Bank Lawyer's Blog

Fourth Corner Painted Into A Corner

This past week, a federal district court judge in Colorado slapped down, hard, Fourth Corner Credit Union. In the process, the judge was equally hard on the federal government that has done a half-baked job in dealing with the problem of state-legal marijuana businesses inability to to obtain access to the nation's financial system because their activities largely remain illegal under federal criminal laws.

As regular readers may recall, Fourth Corner Credit Union is a state-chartered credit union in Colorado that was formed in 2014 by (in the lofty rhetoric of the credit union's attorneys) "ten courageous citizens" to provided banking services to the "compliant, licensed cannabis and hemp businesses and to thousands of persons, businesses and organizations that supported the legalization of marijuana." In order to effectively operate, however, Fourth Corner needed a "master account" from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The FRB-KC turned down Fourth Corner's application for such an account on several the grounds, including that federal law preempts state law and that the FRB KC won't grant a master account to a financial institution that is engaged in the facilitation of illegal activities (like the laundering of the proceeds illegal drug sales). Fourth Corner sued for a mandatory injunction by the court that would compel the FRB KC to grant the master account. The district court denied the motion, dismissed (with prejudice) the credit union's complaint, and awarded the FRB KC its reasonable costs.

That had to hurt.

Although the court declared that it did not need to reach the issue of federal preemption, it observed in a footnote that "[i]t is clear, however, that Congress has the power to prohibit cultivation, distribution and use of marijuana notwithstanding compliance with state law." In other words, even though I didn't have to decide the issue, if I had, I would have upheld federal preemption of state law.

That blasted the "Supremacy Clause" of the US Constitution (Article VI, Paragraph 2)! It's so inconvenient.

In the course of its opinion, the judge blistered the backsides of federal regulators, with special emphasis on FinCEN and the US Justice Department for their "guidance" on this issue. Fourth Corner alleged that such guidance provided federal "authorization" to serve marijuana-related businesses ("MRBs"). The judge didn't buy it (anymore than I did).

The problem is, the FinCEN guidance and Cole memorandum do nothing of the sort. On the contrary, the Cole memorandum emphatically reiterates that the manufacture and distribution of marijuana violates the Controlled Substances Act, and that the Department of Justice is committed to enforcement of that Act. It directs federal prosecutors to apply certain priorities in making enforcement decisions, but it does not change the law. The FinCEN guidance acknowledges that financial transactions involving MRBs generally involve funds derived from illegal activity, and that banks must report such transactions as “suspicious activity.” It then, hypocritically in my view, simplifies the reporting requirements.

In short, these guidance documents simply suggest that prosecutors and bank regulators might “look the other way” if financial institutions don’t mind violating the law. A federal court cannot look the other way. I regard the situation as untenable and hope that it will soon be addressed and resolved by Congress."

Since next year is a presidential election year, "soon" is not likely to be prior to 2017. Until then, to repeat ourselves, any bank that serves marijuana related businesses "is playing with fire and not wearing an asbestos suit."

playing with fire and not wearing an asbestos suit. - See more at: http://www.banklawyersblog.com/3_bank_lawyers/2015/10/over-the-summer-while-i-was-downing-cold-beers-by-the-barrel-the-federal-reserve-bank-of-kansas-city-and-the-ncua-finally-ac.html#sthash.qKIhqoJx.dpuf

playing with fire and not wearing an asbestos suit. - See more at: http://www.banklawyersblog.com/3_bank_lawyers/2015/10/over-the-summer-while-i-was-downing-cold-beers-by-the-barrel-the-federal-reserve-bank-of-kansas-city-and-the-ncua-finally-ac.html#sthash.qKIhqoJx.dpuf

playing with fire and not wearing an asbestos suit. - See more at: http://www.banklawyersblog.com/3_bank_lawyers/2015/10/over-the-summer-while-i-was-downing-cold-beers-by-the-barrel-the-federal-reserve-bank-of-kansas-city-and-the-ncua-finally-ac.html#sthash.qKIhqoJx.dpuf

The Fed On MJ Banking: Nyet

Over the summer, while I was downing cold beers by the barrel rather than blogging, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and the NCUA finally acted on the applications of Fourth Corner Credit Union for, respectively, a "master account" for access to the Federal Reserve System and for insurance of share accounts. In both cases, the answer was not only "No," but "Hell, No!" Fourth Corner sued both the NCUA and the Fed. last week, the Fed filed a Motion to Dismiss Fourth Corner's complaint that ought to send a chill down the spine of every bank in Colorado, Washington, Oregon and Alaska that thinks it can "work around" the federal banking regulators on the Supremacy Clause when it comes to banking a state-legal, federal-illegal marijuana business.

In broad strokes, the Fed alleges that federal law, in this case the Controlled Substances act, trumps state law on marijuana use by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution. This should be "Hornbook Law" to any bank regulatory attorney. The manufacture, sale, and distribution of marijuana is prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. Therefore, "any affirmative action that Colorado has taken to facilitate the distribution of marijuana is preempted by federal law."

In the present case, Colorado attempted to grant TFCCU a charter that would, in effect, intentionally allow TFCCU to aid and abet violations of federal law by offering banking services to businesses engaged in the manufacture and/or distribution of marijuana. Such an act is preempted by federal law and is void and without effect...The Court would not aid other such attempts--such as if Colorado enacted a scheme to allow trade in endangered species or trade with north Korea in derogation of federal laws, and then chartered a credit union to handle finances for companies conducting such illegal trade...TFCCU is not an entity that can be recognized under federal law" and the credit union's complaint must be dismissed.

Beyond the "master account" and insurance of accounts applications at issue here, the Motion to Dismiss contains a broad condemnation for any existing financial institution--credit union or bank--that thinks that it is somehow safely avoiding federal criminal law prosecution and/or bank regulatory agency enforcement action because it follows the "FinCEN Guidance" issued in early 2014 that, in turn, followed the "Cole Memorandum" guidance provided to US Attorneys on prosecutorial discretion in the area state-legal marijuana businesses. The Fed contends that such "guidance" is not a protection from criminal prosecution (which the guidance itself states, if read carefully). Even if it affords such protection, the Fed makes clear that the Fed would not be bound by it.

The Fed also makes clear that it considers any financial institution that engages in providing financial services to a state-legal marijuana business to be engaging in aiding and abetting a criminal activity under federal law, and that federal law controls. Under that analysis, the Fed should, if it is consistent, take enforcement action against any Fed-member bank that is so engaged. I fail to see why the OCC, FDIC, or NCUA would take a contrary position.

An anonymous (naturally) critic from Dogpatch, U.S.A., attempted to leave a comment on the blog a few months ago that criticized my support of (the critic's phrase) "federal infallibility" regarding state marijuana laws. The poor soul apparently conflated "Papal Infallibility," a theological doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, with the constitutional principle of "Federal Supremacy. The issue at stake is not who is "right" or "wrong" regarding whether the manufacture and distribution of marijuana for recreational use should or should not be illegal, it is whose law prevails when state and federal law conflict on this matter. My view is that federal law prevails and that any financial institution (and its directors, officers, and employees) that "banks"  a state-legal marijuana business is running a serious risk of being hammered by different federal agencies for violating federal criminal laws.

If your credit union's or bank's business plan is "I feel lucky today," more power to you. I think that you're playing with fire and not wearing an asbestos suit.

Operation Choke Point Lawsuit: The Plaintiffs Are Still In The Game

While some pundits think that Operation Choke Point is a dead issue, as evidenced by the FDIC's recent guidance that claimed that they were only kidding when they labeled entire lines of business as "high risk," the folks at Ballard Spahr note that the lawsuit filed by the payday loan industry against the bank regulatory agencies continues to forge forward. On September 25, the federal judge hearing the case "rejected most of the arguments in the agencies’ motion to dismiss," allowing the lawsuit proceed.

The agencies first challenged plaintiffs’ standing to sue. While acknowledging that the denial of banking services establishes one necessary element of standing (an “injury in fact”), defendants argued that the plaintiffs do not satisfy the two remaining elements, namely causation, a link between the defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs’ injuries, and redressability, evidence that a favorable ruling will redress the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.

According to the defendants, the plaintiffs’ injuries resulted from independent decisions by their banks rather than the agencies’ guidance documents. Judge Kessler notes that the plaintiffs’ burden of eventually proving their “third party” causation theory−that the defendants’ conduct compelled the banks to deny them service−will be substantial. However, taking as true all of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations, as is required when deciding a motion to dismiss, she determined that the claims satisfy both the causation and redressability requirements.

The judge also found that the agencies' subsequent "guidance" that "urged" banks to take a risk-based approach on a client-by-client, rather than industry-by-industry basis, does not render the controversy "moot."

Although she agreed that the agencies’ subsequent pronouncements have largely superseded earlier Choke Point guidance, Judge Kessler rejected the defendants’ contention that this alone renders moot all of the plaintiffs’ claims. In particular, she notes that the plaintiffs claim they have been stigmatized and deprived of their ability to engage in a legally permitted business, all without constitutionally required notice and opportunity to be heard.

The judge dismissed claims based upon alleged violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, ruling that agency "guidance" is not final agency action. That is technically correct. However, as those of us who see the consequences of failing to follow agency "guidance," including the inclusion on examination reports of MRAs (matters requiring attention) for "violation" of "guidance," the way the agencies use guidance might be considered by a cynic as an end-around the APA. Luckily, I'm an optimist and would never suggest such a thing.

As I've previously assert, I think that the only thing that will ultimately drive a stake through the heart of Operation Choke Point will be a change in the White House in 2016. Until then, I hope that the plaintiffs continue to keep fighting the good fight.

Reality Check

While ideologues pontificating from ivory towers claim that community banks don't need regulatory relief, since they are doing just fine financially, boots on the ground tell a different story.

Community banks are drowning in a torrent of regulatory compliance costs, and Jack Barrett, president and CEO of First Citrus Bank, wants that to change.

Federal agencies that supervise financial institutions should focus on the largest institutions with the most complex transactions, Barrett wrote in a May 13 letter to Martin Gruenberg, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

Barrett claims that the FDIC devotes three-quarters of its supervisory efforts to community banks that hold 13% of the industry's assets, while devoting only one-quarter to the largest banks.

“How is it sound for a soundness regulator to direct three times the amount of supervisor resources to 13 percent ($2.1 trillion) of industry assets, while 87 percent, $13.2 trillion of exposure, garners a mere 1/4th of supervisory resources?” Barrett’s letter said.

However, it's not the misallocation of FDIC resources, but the cost to First Citrus of managing all that regulatory scrutiny, that causes Barrett the most heartburn.

In 2014, First Citrus incurred $412,000 in expenses related to regulation, compared to less then $25,000 spent each year prior to 2008. The biggest chunk of regulatory expenses last year — $189,000 — was for personnel, as First Citrus, like many other community banks, has had to beef up compliance staff.

Regulatory costs equated to 72 percent of the bank’s net income of $662,000 in 2014.

"If we are too small to save, do the regulatory agencies know we are also small enough to drown in torrential compliance costs?” the letter said.

Yes, they know it. They'll pay lip service to the problem, then get about the business of consolidating the banking industry on the Canadian model favored by some. A few huge banks, working hand-in-glove with the central government to redistribute credit to those who most "deserve" it.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

You may recall last year's pronouncement by the head of FinCEN, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, that 105 financial institutions were, thanks to the amazing guidance provided in February 2014 by FinCEN, servicing state-legal, federal-illegal marijuana businesses. Apparently, less than 10% of those are in Colorado, land of the free and home of the dazed, because according Colorado Rep. Jared Polis, only eight commercial banks and two credit unions in that state are banking the pot biz, and none of them want to be publicly named.

I assume that they don't want to happen to them what happened to publicity-challenged MBank out of Oregon. As recently related in published reports, that Oregon bank announced in January that it was open for (marijuana) business not only in Oregon, but in Colorado, and that it had the "tacit approval" of the FDIC to bank the unbankable. Within less than a week, because it was supposedly "overwhelmed" by the response from Colorado marijuana businesses, it pulled entirely out Colorful Colorado. Now, it's announced that it has pulled out of the entire marijuana business nationally, even in its home state of Oregon, apparently haven satisfied the munchies and gotten a good night's sleep. Like the Colorado exit, the industry-wide exit is supposedly due to the unexpected response of unbanked pot sellers and the bank's determination that "the bank is not big enough to provide and support all of the compliance components required."

It may be pure coincidence, but it appears that any time a bank is publicly "outed" as a banker to the stoned, the bank pulls out of the business. None of the 105 institutions cited by Ms. Calvery or the ten cited by Mr. Polis was named. Had they been, how many of them would have "pulled an MBank"? Most, if not all, is my guess.

Unlike banking payday lending, a perfectly legal business that the regulators are trying to eradicate, banking marijuana selling, a blatantly illegal business (under federal criminal laws), is just fine with the federal banking regulators as long as the bank flies under the radar screen. It's OK to service an illegal drug business as long as you (A) file the right kind of Cheech & Chong SAR or SARs, and (B) don't ever, ever, let anyone but the illegal business owners and bank officials know about it. Do you think that this state of affairs breeds cynicism and contempt for the rule of law? Me, too.

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell." It was bad policy for the US military and it's no better for the US banking business.

Changing of the Guard at DOJ

The recent confirmation of Loretta Lynch as the none-too-soon successor to the current Commissar Attorney General of the United States, engendered a lot of speculation about whether or not the exit of "Fast and Furious" Holder will also spell the end of Operation Choke Point. In a Senate hearing, Ms. Lynch was less than enlightening on this point.

In response to questions by Senator Mark Lee, a Chock Point critic, she sounded positively tepid.

Lynch told the senator that should she be confirmed, she would work with him to ensure that law-abiding Americans aren’t targeted by the initiative.

“I look forward to hearing your concerns and working with you on them,” she said.

Let's hope that when she uses the term "working with you" she doesn't really mean "working you over." Time will tell.

On another issue, however, she differs markedly from her boss, the Department of Justice, and FinCEN, which have been falling all over themselves to aid the heirs to Cheech and Chong to light up their bongs. Unlike Barack, Loretta loathes the demon weed.

A federal prosecutor in New York, Ms. Lynch told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary she disagreed with the president’s no-big-deal take on pot, saying, “I certainly don’t hold that view and don’t agree with that view of marijuana as a substance.”

“I think the president was speaking from his personal experience and personal opinion, neither of which I’m able to share,” Ms. Lynch said. “But I can tell you that not only do I not support the legalization of marijuana, it is not the position of the Department of Justice currently to support the legalization. Nor would it be the position should I become confirmed as attorney general.”

A stated opposition to "legalizing" marijuana could be read as merely opposing legalization at the federal level. In addition, personally opposing legalization, even at the state level, does not necessarily translate into abandoning the current position of the DOJ as embodied in the "Cole Memorandum" and its spawn at the DOJ and FinCEN. That position appears to be that as long as a state legal marijuana business doesn't run afoul of eight listed activities which the DOJ thinks are "really, really bad" (as opposed to being merely "really bad"), then federal law enforcement will look away. In the case of banks that service such "legal/illegal" businesses, as long as they file special super secret SARs and perform initial and ongoing due diligence with a level of detail that would confound the NSA, the Feds will cut them a break, as well.

 

Pot's proponents claim that we should not take Ms. Lynch seriously. They note that she was testifying before a committee chaired by the marijuana-repulsed Chuck Grassley. I guess their point might be that she was "spinning" (i.e., committing perjury).

 

Assuming, however, that she was actually delivering her honest opinion to Senator Grassley, I think that Ms. Lynch's arrival on the scene may bode ill for the "three monkeys approach" to the future enforcement of federal drug laws against businesses that are engaged in state-legal-federal-illegal marijuana businesses. "Looking the other way" might prove to be a thing of the past for the DOJ, even before a Republican AG takes office in 2017 (should a Republican win the White House in 2016).

 

Moreover, the rogue banks in Colorado, Oregon, and elsewhere, who, in banking marijuana businesses, have been operating under the "don't-ask-don't-tell" benevolence of the FDIC and other federal banking regulators who take their cues from the head of the Executive branch (although they would deny that allegation until the end of time), may find that the examiners who have been giving them "tacit approval" to bank marijuana businesses as long as they don't make that fact public, are suddenly attacked by fits of rectitude and begin to take federal drug trafficking laws seriously again. If that happens, good luck with holding the agencies to their "tacit" approval.

Luetkemeyer Resumes Choking Choke Point

God bless his Middle American heart (paid subscription required): Missouri Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer "reintroduced legislation Thursday that would block regulators from ordering banks to end relationships with customers without cause, in response to" Operation Choke Point. Readers likely recall Rep. Luetkemeyer's introduction of the same bill last year which, because of Democratic control of the Senate, went nowhere. I suppose that he's encouraged by both the Republican takeover of the Senate and the FDIC's recent retreat (on paper, at any rate) from its hand-holding with the US Department of Justice in jointly bar-arming the windpipes of "disfavored" businesses so that they could not breathe in the rarefied air of the US banking system.

"I am reintroducing the Financial Institution Customer Protection Act because this legislation needs to be codified into law so that other agencies don't ever fall into this illegal and abusive practice," Luetkemeyer said in a press release.

The bill would forbid financial agencies from pressuring banks to cancel accounts unless there is a "material" reason and would mandate a formal rule defining reputational risk. The bill would also tweak language under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, narrowing violations covered under the law from those "affecting" financial institutions to those "by" or "against."

That last "tweak" would hinder the Justice Department's use of Section 951 of FIRREA to go on fishing expeditions against banks and businesses on the basis of investigation certain fraudulent or concealed actions that allegedly pose an ill-defined "reputational risk" to banks (and that, thereby, "affect" them), as opposed to actually being directed "against" the bank or undertaken "by" the bank itself. The DOJ was using the lower standard of Section 951 to pursue civil remedies (civil money penalties) rather than the higher standard to prove criminal wrongdoing, as a way to squeeze banks and the nefarious payday lending, gun-dealing, porno-purveying, online-hooking-up businesses they serviced to stop doing business together.

Even if the bill makes it through both the House and the Senate (where it will receive the gentle ministrations of War Chief Warren), you have to wonder whether the Perpetual Campaigner in the White House will veto it, and, if he does, whether the Senate has enough votes to override that veto. I'm skeptical.

Nevertheless, with Eric Holder slipping out the DOJ's back door, keeping the pressure on the DOJ (and the federal bank regulators) may bear additional fruit, if not this year, then in the next few years.

More Depth On Legal Issues Surrounding Marijuana Banking

University of Alabama Law Professor Julie Anderson Hill has posted a draft of a work-in-progress, an article for an upcoming Case Western Law Review Symposium Issue, entitled "Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism." In it, she explores the legal issues surrounding banks providing banking services to state-legal marijuana-related businesses in more depth than you'll see on the pages of this rag. While it requires some polishing (including the addition of a specific discussion of Fourth Corner, the Colorado cannabis co-op, in a section in the later portion of the article that she discusses in passing earlier in the article), I found it to be a valuable addition to the analysis of the risks to banks that want to provide services to such businesses.

Here's a portion of the "abstract" of the article provided by Professor Hill, which summarizes her approach and conclusions:

This article explores the root of the marijuana banking problem as well as possible solutions. It explains that although the United States has a dual banking system comprised of both federal- and state-chartered institutions, when it comes to marijuana banking, federal regulation is pervasive and controlling. Marijuana banking access cannot be solved by the states acting alone for two reasons. First, marijuana is illegal under federal law. Second, federal law enforcement and federal financial regulators have significant power to punish institutions that do not com-ply with federal law. Unless Congress acts to remove one or both of these barriers, most financial institutions will not provide services to the marijuana industry. But marijuana banking requires more than just Congressional action. It requires that federal financial regulators set clear and achievable due diligence requirements for institutions with marijuana business customers. As long as financial institutions risk federal punishment for any marijuana business customer’s misstep, institutions will not provide marijuana banking.

Among the many fascinating (to a nerd like me, at any rate) observations made by Professor Hill was the following potential problem with the Federal Reserve approving Fourth Corner's access to the federal reserve payments system:

If the Federal Reserve provided payment services to a cannabis credit co-op, the Federal Reserve and its employees would be engaging in money laundering. They might also be conspiring to manufacture and distribute marijuana, aiding and abetting the manufacture and distribution of marijuana, and acting as accessories after the fact for the manufacture and distribution of marijuana. 

As long as they don't process payments for payday lenders, online dating services, or Smith & Wesson, they should be safe from prosecution under the "prosecutorial discretion" mantra chanted by the present executive branch monks until the current administration vacates the White House. The problem with that approach is that the statutes of limitation will not have expired by the time new Attorney General Ted Cruz decides to wage a little MJ jihad on every Justice Department and federal bank regulatory agency official who looked the other way when some bankers in Colorado or Washington lit up a fat boy and followed the money.

I also agree with her conclusion that, while action by the U.S. Congress is necessary, it's not enough. A change in attitude by federal bank regulators will also be required, whether of not we get a federal legislative fix. If due diligence requirements make it too risky and expensive to bank these businesses, then marijuana businesses are going to find themselves continuing to face problems that only a third-party payment processor or payday lender could truly appreciate.

Cheech and Chong Join The FDIC

There was some rather surprising news this week via the American Banker (paid subscription required) regarding banking: the FDIC is following FinCEN's lead in telling banks in Colorado (and elsewhere) to "smoke 'em if you've got 'em."

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. has quietly aligned itself with guidelines from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network that are meant to assuage bankers' fears about the burgeoning marijuana industry, American Banker has learned.

[...]

Back in February, when Fincen released its guidance, the FDIC declined to comment on the document. But on Monday, FDIC spokesman Greg Hernandez confirmed that the agency is currently using the Fincen guidance.

The FDIC's decision to use the guidance is significant because federal banking agencies had previously refused to say whether they'd align themselves with the document, which is part of a broader Obama administration push to foster state-level experiments with marijuana legalization.

[...]

During one recent bank examination, an FDIC official told the bank's directors that the agency is in alignment with Fincen's marijuana guidance, according to Lance Ott, a consultant to the bank who heard the discussion. At the same time, the FDIC employee made clear that the agency is neither encouraging nor discouraging banks from serving pot merchants, Ott said.

The FDIC official told the bank that marijuana is a higher-risk business because of its dependence on cash and the increased chance of robbery, but that pot businesses do not hold a reputational risk for banks in states such as Colorado and Washington that have legalized the drug, Ott recalled.

One commenter to that article put one ironic aspect of this recent news very well.

Lemme see if I understand this. Two federal agencies, the FDIC and FinCEN, are knocking themselves out to have banks provide services to pot businesses which are legal in only a handful of states, while being illegal under federal law. Yet the FDIC, until just recently, actively participated in overt (Operation Chokepoint) and still participates in covert efforts to pressure banks to discontinue providing services to so-called alternative financial service providers, such as check cashers, money remitters and payday advance companies, that are legal in most states and are registered (legal) with FinCEN as Money Service Businesses. Where is the logic??

Logic? You want logic? Silly boy!

At the same time that the FDIC is inhaling deeply, its counterpart in the credit union arena is apparently blowing cold.

A New Mexico credit union closed its marijuana business accounts after a negative reaction by a NCUA field examiner, according to Paul Stull, president/CEO of the Credit Union Association of New Mexico in Albuquerque.

“From what I was told, the field examiner's reaction was quite over the top,” said Stull, who declined to name the specific credit union involved in the alleged incident. “The examiner said there was no way this could be done legally.”

The credit union closed the accounts after an examiner threatened to issue a letter of understanding and agreement if it didn't do so, Stull said. To his knowledge, there are no credit unions currently offering banking services to New Mexico's licensed medical marijuana businesses.

I spoke with the chief compliance officer of a Colorado Fed-member state bank that a Federal Reserve examiner made comments to her bank to the effect "You know, other banks in Colorado are banking marijuana businesses," but when she tasked if that meant that the Fed was taking the position that as long as the bank complied with the FinCEN guidance, the Fed would not object, the examiner backed off and said that he didn't mean to imply that such activity was OK or not OK, but that each bank needed to make an individual risk decision. Whatever the hell that means.

In other words, the federal regulators are all over the board on this issue.

The head of the Washington Bankers Association spoke for all but a tiny minority of banks in both Colorado and Washington (and elsewhere).

James Pishue, president of the Washington Bankers Association, said that the vast majority of banks are still staying away from marijuana because the drug remains illegal under federal law. "There really needs to be a federal solution to this," he said.

Yes, here's the basic risk for a bank that knowingly provides banking services to a marijuana business: The...Bank...Is...Violating...Federal...Criminal...Laws. The bank has to depend on the forbearance of federal government regulators and prosecutors to continue to get away with that law-breaking activity. If that's how you want to roll, go for it. You'll look great in pinstripes once John Ashcroft's doppelganger takes over as Attorney General in January 2017.

On the other hand, you are going to need to smoke dope to comprehend the current regulatory landscape of banking dope.

The Rule of Lawlessness

Former FDIC Chairman Bill Isaac's recent rant opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal (paid subscription required) was a masterful smackdown of the current administration's handling of the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Basically, Isaac accuses the executive branch of acting illegally.

The FHFA as conservator is a fiduciary—or trustee—for the shareholders of Fannie and Freddie. Its job is to, as the law says, "conserve [the enterprises'] assets and property" for shareholders while Fannie and Freddie rebuild their capital base and eventually exit the conservatorship.

That's not what has happened. When presented with the once-unthinkable reality of Fannie and Freddie making enough money to retire the Treasury's senior preferred stock and build enough capital to meet their financial obligations without government assistance, the Obama administration moved in 2012 to confiscate all Fannie's and Freddie's profits and wind down the two mortgage giants. Investors in Fannie and Freddie have responded by suing in federal court.

The government is trying to deny the plaintiffs the right to discovery (sound familiar?) because, according to Isaac, it's afraid of what might be revealed.

This information could include emails and other documents demonstrating that the government's true intent was to seize current and future Fannie and Freddie profits for itself and leave shareholders with nothing. To justify its position against granting discovery to plaintiffs, the government argues that disclosure of current and future plans for the conservatorship could be "disruptive to the housing market and to the nation's economy." Almost laughably, the government also argues against disclosure because that could "create market perception that the Enterprises are not financially viable," and that "this would have a negative impact on sales of debt and mortgage-backed securities." Putting aside the circularity of these arguments, the real absurdity is that the government's own activities have deprived Fannie and Freddie of capital and kept them too weak to emerge from conservatorship. By taking all of the enterprises' profits, the government has left them undercapitalized and permanently unable to rebuild their capital.

Isaac asks an obvious, important question: what's does this hijacking mean for the future? His answer is sobering.

Given the government's dereliction in its duty to conserve value in Fannie and Freddie, an obvious question arises pertaining to any "reform" of housing lending proposed by the administration and enacted by Congress. If the administration plans to wind down Fannie and Freddie with no recourse for investors, or to nationalize them in creating a new federal housing entity, as a Senate housing reform bill would do, where will the capital come from to finance the new system? What investor would put capital into something so uncertain and so unprotected by law as Fannie and Freddie have proved to be?

There can be varied opinions over which reform is best for our country or what, if any, role Fannie and Freddie will have in a future housing market. But there should be no disagreement about the law. Capital follows the rule of law, and if investors can't count on that in the U.S. and in the housing markets, they will put their money elsewhere.

"Capital follows the rule of law" applies beyond Aunt Fannie and Uncle Freddie, as important as they may be to the housing market and the economy as a whole. It also applies to the entire banking business.

Those of us who've been representing banks for a number of years (October will mark my 40th year of wandering in that desert) can't recall a time, outside of the relatively brief episode surrounding the collapse of the savings and loan business in certain parts of the country, when the federal government has treated adherence to the rule of law with such elasticity. From the envelope-pushing "disparate impact" doctrine's foray into fair lending (and the use of every artifice to prevent the SCOTUS from having an opportunity to strike it down), to Operation Choke Point and its "informal" enforcement through "informal" regulatory examinations and supervisory pressure, to cases like those of Patrick Adams, whose David-vs.-Goliath struggle seems to serve no purpose other than sending a message that due process is a pipe dream if you fail to knuckle under to a brow beating, to the avalanche of regulations following the enactment of Franken-Dodd, I cannot recall a previous time when community bankers and credit union boards and management have had such a sense of anxiety that borders, in many cases, on despair.

I understand why capital would flow to the Too Big Too Fail. They get hit with a few hundred million here, a few billion there, and rarely miss a beat. They take a licking and keep on ticking. The Too Small To Save don't have that status, and they know it.

Perhaps it's cognitive dissonance. Perhaps its the blind hope that "this, too, shall pass." Perhaps it's simply the fact that "this is what I know how to do and it's all I know how to do, so I'm gonna keep on doin' it until they force me to stop." However, if you have options as to where your capital will flow, how long before you cash in your chips on the banking business and take it to a business where the regulators who can shut you down and/or sue you don't have to take remedial educational courses to learn the basics?

I'm not advocating a course of action, I'm merely asking a question.