable part of the financial services business.

Mr. Kies also mentions the fact that there's a trillion dollar federal deficit that makes this the best time to press the case. However, he does not mention by how much that deficit would be reduced by taxing credit unions, which ought to show up somewhere in the argument if it's to survive counter attacks. 

Meanwhile, In Illinois, the hate-fest between banks and credit unions rages on.

Linda Koch, CEO of the Illinois Bankers Association, wrote an op-ed piece for The State-Journal Register in that state's capitol city, in which she sang the same tune as the ABA panelists.

She took the additional step of citing the CBO to the effect that CU tax exemption costs the federal government $2 billion a year in "lost revenue" and the state of Illinois $25 million. I don 't know what the state of Illinois's budget deficit is, but I do know that $2 billion in additional tax revenue is a drop from an eye dropper in a Pacific ocean of federal spending that, according to the Heritage Foundation, reached $3.6 trillion in 2012 and is expected to reach $5.5 trillion by 2022. To me, contributing such relatively small amounts to the black hole of government spending is an argument that lacks weight. I'd prefer that banks stick to the fact that if credit unions want to be "more like banks" (in other words, make commercial loans), they can pay the same freight that goes with that business model, including income taxes. You want to waddle, quack, and fly like a duck, but be pampered like a golden goose. Sorry, leveling the playing field on the powers side ought to come with a leveling of the playing field on the taxation side. Otherwise, you really are gaining an unfair competitive advantage.

The CEO of the Illinois Credit Union League, Dan Plauda, responded to Ms. Koch with the argument that tax revenues from credit unions in Illinois won't solve Illinois' revenue shortfalls. That's most likely very true. However, he also alleges that taxing credit unions will hurt their members, who rely on deposit rates that are much higher than banks pay and consumer loan rates that are much lower than those charged by banks. To me, that makes the banks' case, that tax exemption gives credit unions an unfair competitive advantage on the same deposits and loans that banks fight for. It seems to weaken the case for credit unions to intrude further into the commercial banks' sacred ground of commercial lending.

Mr. Plauda talks about how credit unions are member owned, "democratically controlled," and manned by volunteers. He also alleges that all "excess revenues" are plowed back into the credit union. By "excess revenues, he means what would otherwise be deemed "profits." I started out my career as a bank lawyer in-house for a large mutual savings bank. The only practical difference between a stock-owned commercial bank and a member-owned mutual is that, by soliciting proxies from members who don't give a rip about anything other than services and rates, management of a mutual is, in many cases, able to "rest easy" from all those pesky shareholders who demand the distribution of "profits" either in the form of higher stock prices, dividends, or both. At the same time, there's not exactly a lot of oversight on salaries and cash bonuses that are deducted from gross revenues before the "excess revenues" are calculated.

Mr. Plauda finished his piece with a flourish.

This “people helping people” approach to financial services helps explain why credit unions have become so popular in recent years. As new bank fees have proliferated, for instance, Americans have moved to credit unions in droves. Last year alone, credit unions nationwide added more than 2 million net new members — the biggest annual net member growth in 15 years.

Today, more than 96 million people belong to credit unions.

If anyone seriously thinks that folks flocked to credit unions because credit union members feel like they are part of a movement of "people helping people," as opposed to the financial incentives of lower loan rates and higher deposit rates, both possible because of CU's tax exempt status, that person needs a reality transplant. It just seems to me that responding to banks' call for the end of credit union tax exempt status by taunting banks with the line "we're stealing your customers by the boxcar-load" is going to make even the densest legislator wake up and smell the coffee, eventually.

Both sides of this debate need to sharpen their arguments. If they're able to do so, that is.

Thanks to a loyal reader from Illinois for links to the Illinois op-ed pieces

A Bad Idea That Refuses To Die

Even though municipalities like San Bernardino have come to their senses and dropped a make-your-investment-banker-rich-quick scheme to seize underwater mortgages from mortgage lenders and wrote down the principal balances, the scheme refuses to completely die. I guess we'll have to use holy water, garlic, mirrors, fire, crucifixes and wooden stakes to stamp it out. In the interim, SIFMA continues to publicly pummel it.

In a recent post on its Pennsylvania + Wall blog, SIFMA's Timothy Cameron reiterates why those municipalities still considering this likely unconstitutional scheme to abandon it.

The proposals being touted target a very narrow slice of homeowners – those that are in private-label MBS and who are current on their existing mortgages, have good credit, and ideally don’t have existing home equity loans or other liens on the property. Those who are behind on their mortgage payments or have poor credit (which is the vast majority of homeowners needing help) will get no relief.

Within the small pool of qualifying homeowners, the proposal, on its face, will substantially undervalue their homes. In one example, the mortgage that investors would get paid $160,000 for is refinanced shortly thereafter for $190,000, with much of the additional $30,000 going to the plan’s backers after costs and a kickback to the municipality are accounted for. This is not fair compensation, since the amount paid is well below the face value of the taken note, and significant profits accrue to private parties.

In addition to the legal issues, the use of eminent domain will also be immensely destructive to U.S. mortgage markets in general and to specific communities using eminent domain, in particular. If the sanctity of the contractual relationship between a borrower and a creditor is undermined by the use of eminent domain, both lenders and investors will be reluctant to provide funding in the future. The result will be a significant contraction of credit availability, particularly in communities that have exercised eminent domain to seize loans. It will be much harder to get a loan: any loans that are granted will likely require much larger down payments, stronger credit scores and higher interest rates to compensate for this new and unprecedented risk. This contraction of credit availability would likely serve to halt any recovery in the municipality’s housing market, and could further depress housing values in the cities using eminent domain.

The last reason may be the most telling. Good luck with the future availability of affordable residential mortgage credit in your soon-to-be dustbowl of a community if you enact this scheme. The investment fund gets wealthy, of course, which is the impetus for this half-baked plan. All to help, but not so much, a narrow slice of the community.

Bad ideas never die. They never seem to fade away, either, unfortunately.

Florida Continues To Pummel Stern

Nearly two years ago, we noted that the Florida Bar had filed a complaint against former Florida Foreclosure King David J. Stern over alleged ethical lapses related to the meltdown of his foreclosure mill firm in the wake of a robosigning scandal. The wheels of justice grind exceedingly slowly (at least, they do in The Sunshine State), but last week, the Bar filed another whopper against Stern.

It took two years, but the Florida Bar has finally dropped a doozey of a complaint against former foreclosure king David J. Stern.

The 80-page complaint includes 17 counts or charges that Stern violated the Bar’s rules of professional conduct. The Bar alleges that Stern failed to properly supervise lawyers and non-lawyers at his firm and failed to halt regular violations of Bar rules.

The article summarizes the allegations made in the long complaint. Most have them appear to have been made public previously.

According to the newspaper, neither Stern nor his attorneys could be reached for comment (although another article states that Stern's lawyer, Jeffrey Tew, "told the newspaper Thursday that Stern has done nothing to warrant discipline"). Unfortunately for Stern, a former nemesis was ready and willing to pipe up with an opinion.

Former assistant state attorney general Theresa Edwards, who investigated Stern several years ago before being fired by the AG's office, said she thinks the bar should have acted sooner. (Contacted by the newspaper, the Bar declined, through a spokeswoman, to comment.)

"Considering the amount of money he's made, his bar license will be of little concern to him," said Edwards, who is now in private practice.

Biting off more than you can chew, then trying to gulp it down by cutting corners, appears, in retrospect, to have been a bad business plan. Then again, perhaps Ms. Edwards is correct. Perhaps he's made so much money that he won't care what the state does with his law license.

We'll see. At this rate, it may be another two years before this plays out. By that time, only crackpot bloggers may even remember who Stern was.

Scapegoating 101

The 20/20 hindsight afforded members of Congress when judging the alleged failures of the independent foreclosure reviews that we discussed last night also graces the peepers of the Government Accountability Office.

The independent foreclosure reviews abruptly ended by regulators in January failed from a lack of objectivity, oversight and consistency in the loan sampling process, said Lawrance Evans, director of financial markets and community investment for the Government Accountability Office.

[...]

Despite having a large portion of the funds already in the mail to homeowners, Evans says GAO’s probe into how the IFR was handled is far from complete.

He told lawmakers GAO plans to conduct more studies on how regulators came up with the $8.5 billion settlement figure when there is no data to show how that number was chosen or exact calculations on how many homeowners were, in fact, harmed by foreclosures.

He pointed out that "regulators’ statistical sampling approach did not include mechanisms to allow the regulators to monitor consultants’ progress toward finding as many harmed borrowers as possible."

Without data on how many borrowers were actually harmed, the GAO representative says his office wants answers on how the compensation figures were determined by the OCC and Federal Reserve.

In other words, the beat(ing) will go on.

And On.

And on.

While that's going on, the regulators are going all passive-aggressive by asking Congress to clarify that the regulators have the power to take enforcement action directly against independent contractors for banks. Because, you know, if the regulators require banks, as part of related enforcement orders, to hire independent consultants to perform very expensive services in order to comply with the enforcement orders, and the lack of clear, or even consistent, instructions on what the criteria and processes should be to perform those services leads to later criticism of the regulators over those services, well, then, regulators must be able to blame somebody, and looking in the mirror is simply out of the question (vampires cannot see their own reflections). Thus, the regulators must be able to blame the independent contractors and pursue them via enforcement processes that give the regulators a leg up on the object of their (lack of ) affection. Just like banks.

The independent contractors are reacting badly to the regulators' reaction (paid subscription required).

"I'm not sure having the regulators regulate consultants would make them more independent," said Jon Winick, president of bank advisory firm Clark Street Capital. "A better idea is to have the regulators hire the consultant then."

That would be a good alternative, except then the regulators would be responsible for the consultants' performance (or lack thereof), and we can't have that. They must be able to blame either the banks, the consultants, or both. That's not possible if the regulators are in a position to bear any responsibility.

"To me, the whole thing about the consultants is just more scapegoating," said Walter Moeling 4th, a partner at the Bryan Cave law office.

Man, I'm glad I'm not as cynical as Walt. Personally, I think this is all just a legitimate disagreement among well-intentioned people who are not worried about covering their own backsides, deflecting blame, or promoting themselves at the expense of others, but only about trying to "do the right thing."