Bank Lawyer's Blog

Paying For The Great Wall: Let The Banks Do It

Customarily, you'd have to work harder than El Chapo's Narc-Anon sponsor to find common ground between me and the Golfer-in-Chief on any issue, but leave it to The Candidate with the Cockatoo Do to move that Sisyphean boulder up the slope and on to level ground. For all of you who've been wondering like me (and most other Americans, as well as many Mexicans) how The Orange Man plans to get Mexico to pay for The Great Wall along the Rio, he's made it clear: American financial institutions will carry his heavy water.

Under the proposal detailed on Trump’s campaign website, the Republican would rely on a section of the Patriot Act to effectively force banks and money transfer companies to determine whether a person trying to send money abroad is a legal resident of the U.S.

That section of the law was written to crack down on terrorist financing and requires banks and other financial institutions to verify the identities of people opening accounts and doing business with them.

Trump has vowed on his first day in office, he would expand that requirement to include wire transfers and require that no foreign person living in the U.S. can send money outside the country without first proving their legal status.

The businessman predicts that Mexico will agree to pay for a border wall within a matter of days to keep money flowing over the border. 

The Trump campaign has also floated increasing visa fees, cancelling visas, and establishing trade tariffs against Mexico as ways to pay for a border wall, but cutting off remittances is the centerpiece of his plan. 

Usually, the words "centerpiece" and "Trump" are used to refer to the living blonde-furred creature he wears on his cranium, the one that sometimes rears back on its hind legs and bays at the moon, Megan Kelly, or any other thing or person who displeases the the former lead singer for Devo. In this case, it refers to banks and other financial institutions, as well as other money transmitters like Western Union, doing what all federal government agencies otherwise responsible for keeping the word "legal" in "legal immigration" have failed to do since the 1930s: ferret out who's here legally and who is here on the down-low.

Naturally, banks are doing back-flips in anticipation of the expense and liability of that job, not to mention the back-breaking prospect of adding a ton or two to the already crushing compliance burden it will entail.

But banks and other financial companies say they do not want to get involved on the front lines in a contentious immigration battle, arguing there are questions about how effectively such a policy could be implemented.

“It should not be for the banking system to be the police or the immigration task force,” said one banking lobbyist. “I don’t think it should be left to banks to report that someone has come in to remit money to whatever country, and it may or may not be legal. That’s not our role.”

[...]

Banks contend that they do not have a method of establishing the legal status of a person in the U.S. A person can open an account or send money abroad simply by showing an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number, which is given out by the government to people lacking a Social Security number, including people who are in the U.S. illegally.

The banking lobbyist said Trump’s proposal is not yet being taken seriously by the industry because it is still several steps away from even beginning to look like a reality.

I assume that same lobbyist a year ago scoffed at the notion that a bloviating clown prince like The Donald could ever beat a well-funded, well-connected, "heavyweight" like The Jebster for the Republican Party's presidential nomination. Underestimating this carnival barker is a common blind spot this election season. He's like a nightmare from which you can't wake up no matter how loudly you scream. Let's take him seriously, no matter how many knots that ties in your nether regions, and make sure that he understands that any banker, even those who live in Colorado and consume mass quantities of EdiPure Raspberry Jellies, who was thinking of holding their nose and voting for him are going to vote for the Wicked Witch of the Chappaqua, or otherwise "Go Green," "Libertarian," or even "Liberace," unless he drops this harebrained scheme to build The Great wall on the backs of America's banks. In fact, bankers could get some assistance in making this point from their MSB brethren, as The Change We Were Waiting For recently noted.

“The notion that we are going to track every Western Union bit of money that is being sent to Mexico, good luck with that,” Obama told reporters. 

I amaze myself when I say this, but "Right On, Mr. President."

As the linked article points out, there are so many ways to circumvent the money transmission barrier that Trump proposes that banks, despite the money and labor it would cost them, would be about as effective in stopping money flowing from Mexican illegal immigrants in the U.S back home to Mexico as the US Border Patrol is at keeping out undocumented immigrants in the first place. In other words, it wouldn't work.

Not that reality ever stopped a megalomaniac.

Rent Seeking "Reform"

In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. responds to a New York Times editorial that claimed that President Obama has been frustrated throughout his two terms by the "political dysfunction" caused by a recalcitrant Republican-led Congress. In his response, Jenkins touches upon a subject near and dear to community bankers and, not coincidentally, to the author of this rag sheet.

If Mr. Obama was “deeply frustrated,” the reason was the American people’s lack of support for his agenda. And what the Times calls his regulatory strategy would better be described as unbridled rent seeking.

That’s the term economists use for exercising government power to create private gains for political purposes. Consider:

Mr. Obama’s bank policy dramatically consolidated the banking industry, which the government routinely sues for billions of dollars, with the proceeds partly distributed to Democratic activist groups.

His consumer-finance agency manufactured fake evidence of racism against wholesale auto lenders in order to facilitate a billion-dollar shakedown.

His airline policy, urged by labor unions, led to a major-carrier oligopoly, with rising fares and profits.

His FDA is seeking to extinguish small e-cigarette makers for the benefit of Big Tobacco and Big Pharma (whose smoking-cessation franchise is threatened by cheap and relatively safe electronic cigarettes).

His National Labor Relations Board, by undermining the power of independent franchisees, is working to cartelize the fast-food industry for the benefit of organized labor.

We could go on. Mr. Obama’s own Council of Economic Advisers complains about the increasing cartelization of the U.S. economy—as if this were not a natural output of regulation. In a much-noted Harvard Business Review piece this spring, James Bessen, an economist, lawyer and software entrepreneur, cites increased “political rent seeking” to explain the puzzle of rising corporate profits in the absence of job creation and economic growth.

The truth is, government playing neutral arbiter over the private economy doesn’t produce rents. A stable and predictable regulatory system produces only mingy or non-existent rents.

Jenkins' allegation that "rent seeking" regulatory "reform" that has resulted in thousands of pages of new regulations that burden banks big and small, as well as pushing the envelope on "disparate impact" and other theories designed to squeeze blood and money out of banks through regulatory enforcement actions, is leading to the "caterlization" of the U.S. economy in general and the U.S. banking system in particular, strikes a chord in many ears It's not the only reason for the consolidation of the banking business, but it's one of them, and a not insignificant one.

As to the ideologues who deny any regulatory burden exists, or if does exist, isn't having a negative effect on community banks (based, I assume, upon Vladimr Lenin's assertion that "A lie told often enough becomes the truth"), the House Financial Services Committee recently published a raft of contrary opinions from the folks on the firing line. Read 'em and weep.

As to where the community banking business, and the country in general, are headed, I have to agree with the conclusion of the CEO of a Mid-Western community bank, communicated to me in an email this weekend: "This doesn't end well."

No, it doesn't. Unless, of course, you're a rent seeker.

No Light At The End Of The Tunnel

Investment banker (and former OTS official) C.K. Lee has been keeping his finger on the pulse of the financial institution capital markets for years, and when it comes to the future of de novo banks, the outlook, to him, looks grim. It's not just due to the hostile attitude of the FDIC, FRB and OCC (although Lee notes that hostility as a factor), it's because of the difficulty of raising capital.

“The barriers to entry are high, not just on the regulatory side but with raising capital.”

It's not the big banks that are having trouble, it's the little guys. The results of those troubles are stark.

The firm estimates it’s raised about $700 million in investment capital for banks in the last six or seven years. Two investment groups they’ve put together recently are in North Texas.

Lee is a former official at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and was regional director of the Office of Thrift Supervision’s Western region. He said in the past three years, about one-third of banks located in the Dallas-Fort Worth area with less than $5 billion in assets have been consolidated. But the biggest shift has been seen at the smallest end of the market, where the smallest businesses go if they can’t get a line of credit at the giant firms.

There were 3,255 banks with less than $100 million in assets in 2003, making up more than 43 percent of all community banks. By 2014, however, there were 1,919 of these firms, making up less than one third of community banks, according a report from the Brookings Institution published in December.

Before 2011, about 3 percent of all banks would merge or be acquired each year. But Lee said recently they are above a 4 percent clip.

So, not only are their many, many fewer little banks today than 13 years ago, but they are merging at a faster rate than even five years ago. As the big get bigger and the small disappear altogether, the consequences for the economy are troublesome.

“A big part of the decline in small business creation in this country over the last six or seven years is because smaller, community banks are going out of business, not necessarily through failure but consolidation,” Lee said. “We are shocked at the level of consolidation that we’ve seen.”

Small businesses have been the nation's biggest job creators and small community banks have been their biggest source of financing. Therefore, the rapid decline in the number of small community banks has hampered job creation. Perhaps that has contributed to the fact that the recovery of the economy from the 2008 recession has been the slowest recovery from a recession since 1949.

Like many of us who serve the community banking business, Lee ends with a common theme: the federal financial regulatory regime has not been helpful.

But Lee insists regulators need to allow banks to keep up with other industries that are seeing a boom in start-ups.

“I just think the regulatory machine is going to be 20 years behind,” Lee said. “I just think we are making a mistake as a country if we’re going to let a lot of really good banks walk off into the sunset.”

So do I, but I won't hold my breath that such a mistake will ever be admitted, much less corrected. On the other hand, geniuses like Lizzie Warren think the U.S. Post Office will pick up the slack.

Come November, I don't expect that the attitude of those with their hands on the levers of power will improve, whichever of the two eminently qualified candidates for the possessor of the nuclear codes grabs the grass crown.

The CFPB's Worst Nightmare: The US Constitution

A couple of months ago, we discussed the possibility that a case involving the CFPB and PHH Mortgage might go against the CFPB, including a potential finding that the CFPB's very existence (as created by the Franken-Dodd Monster) is unconstitutional. The prior blog post linked to a Forbes article by former White House official Susan Dudley in which Ms. Dudley listed the various arguments on which a finding of unconstitutionality could be based.

Long-time bank lawyer (and current Dorsey & Whitney partner) Joe Lynyak gave his analysis of the same topic in an article in the Westlaw Journal's "Bank and Lender Liability" entitled "The Constitutionality of the CFPB —An Exegesis." That's an imposing title, but at only four pages, it's worth a read, especially if, like this blogger, you've been wishing upon a star that the CFPB might, at best, take a long walk off a short pier, or, at worst, get its extremely large, flapping wings clipped.

Joe lists a number of the same arguments against the CFPB that Ms. Dudley also discussed, including:

• All authority is vested in a single director with extraordinarily broad power, no oversight by a board or commission, and tenure that can be shortened only by removal by the president "for cause."
• Unique existence as a bureau" within the Federal Reserve, an independent entity whose budget (and, therefore, the CFPB's budget, which the Federal Reserve is mandated to fund) is immune from Congressional oversight or control or, for that matter, any oversight or control by the FRB.
• "Broad administrative authority to examine and supervise a wide range of consumer financial firms, with administrative hearing authority to enforce orders requiring corrective measures. Favorable hearing determinations by an administrative judge can be summarily reversed by the director."
• The ability of the bureau to exercise such broad enforcement authority over any "unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice," which "need not be illegal; instead, it may be merely unfair in the view of the bureau."
• The ability of the CFPB ignore the due process rights of people and entities subject to its jurisdiction by regulating via enforcement orders — a practice that in many cases obviates the responsibility to extend the protections afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act (the In every instance
  governmental agency power has remained subject to acceptable levels of oversight by the three branches of the federal government —at least until now. APA affords the opportunity for public comments and dialogue prior to the exercise of an
  agency rulemaking)."
• The CFPB's"position that statutes of limitation do not apply to its enforcement activities, with the result being that targeted institutions have been sanctioned for conduct occurring well beyond the five-year federal agency statute of limitations governing agency enforcement actions that seek monetary penalties."

As to the PHH case, Joe does what many weak-kneed commentators often fail to do: he offers an actual opinion.

As to whether the CFPB’s current structure can withstand a constitutional challenge¸ it is suggested that the correct answer to that question is no. Although the necessities of a federal agency’s administrative mission concededly require flexibility, in the CFPB’s case the outer parameters of permissible agency boundaries have been far exceeded.

A review of the somewhat patchwork set of judicial decisions addressing this issue indicates that courts balance several factors against an infringement on the president’s right to dismiss agency officials without cause.

[...]

In light of the clear efforts of consumer proponents of the CFPB to statutorily insulate the bureau from any meaningful oversight, it is very probable that the CFPB will be found to be unconstitutionally structured.

After dropping that "hot sports opinion" on his audience, he then offers some insight into what festivities might ensue as supporters and opponents of The Adjustment Bureau attempt to either resurrect it or to decapitate it, drive a stake through its heart, and set the remains on fire.

Importantly, should the CFPB’s structure be struck down, the bureau’s prior actions and interpretative pronouncements (now spanning more than five years in length) arguably will become void. Also (and absent judicial mischief that might create a solution to the absence of a reasonable degree of executive oversight), any corrective measures to remedy a constitutional infirmity relating to the CFPB must be considered and adopted by Congress.

Finally, if the CFPB is found to be operating on a constitutionally infirm basis, legislative efforts to defend the bureau will encounter an interesting role reversal.

In the past few years, critics of the CFPB have attempted to amend the bureau’s statutory structure. These attempts have been soundly defeated by supporters who have effectively filibustered any such efforts. (The most frequent attempts for statutory changes have involved proposing a commission form of agency governance, as well as imposing congressional oversight through the budget process.)

Even though it might be relatively simple to minimally modify the CFPB’s structure in order to pass constitutional muster, opponents of the bureau could filibuster any attempt to cure the statutory difficulties without obtaining the concessions demanded by critics. Although this result seems highly likely if the CFPB is found to be unconstitutional, the belief that the bureau has brought about a paradigm shift in consumer protection may prevent consumer advocates from both anticipating this result and compromising sooner rather than later.

I'd pay for tickets and movie theater popcorn prices just to see all that unfold.

On Independence Day, it's pleasant to contemplate the possible demise of a tyrannical overlord, especially one whose minions clothe themselves in the mantle of "doing god's work," the US Constitution be damned.

Will PHH Clip The CFPB's Wings?

In a recent hearing before a federal appeals court, some of the justices appeared to be sympathetic to arguments by mortgage giant PHH Mortgage that the CFPB is unconstitutional. In Forbes, Susan Dudley, Director of the GW Regulatory Studies Center and a former White House official in the "W" administration, explores the arguments in favor of knocking the CFPB off its high horse and finds that they might have traction. She cites the following critical passage from PHH's brief:

The Director is not answerable to the President, as he is removable only for cause. Nor is Congress able to rein in the Director using its power over the purse, as he has the sole power to fund his agency from the Federal Reserve System’s operating expenses, and Congress is prohibited from reviewing the Director’s budget determinations. The Director is not checked by the deliberative decision-making process of a multi-member commission structure, nor is he checked by a short tenure, as he serves a fixed five-year term. And far from a limited scope of power, the Director wields vast authority under eighteen statutes previously enforced by seven different agencies. Never before has so much power been accumulated in the hands of one individual so thoroughly shielded from democratic accountability. The combination of these unprecedented structural features violates the separation of powers.

As Dudley correctly observes, the CFPB is unique. Other federal regulatory bodies are either executive branch agencies or independent commissions. In either case, they are subject to executive and/or legislative control directly or through an oversight body composed of members selected by the president and confirmed by Congress. Most are also subject to control through the appropriations process, giving another body control of the purse strings.

The CFPB is controlled not by a commission, but by a single director (currently, King Richard Cordray, Champion of Jeopardy) who is subject to removal by the president only "for cause." Other agency heads can be removed for wearing a tie with an offensive motif. calling the First Lady "Babe," or for an infinite variety of spurious reasons. Moreover, the CFPB's budget cannot be controlled by Congress. The FRB, is required to fund it by law, and Congress has no oversight.

This lack of checks and balances has concerned us since the CFPB sprang from the nether regions of Lizzie Warren, who deliberately concocted the Adjustment Bureau to be completely outside the control of anyone other than the reichsführer who runs it on any given day, which Warren originally intended be herself. The Director would be guided only by his or her knowledge of what was best for all consumers, applying truth, justice, and anti-abusiveness as Gaia gave him or her to see the light.

About six months ago, I attended a conference at which one of the panelists was a millennial former member of the CFPB's enforcement "arm" who recently rushed out the revolving D.C. door into a high-paying job with a banking law firm where he, naturally, advised those being persecuted prosecuted by the CFPB. In addition to possessing his generation's endearing narcissism and lack of respect for his elders, he scoffed, with a self-satisfied smirk, at concerns about the lack of controls over the CFPB because the Adjustment Bureau had been around for several years "and nothing horrible had occurred." One of the older panelists interjected one word: "Yet." I might have added: "Ask PHH."

As Dudley points out, even if the appeals court rules in favor of the petitioner, there are half-steps between nothing and abolishing the CFPB in its entirety as being an unconstitutionally created monster of Franken-Dodd. It could strike down the sole director structure; it could strike down the provision of Franken-Dodd that permits the president to fire the director only for cause; it could strike down the funding structure; it could do none of the above or all of the above. Whatever it decides, the decision is almost certainly to be appealed. By the time it reaches the SCOTUS, who knows what the composition of that august body might be, given the insanity that is the current season of "Election 2016"?

Nevertheless, Dudley asserts that "the future of something President Obama considers one of his main accomplishments is hanging in the balance."Here's hoping that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit gives the CFPB a little nudge in the "right" direction.

Barney Bites Bernie (And Neel)

Now that hell has frozen over, I find that all kinds of amazing things are occurring, one of which has created the danger of ripping a huge hole in the space-time continuum: I find myself in agreement with Barney Frank.

While watching the PBS News Hour this past Thursday night, who should pop up but the former House Banking Committee Chair and favorite Bank Lawyers Blog Bullseye, Barney, who was interviewed by Jeffrey Brown about Frank's reaction to statements by Neel Kashkari, currently president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and former Bush Bailout TARP Toolmaker, and the ever-cranky Bernie Sanders, Gen Y's favorite "Democratic Socialist," about "To Big To Fail Banks." Sanders also alleged that the way to break up big banks is to reimpose the Glass-Steagall on commercial banks. Frank, now that he's out of the political arena and no longer feels compelled to be what every politician feels he or she must be, i.e., a caster of shade upon of the truth, was remarkably critical of two gents who are spouting the Democrat Party line about the evils of Wall Street's "TBTF" banks.

Barney may have gained some objectivity, but he's lost none of the pungent-tongued arrows from his verbal quiver.

In the first place, both Senator Sanders and Mr. Kashkari continue to evade the biggest question. That is, how big is too big? The crisis which touched off when Lehman Brothers couldn’t make its payment, Lehman Brothers was about $650 billion in assets. We have banks four and five times that size

And the question is, does everybody have to be smaller than Lehman Brothers is today? But that would have consequences. Getting there would be a problem. By the way, it should be very clear, Glass-Steagall doesn’t do it. There is a disconnect between Senator Sanders insisting that the banks be broken down to the point where they won’t by their own size threaten, if they have too much debt, to undermine it.

And Glass-Steagall — Glass-Steagall would reduce — it wouldn’t do anything to Goldman Sachs and to Morgan Stanley, which are almost Glass-Steagall-ized themselves. But looked at Citicorp, or J.P. Morgan Chase, or Bank of America, Wells Fargo, even if they were subject to Glass-Steagall, they would still be well beyond the size that Lehman Brothers was.

There is just a disconnect between saying we’re going to do Glass-Steagall and getting the banks down to a size where, if there was a complete failure, you would get damaged by it.

The entire response above by Frank is remarkable for the fact that he's right. It's obvious that he's not been spending his time since retirement sampling the wares of Mar Jane-related "legal" businesses in Colorado.

Frank also jumped all over Kashkari's comparison of the 2008 meltdown to the S&L crisis of the 1980s, and Kashkari's statement that the reason the S&L crisis didn't bring the economy down was because none of the S&Ls was "too big to fail." Again, Frank asks why Kashkari won't tell us how big is too big? He also correctly notes that the bailout of the S&Ls cost a lot more than the bail out of big banks in 2008, although he does not also observe that this was because the 2008 TARP allowed the big banks to survive, while the S&L "bailout" allowed them to fail (or most of them, at any rate (outside the Southwest Plan thrifts), and established the Resolution Trust Corporation, staffed by the FDIC, to liquidate their assets. If the politicians, including Frank, had stayed out of it in the 1980s and let the initial bailout template concocted by the former Federal Savings and Loan Corporation play out, there's a chance that the money from that bailout might also have been largely repaid.

Frank says the primary risk is not size but "indebtedness," and on this point he's got a point. However, I disagree with his assertion that his bloated namesake, Dodd-Frank, has dealt successfully with the risk of bank's engaging in excessive borrowing and hinky derivatives that made "The Big Fail" such a hit (his misapprehension of the effect of the Volcker Rule has been lambasted previously), and his assertion that now, no bank is too big to fail. 

If a large institution can’t pay its debts, it fails. It is not too big to fail. It is put out of business, by law. No federal official can advance any money to pay its debts under the law until it is dissolved.

TARP also required legislation to create, and the wide-open authority it provided the federal government to bail out banks was induced by panic among folks at the highest levels of the federal government (including Frank) of immanent widespread economic collapse. We'll see how effective Franken-Dodd is when the next crisis hits, as it inevitably will. There's no prohibition on a future panicked Congress changing the rules on the spur of the moment to do what Frank claims can never again be done.

To prove that I haven't completely turned to the dark side, I think his statements about overturning Citizens United are bunk. Nevertheless, all-in-all, startlingly, he makes a lot of sense.

Rent-a-Charter vs. Strategic Alliance

In June 2004, I wrote a post about schemes by non-bank lenders, especially payday lenders, to "partner" with banks and thrifts in ways that would allow the non-banks to use the bank's or thrift's status to "preemept" "inconvenient state laws, such as those pesky usury limits. As I said at the time:

Apparently, the state-chartered banks involved in this practice are counting on the continued lack of objection by the FDIC, and the continued sympathy of state banking regulators who are eager to increase the number of state-chartered institutions that they regulate. In my opinion, this is a risky course.

I also pointed out at the time that national banks and federal savings banks could rest assured that their primary federal regulator would be scrutinizing their business arrangements with non-banks like Elizabeth Warren looking under her bed every night for a bad banker looking to steal all the cash she has hidden in the sock that she keeps under her pillow.

According to a recent client alert from Chapman and Cutler LLP, this bad old idea not only refuses to die, but has engendered state officials to take action to stop it in its tracks. While the alert discusses the State of Pennsylvania going after payday lenders who've aligned themselves with Native American tribes (which has been a problematic marriage for quite some time), it has wider implications for similar arrangements. In this instance, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania alleged that the "true lender" for regulatory purposes was not a bank in Delaware that would have been exempt from Pennsylvania usury limits and licensing requirements but the non-bank website "originator" that did most of the origination work and derived most of the economic benefits from the loans. The authors note that in other jurisdictions, the court decisions have not been in lockstep on the issue of preemption, arrangements like the one challenged here are likely always to put the lenders in the regulatory crosshairs.

No clear rule has emerged although regulatory challenges almost certainly are more likely to be made when excessive interest rates and/or abusive sales or collection practices are involved. In this case, the loans imposed interest rates of 200% to 300%.

The alert notes that even though the court's decision involved only a motion to dismiss Pennsylvania's action, and that is a long way from a judgment on the merits, the red flags for financial institutions involved in such relationships are clear "because it demonstrates that plaintiffs will continue to raise the “true lender” theory and courts will not necessarily dismiss at an early stage (for failure to state a claim upon relief can be granted) “true lender” claims solely because a bank is the named lender on the loans, at least where there are allegations that the originating bank does not have substantive duties or an economic interest in the program."

In order to mitigate the risk of claims based on the “true lender” doctrine, companies that engage in internet-based lending programs through an arrangement with one or more banks should consider how the programs are structured. For example, consideration should be given to operations where the bank has substantive duties and/or an economic interest in the program or loans. We are aware that some internet-based lending programs are considering structural changes of this nature.

The firm also advises institutions to make certain that they comply with regulatory guidance governing relationships with service providers. They cite FIL-9-2016 and related FDIC guidance. I'd also suggest taking a look at the OCC's Bulletin 2013-29.

Or, for a change of pace, a bank considering one of these schemes might decide to take its entire capital to The Bellagio in Vegas, walk up to nearest roulette wheel, and lay it all on "00." I mean, if you like dancing along the razor's edge with insured deposits, you might as well go all-in. Plus, you get free booze as long as your money lasts. To hedge your bet, you might want to hold back enough to buy a one-way ticket to Havana (regular flights from the States start soon) just in case that method of income-generation doesn't work out as well as a strategic alliance with a non-bank payday lender.

De Novo Deep Freeze Thawing? Not So Fast!

Although SNL's Nathan Stovall tantalizes readers with the headline "De novo market could be warming up," I think that--reading between the lines--the De Novo Deep Freeze of the past 8 years is not going to be thawing this year.

Stovall cites the recent de novo charter approval of California's Core Commercial Bank. However, that bank's investment adviser's CEO, Edward Carpenter, while stating his belief that "you can expect to see more applications in the relatively near future," warns that the path to approval of a de novo charter is a rocky one.

[T]he application process for de novos is "considerably more difficult" and requires much greater preparation now than before the credit crisis...

[...]

"We believe that a new bank requires more capital than it did in the past. It requires a stronger and deeper management team than it did in the past. And it needs to make a more persuasive case than was often made in the past about community need."

Core Commercial, like the two other most recent de novos, Pennsylvania's Bank of Bird-in-Hand and New Hampshire's Primary Bank, "plans to target a fairly narrow customer base as well, catering to small and medium-sized businesses that might feel disenfranchised by the nation's largest institutions." I assume that the geographic market area is also relatively focused, and that the applicants had to prove with more than lip service that the community was not being adequately served by existing financial institutions.

While Carpenter seems optimistic (and, I'm sure, stands ready to assist other potential clients with their de novo needs), others, including some regulators, are less pie-eyed.

Candace Franks, commissioner of the state banking department in Arkansas, acknowledged that de novo banking activity certainly slows during a recession, but said prior downturns have been followed by a "generous" era of de novo applications. She said that certainly hasn't been the case this time around. Franks, the immediate past chairman of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, said the lack of de novo activity is "very concerning to us," particularly in rural areas like Arkansas, where community banks serve as the engine of small business activity.

Some observers have argued that regulators were hesitant to grant new charters since many banks that failed during the crisis were de novos formed in early 2000s. The Federal Reserve discussed the issue on a handful of occasions. Robert Mahalik, director of applications at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, said at a conference in April 2014 that he saw no hint that new charter activity or approval would be on the near horizon.

Stoval also discusses other disincentives that may restrain a de novo deluge.

While regulators might be easy to blame for the dearth of de novos, Stevens noted that bankers have not painted a very attractive picture for parties considering entering the industry, often complaining about heightened regulatory burdens. Such rhetoric could serve as a deterrent to potential investors.

Some advisers say there simply are not many investors looking to form new banks. DD&F Consulting Group President Randy Dennis, who has helped launch a number of de novos in his career, said there is a whole new breed of investors that want to put money to work in the banking sector, but some are concerned they will not be able to receive regulatory approval. He further said the higher capital requirements facing de novo banks have limited investor interest.

[...]

...Tom Brown, longtime bank investor and CEO of Second Curve Capital LLC, said at a conference in mid-November that he understood why there is so little investor interest in forming a new bank charter. He believes the capital constraints on de novos make it difficult for investors to earn adequate returns on their capital.

"Who in their right mind would start a bank today? The FDIC requires $35 million in capital to start a bank. And no one can pencil out an annual rate of return on $35 million in the next five years, so you're not seeing new chartered banks," Brown said at the event.

Well, obviously the investors in Core Commercial, who we presume are not insane.

Noted bank attorney Walt Moeling of Bryan Cave also is cautiously optimistic. He thinks the prospects of additional de novo applications is "real," but that there numbers will be far less than in the past.

All the observers seem to agree that the application process will not be easy. The organizers will need to present a convincing case, based on hard data, of the need for the new institution. Capital will be king, and as Tom Brown asserts, the more capital required, the more difficult it is to earn a decent return on equity, especially when private investors have places to place their capital where the returns are larger, quicker. Management will also be critical, with both expertise and probity playing critical roles. Finally, the application process is likely top much more time-consuming and expensive than it ever has been.

And, of course, once the doors are opened, what you have is a community bank, trying to make money in a Post-Franken-Dodd world chock-full of Maxine Waters, Elizabeth Warrens, and other "progressive" ideologues who will look over your shoulder 24/7/365 to "guide" you on the path to righteousness, if not necessarily to profitability.

Yes, Virginia, There Is A Regulatory Burden On Small Banks

Preston Ash of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, sent me (on New Years Eve, no less) an article co-authored by Preston and Christoffer Koch and Thoma F. Siems of the Dallas Fed, entitled "Too Small to Succeed?--Community Banks in a New Regulatory Environment." Notwithstanding my semi-inebriated initial misunderstanding as to whether or not Ash was calling me out for stealing his idea for an article, it quickly was made clear to me that the authors wanted to share their thoughts with me because we all are thinking along the same lines (as evidenced by my blog post of December 27, 2015) to wit: the regulatory burden on community banks is reducing their number.

An excerpt from their article:

In 1992, community banks accounted for 64 percent of $4.6 trillion in total banking assets. By 2015, their market share had dropped to 19 percent of $15.9 trillion in total assets (Chart 1). Despite this decrease, community banks still account for the largest share of small-business loans. Currently, small- and medium-sized banks hold 55 percent of small-business loans and 75 percent of agricultural loans.

In twenty-three years, total assets of financial institutions in the U.S. have nearly quadrupled, yet community banks share of that total has shrunk from nearly two-thirds to less than one-fifth. At the same time that the big banks were getting bigger, they were leaving it to the incredibly shrinking community banking segment to make the majority of small business loans and three-quarters of all agricultural loans. The large banks are growing ever larger, yet are failing to serve the majority of the nation's main job creators, small businesses, leaving that task to the ever-decreasing number of remaining community banks.

After noting what we (and many others) have observed, that the lack of new charters since 2008 is an "alarming" contributing factor to decreasing the total number of community banks, the authors state that from their own conversations with bankers in their district, bankers seem to believe that the top reason for the shrinkage is "regulatory burden." The authors ask, "Are their concerns justified?" Among the factors that lead them to conclude in the affirmative are the following:

• Call reports have grown from 30 pages in the 1980s to 84 pages today.
• "At the end of 1970, Call Reports contained 53 items that banks filled out; this past quarter's filing included 2,379 items, with recent additions of more off-balance sheet and memoranda items."
• "From 2001-10, 10 major banking acts became law, totaling 1858 pages."
• "Feldman, Schmidt and Heinecke (2013) at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis find that the median reduction in profitability (return on assets) for the smallest banks—those banks with assets less than $50 million—is 14 basis points if they have to increase staff by one-half of a person and 45 basis points if they increase staff by two people." In other words, the smaller the bank, the more of a proportionate burden it is to hire the staff to comply with increased regulatory compliance and reporting requirements.

The authors conclude that community bankers have a legitimate beef.

[S]maller community banks appear to have a valid concern that their compliance burden is rising and the playing field is becoming more uneven. Regulatory oversight should match the level of risk an institution poses to the financial system and economy at large. Otherwise, more banks may become too small to succeed.

It's not just bloviating bloggers who are sounding the trumpet for regulatory relief. Some actually responsible regulators are also playing the same tune. Of course, it's a presidential election year and the masters of gridlock in D.C. are not likely to cooperate on much until the grass crown is awarded to the next Cynic-in-Chief. Still, bank lobbyists need to use this ammunition to fire away at their senators and congresspersons, because this is a trend that will not likely reverse itself of its own accord.

2016: Year Of The Merger

Respected bank analyst Dick Bove told CNBC last week that the United states is in for a tsunami of bank meregers in the coming year.

"In the United States, I think you will see a huge wave of mergers in banking in 2016," Bove, who is the vice-president of equity research at Rafferty Capital, told CNBC.

"The regional banks are going to be buying each other and I would expect to see 2016 being one of the biggest years for bank mergers that we have seen in the last decade," he later added.

If the activity that I have seen thus far in my little corner of the universe is any indication, you can take Bove's prediction to the bank. Community and regional bank M&A lawyers are going to be plenty busy in 2016.

In addition to customary reasons for consolidation that we've talked about over the past few years, including the crushing regulatory environment post-Franken-Dodd, there's another that I haven't heard discussed, but that ought to be thrown in the hopper of any bank owner who has been fantasizing about cashing out and sipping Margaritas in Mazatlan.

Bove was also bloviating last week (this time to CNN) about how problems in the oil patch spell trouble for banks that bank the "Awl Bidness," and that those kinds of problems have, in the not-so-distant past, spread beyond the oil states and caused a wider economic recession. There are differences this time around from the 1980s on Texas, but Bove is still "concerned" that even big banks outside of Houston and Dallas could feel the pinch. Chase's Jamie Dimon disagrees.

Even Wall Street banks are facing questions about the impact of falling oil prices.

While just a small fraction of their total loan portfolio is directly tied to energy lending, Bove estimates around 20% of their investment banking revenue comes from energy.

JPMorgan Chase(JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon, in a call with analysts this week, acknowledged there may be "slight negatives" for the bank related to commercial and real estate trouble in Dallas, Denver and Houston.

Yet the big banks are well diversified. That means they should benefit from the anticipated boost to consumer spending caused by lower oil prices.

The oil price slide is "not going to be a big deal" for JPMorgan, Dimon said.

Dimon did such a good job of calling the last recession in advance that I think that we all can rest easy based solely on his judgment, right? Yeah, that's what I thought, too.

Even if it's unlikely that oil-related industry woes will, alone, take the US economy down another black hole, you have to wonder whether, coupled with the global stock market retreat caused by China's reckless debt-funded economic expansion finally grinding to a halt and sliding backward, and what the ripple effects of that might be, if now might be the time to pull the plug, while the US economy, while not partying like it's 1999, sure as heck isn't slumbering like it's 2009. It's at least worth more than a passing thought.