Bank Lawyer's Blog

Regulatory Abuse: Let's Make It More Transparent

2016-03-20T21:48:00-05:00

Last week's release of a report by the FDIC's Inspector General that outlined the allegedly thug-like behavior of some FDIC lawyers and supervisory personnel against banks that dared to engage in tax refund anticipation lending, a business that the Care Bair found distasteful on moral grounds (notwithstanding that the line of business was legal), generated the expected smoke, blown up the public's backside by all the usual suspects. A couple of articles in the American Banker (paid subscription required) by reporter Lalita Clozel nicely outlined the sturm und drang for those of us with short attention spans.

The agency allegedly used a number of strong-arm tactics -- including rigged examination reports, selectively leaking information to a competitor, and hampering a firm's acquisition plans -- in order to force the banks from offering such loans.

The inspector general's report concluded that the actions "involved aggressive and unprecedented efforts to use the FDIC's supervisory and enforcement powers, circumvention of certain controls surrounding the exercise of enforcement power, damage to the morale of certain field examination staff, and high costs to the three impacted institutions."

Among the criticized actions of the FDIC were the actions of an FDIC attorney, who allegedly "abusively threatened" banks in person and on the phone. I'm not sure what "abusively threatening" a person entails in this case, but in my 41+ years of practicing law, most of it representing financial institutions, I've been threatened on rare occasions by government attorneys, and invariably the person doing the threatening is what is often referred to in legal circles as a "classical parum canis asinum" ("punk ass little bitch"). People with actual courage don't threaten, they simply "do." With a few notable exceptions, the overwhelming majority of bank regulatory agency attorneys I have dealt with over the years have not been "abusively threatening," and among those few that have issued threats, some of have done so under what they thought was the protection of anonymity.

Clozel sets forth a bullet point list that summarizes many of the other criticized actions of the FDIC against the banks in question and against the FDIC's own examination staff. The FDIC disputes almost all of the allegations of the inspector general, although it does assure the IG that it will take several steps "to improve both internal and external communication." In other words, when the boys and girls in D.C. tell the field staff to screw a bank, they'll make sure that it's communicated clearly. The FDIC also alleged that it will update its "appeals process" so that banks that are being shot at by FDIC supervisory and legal staff can appeal up the food chain to the officials who set the rein of terror in motion in the first place, so that they can say that the agency paid lip service to due process while they all sit around and laugh at the appeal.

The FDIC also claimed that it "does not condone" the "aggressive behavior of at least one employee" and that this employee "has since left the agency." No doubt to join ISIS. It's comforting to know that when it comes to taking action on abusive action of one of its employees, the FDIC is always quick to throw under the bus those who are no longer employed by the agency.

In a Congressional hearing, at which the IG testified about the matter, Republican and Democrats split predictably. The Republicans were "troubled" by the alleged abuse, while the Democrats were "troubled" by tax refund anticipation loans themselves. As we've seen with both parties, depending on the issue, each believes that in some cases, the ends justify the means.

Fred Gibson, the FDIC's Inspector General, expressed an additional concern that many share, and that may apply with even more force to the CFPB. He said that the FDIC should have released guidance, rather than create "rules by enforcement." This concern was echoed by Rep. Sean Duffy, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee that conducted the hearing.

"It is hard enough to comply with rules that are put out that people are trying to read and try to comply with but it is even harder when you have a regulatory body of our financial industry that tries to enforce first and give guidance later. We should know what the rules are, the rules of the game should be clear."

If you make the rules of the game clear, then (A) people can challenge them on the basis that they are arbitrary or lack substantial support, or (B) the agency is then bound by the rules in lieu of personal taste (or, in the case of tax refund anticipation loans, distaste). That takes all the found of regulating.

This all was nice theater, and you have to give the Mr. Gibson and his staff a hat-tip for spitting into the wind. Nevertheless, if anyone thinks this will change the FDIC's conduct going forward, your smoking some of that legal/illegal Colorado hemp. The only thing that will do that is a change in the White House in November. Then again, Sheila Bair, who started this "trickle down" abuse in 2008 (according to the IG's report) was a Bush II appointee.

Ex Post Facto Expertise

2016-03-06T21:55:00-06:00

Several years ago, I expressed some amusement (in a "gallows humor" sense, I admit) about the fact that the CFPB was sending attorneys to classes to obtain basic knowledge about bank law after they were hired. Ideological purity, I assume, was the primary job qualification. Therefore, I take it as a perversely encouraging sign that the Adjustment Bureau's former General Counsel and Acting Deputy Director (a different position than "In Real Life Deputy Director") last week announced that she was quitting the agency and jumping feet first into the dung heap of the financial services business.

Meredith Fuchs, who recently stepped down as acting deputy director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, is joining Capital One as the bank’s senior vice president and chief counsel on regulatory issues, according to a report from TheHill.com.

Fuchs served as general counsel at the CFPB before she was named acting deputy director in July 2015 after Steve Antonakes stepped down as deputy director.

The revolving door between the regulator and the regulated is so common in the fever-ridden Potomac Tidal Basin that it hardly raises an eyebrow in a cesspool that might soon be ruled by a man possessed of aeronautically engineered hair and the debonair demeanor Al Bundy. Still, there is something just a bit askew when the resume of the person who was the General Counsel and then Acting Deputy Director of an agency with such extensive power and authority over financial services lists a single job in the financial services industry after she leaves that agency. Perhaps you can find such a job there.

I'm sure that Capital One is looking for "insight" into the attitudes and workings of the CFPB and, when ethical waiting periods have expired, access and even credibility, when necessary, to perhaps lessen the impact of the next blow from the CFPB's cudgel. I'm sure that Ms. Fuchs will provide it. Her resume marks her as an extremely bright and talented lawyer. Let's hope that when the door swings back to the regulatory side and she re-enters government service, she has a lot more hands-on experience with the financial services businesses that she's regulating than she had the first time around the block. Maybe she'll start a trend at the CFPB: know something about the business before you start regulating it. The regulated might want to see if things improve with an approach other than on-the-job training.

De Novo Deep Freeze Thawing? Not So Fast!

2016-01-31T21:54:00-06:00

Although SNL's Nathan Stovall tantalizes readers with the headline "De novo market could be warming up," I think that--reading between the lines--the De Novo Deep Freeze of the past 8 years is not going to be thawing this year.

Stovall cites the recent de novo charter approval of California's Core Commercial Bank. However, that bank's investment adviser's CEO, Edward Carpenter, while stating his belief that "you can expect to see more applications in the relatively near future," warns that the path to approval of a de novo charter is a rocky one.

[T]he application process for de novos is "considerably more difficult" and requires much greater preparation now than before the credit crisis...

[...]

"We believe that a new bank requires more capital than it did in the past. It requires a stronger and deeper management team than it did in the past. And it needs to make a more persuasive case than was often made in the past about community need."

Core Commercial, like the two other most recent de novos, Pennsylvania's Bank of Bird-in-Hand and New Hampshire's Primary Bank, "plans to target a fairly narrow customer base as well, catering to small and medium-sized businesses that might feel disenfranchised by the nation's largest institutions." I assume that the geographic market area is also relatively focused, and that the applicants had to prove with more than lip service that the community was not being adequately served by existing financial institutions.

While Carpenter seems optimistic (and, I'm sure, stands ready to assist other potential clients with their de novo needs), others, including some regulators, are less pie-eyed.

Candace Franks, commissioner of the state banking department in Arkansas, acknowledged that de novo banking activity certainly slows during a recession, but said prior downturns have been followed by a "generous" era of de novo applications. She said that certainly hasn't been the case this time around. Franks, the immediate past chairman of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, said the lack of de novo activity is "very concerning to us," particularly in rural areas like Arkansas, where community banks serve as the engine of small business activity.

Some observers have argued that regulators were hesitant to grant new charters since many banks that failed during the crisis were de novos formed in early 2000s. The Federal Reserve discussed the issue on a handful of occasions. Robert Mahalik, director of applications at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, said at a conference in April 2014 that he saw no hint that new charter activity or approval would be on the near horizon.

Stoval also discusses other disincentives that may restrain a de novo deluge.

While regulators might be easy to blame for the dearth of de novos, Stevens noted that bankers have not painted a very attractive picture for parties considering entering the industry, often complaining about heightened regulatory burdens. Such rhetoric could serve as a deterrent to potential investors.

Some advisers say there simply are not many investors looking to form new banks. DD&F Consulting Group President Randy Dennis, who has helped launch a number of de novos in his career, said there is a whole new breed of investors that want to put money to work in the banking sector, but some are concerned they will not be able to receive regulatory approval. He further said the higher capital requirements facing de novo banks have limited investor interest.

[...]

...Tom Brown, longtime bank investor and CEO of Second Curve Capital LLC, said at a conference in mid-November that he understood why there is so little investor interest in forming a new bank charter. He believes the capital constraints on de novos make it difficult for investors to earn adequate returns on their capital.

"Who in their right mind would start a bank today? The FDIC requires $35 million in capital to start a bank. And no one can pencil out an annual rate of return on $35 million in the next five years, so you're not seeing new chartered banks," Brown said at the event.

Well, obviously the investors in Core Commercial, who we presume are not insane.

Noted bank attorney Walt Moeling of Bryan Cave also is cautiously optimistic. He thinks the prospects of additional de novo applications is "real," but that there numbers will be far less than in the past.

All the observers seem to agree that the application process will not be easy. The organizers will need to present a convincing case, based on hard data, of the need for the new institution. Capital will be king, and as Tom Brown asserts, the more capital required, the more difficult it is to earn a decent return on equity, especially when private investors have places to place their capital where the returns are larger, quicker. Management will also be critical, with both expertise and probity playing critical roles. Finally, the application process is likely top much more time-consuming and expensive than it ever has been.

And, of course, once the doors are opened, what you have is a community bank, trying to make money in a Post-Franken-Dodd world chock-full of Maxine Waters, Elizabeth Warrens, and other "progressive" ideologues who will look over your shoulder 24/7/365 to "guide" you on the path to righteousness, if not necessarily to profitability.

Clinton Promises to Fly Beyond Dodd-Frank

2015-12-13T21:52:00-06:00

Hillary Clinton, in trying to out-Warren Warren, is ensuring that many bankers, of whatever stripe, will have to take a moment to ponder what a Clinton presidency might mean for the entire banking business before pushing the lever for her in November 2016. Unlike many Republican candidates, who publicly promise to roll back Dodd-Frank's more onerous provisions (regardless of private intent), Hillary promises to take Dodd-Frank to places that even its most ardent supporters have only dreamed about.

But it’s not enough simply to protect the progress we have made," Clinton wrote. "As president, I would not only veto any legislation that would weaken financial reform, but I would also fight for tough new rules, stronger enforcement and more accountability that go well beyond Dodd-Frank."

On Clinton's wish list are the usual proposals to strengthen the Volcker Rule, reimpose Glass-Steagall, break up big banks, restrain "risky" derivative trading, put Jamie Dimon in thumb screws, and force Wall Street interns to entertain donors to the Clinton Foundation at various strip clubs, she gets into the ominous "bad bankers" proposals that threaten to turn a danger of "trickle down" of big-bank regulation onto community banks into a virtual Niagra Falls.

Extend the statute of limitations for major financial crimes to 10 years
Require financial firms to admit wrongdoing as part of settlements
Increase transparency about terms of settlement and fines actually paid to the government
Penalize executives when their firm pays a fine

She also wants the SEC and CFTC to be "independently funded," just like the CFPB. That way, behavioral psychologist and utopian intellectuals can team up to remove any checks-and-balances on the social engineering agendas of the Progressives that Hillary is courting in her bid to grab the grass crown. As King Richard and his minions have been attempting to do with the CFPB.

Her desire to insert "strong regulators" into bank regulatory agencies also bodes ill for community banks. If you love the way that for the last eight years, bank regulators have second-guessed executive decision making on a continuous basis, used regulatory power to attempt to choke off bank access to legal but politically and/or "morally" disfavored businesses, and pushed the envelope of theories like "disparate impact" to find discrimination where no one has ever found it before in order to reward favored constituencies, you'll love another eight years under the current president's "logical successor." At least she's giving you a "heads up" and not hiding the ball. Don't say you weren't warned.

Now, if the opposing party could only nominate something other than the south end of a horse traveling north to run against her. If they can find one, that is.

The Underbelly Of The Mt. Holly Settlement

2015-05-28T22:04:00-05:00

The settlement of the Mt. Holly disparate impact case before it could be decided by the US Supreme Court were suspicious. At the time, it was thought by many that the US Justice Department had helped to engineer that settlement so that its (and HUD's and the CFPB's) use of that questionable doctrine in fair lending claims could continue for a while longer. The last thing the Feds wanted was for the SCOTUS to decide the matter, because they were worried (correctly) that it would strike down its use. At the same time, the banking industry wanted the SCOTUS to render a decision, because it thought that the court was more likely than not to strike down the doctrine's use in the fair lending context. The last thing that banks wanted was for the parties to the case to settle before the SCOTUS could render its decision (which is exactly what happened).

Recently, a rock has been overturned that has exposed a bunch of creepy-crawlers that work not for the federal government, but for the big banks that wanted the SCOTUS to rule in the Mt. Holly case. According to a former senior executive of Chase, that bank tried to get him to use his board position with a non-profit housing organization to "scuttle" the funding of the settlement. Moreover, the former executive, Wayne Trotman, at the time the mid-Atlantic market president of Chase, alleges that when he refused to breach his fiduciary duty as a member of the board of directors, the bank retaliated by firing him.

The fact that Mr. Trotman is an African-American adds not only to the radioactivity of the alleged wrongful conduct, but also substantial irony to those actions, if Mr. Trotman's allegations are true. While Chase counters that Trotman's claims are "baseless," Trotman's lawyers claim that they have "substantial evidence" to support them.

Obviously, the first thing that Trotman has to prove is that Chase pressured him to use his board position to scuttle the settlement. According to the linked article, which cites Trotman's Complaint, he claims that he was instructed to do so by Chase's Associate General Counsel, via email, even after he refused on the grounds that it would breach his fiduciary duty. The Complaint later states that another Chase attorney told him that he should not honor the request (which was also the position of his supervisor). Apparently, the ball started rolling in Jamie Dimon's office after he (and the heads of other large banks) received an email from Tim Pawlenty of the Financial Services Roundtable uirging the bankers to find ways to derail the settlement long enough for the SCOTUS to render a decision. There does not appear from the kinked article to be any order from Dimon that Trotman do anything, but, then, that's what subordinates are for: read the CEO's mind and "get 'er done" while retaining deniability for those residing at the top of Mt. Olympus.

The harder nut to crack for Mr. Trotman may likely be proving the causal connection between his decision to be an honorable man and not to breach his fiduciary duties, and his subsequent termination by Chase. It's impossible to determine that connection solely from the linked article, although I assume that the "substantial evidence" referenced by Trotman's lawyers indicates that they think that they can carry the water on that claim. The man worked for Chase for 19 years, received a "meets expectations" review shortly after the incident (although Chase substantially cut his bonus from the previous year, in which he received the same rating), then six months later received a mid-year performance rating of "poor" and was fired 14 days later without being provided an opportunity to improve. On its face, it looks like there might be fire with this smoke.

On the other hand, we haven't seen Chase's formal responsive pleading. In one press report, a Chase spokesperson told a reporter that Trotman 's position was eliminated in a "reorganization of markets." That spokesperson also claimed that Chase would "fight this in court." I guess that beats fighting it in the streets.

Obviously, it's too early to tell what the outcome of this lawsuit might be. The smart money in these situations is on a cash settlement with nondisparagement and confidentiality provisions in the settlement agreement, so that the "reputational risk" is mitigated and the whole sordid affair is swept under a rug.

Still. When it comes to picking a champion inducer of the gag reflex, it's often tough to choose between Big Banking and Big Government.

Releash The Hound

2015-05-25T21:26:00-05:00

Calling the CFPB a "rogue agency," Georgia Senator David Perdue introduced a bill in the Senate last week to bring the rogue to heel. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Accountability Act of 2015 is a companion bill to one that passed the House with substantial bipartisan support.

"Right now, the CFPB is a rogue agency that dishes out malicious financial policy and creates new rules and regulations at whim without real Congressional oversight. The American people, through Congress, deserve a closer look at the CFPB and how its actions will impact consumers," he said. "Additionally, the agency itself has failed to operate within its own budget and proven it is more concerned with preserving its own power than protecting the public. Ultimately, I believe the CFPB should be eliminated, but an important first step is bringing it into the light for the American people."

As expected, financial institution trade groups supported the bill. In addition, taxpayer advocacy also voiced support.

A statement from the Taxpayers Protection Alliance charges that the CFPB operates outside of the jurisdiction of Congress that most agencies operate in and continues to be appropriated by taxpayer funds without the proper Congressional oversight. "This is an agency that demands scrutiny like any other federal agency and should be held accountable for their actions by moving into the proper process for Congressional appropriations," said David Williams, President of the Taxpayers Protection Alliance. "Any federal agency operating with the use of taxpayer funds must be subject to oversight by the elected officials that represent those taxpayers in Washington."

Expect Senators Darth Warren, Vladimir Ilyich Sanders, and their comrades in the Senate to fight tooth-and-nail to derail this bill. Even if it passes the Senate, expect the president to veto it. At that point, we'll see how extensive the "bipartisan" support for the law might be, because I would be surprised to see such a veto overridden this year or next.

Still, a boy can dream.

Going Unrogue

2015-05-03T21:45:00-05:00

McGuire Woods attorneys Matthew Orso and Joshua Davey recently discussed the hypocrisy of the CFPB's public statements that it favors "transparency" and claims that it is not subject to "the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), which, among other items, requires an agency to hold committee and subcommittee meetings in public."

Only three agencies are statutorily exempted from FACA – the Central Intelligence Agency, the Officer of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Federal Reserve.

Yet despite the fact that the CFPB is not involved in intelligence gathering or the setting of monetary policy, Director Richard Cordray has taken the position that it is not subject to FACA.

Unfortunately for the CFPB, Cordray made the claim to a Wisconsin Congressman, who wanted to attend a CFPB's Consumer Advisory Committee meetings in February, at the time that the CFPB denied his request. That Congressman turned around and introduced a bill to peel back the curtain on whatever the CFPB is trying to hide. We hope that it's not a wizard.

Congressman Sean Duffy claims that his bill, the Bureau Advisory Transparency Act, "mandates that FACA must apply to all of the CFPB's advisory committees. The people have a right to know what their government is up to, and the government has a responsibility to provide that transparency." In addition to that act, Orso and Davey note that "a budget amendment has been proposed by Senator Perdue to subject the CFPB to the Congressional appropriations process, rather than allowing its continued operation under the Federal Reserve with no accountability to Congress. The amendment seeks to allow Congressional oversight of the CFPB’s functions in light of its roughly $600 million budget."

Transparency and accountability. For the CFPB? Expect the Massachusetts Mohican to go on the warpath against these heinous concepts. They're fine when they apply to the rest of the world, but not when they try to impede the "justice for all" that can only be provided by the benevolent despots whose ideology is pure and must remain unsullied by the low-lives who inhabit the opposing realms of the universe (i.e., the other 99%). After all, what will happen to the fog-brained poor without Aunt Lizzie and her cadre of true believers to tell them what they ought to want?

Davey and Orso close with a dash of hope and a dollop of reality.

The days of the CFPB’s clandestine policymaking and unbridled activities may be coming to a close. Don’t expect it to happen without a fight.

The following is rare footage of Senator Warren sending the Adjustment Bureau's famous "Flying Squad" of litigation lawyers after a transparency-seeking waif and her little dog. Those offended by the sight of chimps with wings, or scarecrow stomping, should shield their eyes.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell

2015-04-26T21:33:00-05:00

You may recall last year's pronouncement by the head of FinCEN, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, that 105 financial institutions were, thanks to the amazing guidance provided in February 2014 by FinCEN, servicing state-legal, federal-illegal marijuana businesses. Apparently, less than 10% of those are in Colorado, land of the free and home of the dazed, because according Colorado Rep. Jared Polis, only eight commercial banks and two credit unions in that state are banking the pot biz, and none of them want to be publicly named.

I assume that they don't want to happen to them what happened to publicity-challenged MBank out of Oregon. As recently related in published reports, that Oregon bank announced in January that it was open for (marijuana) business not only in Oregon, but in Colorado, and that it had the "tacit approval" of the FDIC to bank the unbankable. Within less than a week, because it was supposedly "overwhelmed" by the response from Colorado marijuana businesses, it pulled entirely out Colorful Colorado. Now, it's announced that it has pulled out of the entire marijuana business nationally, even in its home state of Oregon, apparently haven satisfied the munchies and gotten a good night's sleep. Like the Colorado exit, the industry-wide exit is supposedly due to the unexpected response of unbanked pot sellers and the bank's determination that "the bank is not big enough to provide and support all of the compliance components required."

It may be pure coincidence, but it appears that any time a bank is publicly "outed" as a banker to the stoned, the bank pulls out of the business. None of the 105 institutions cited by Ms. Calvery or the ten cited by Mr. Polis was named. Had they been, how many of them would have "pulled an MBank"? Most, if not all, is my guess.

Unlike banking payday lending, a perfectly legal business that the regulators are trying to eradicate, banking marijuana selling, a blatantly illegal business (under federal criminal laws), is just fine with the federal banking regulators as long as the bank flies under the radar screen. It's OK to service an illegal drug business as long as you (A) file the right kind of Cheech & Chong SAR or SARs, and (B) don't ever, ever, let anyone but the illegal business owners and bank officials know about it. Do you think that this state of affairs breeds cynicism and contempt for the rule of law? Me, too.

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell." It was bad policy for the US military and it's no better for the US banking business.

Subprime May Return, But Will It Be In A Pine Box?

2015-04-06T21:35:00-05:00

Former community banker and occasional guest poster Pat Dalrymple is a columnist for a Colorado newspaper who has a former insider's view on the sometimes wild and wacky world of commercial lending. You didn't think it was either wild or wacky? Read Pat's latest column.

He’s baaaack.

No, neither Jason, nor Freddie, nor Arnold has returned after having been absolutely, irrevocably annihilated in the last episode.

Rather, it’s subprime, the evil force that terrorized America, from Wall Street to Main Street to Elm Street, that may be coming soon to a closing near you.

A residential mortgage lender has announced that it’s making loans of up to $2 million that don’t require tax returns or employment verifications. Nor does it set a minimum time from a short sale that the borrower might have had. Bankruptcies and foreclosures require only two years’ seasoning after the event. Income is verified through bank statements, and an income-to-debt ratio can be as high as 50 percent.

The loan to value ratio is capped at 85 percent, but no mortgage insurance is mandated. A 700 credit score will qualify a borrower for a $2 million loan, and only 500 is necessary for a mortgage up to $750,000. And, to top it all off, cash-out refis are OK.

Sounds kind of scary, doesn’t it?

Pat parses the underwriting risks, and comes to the conclusion that money can be made on this type of lending, "subprime" or not, and that from an underwriting standpoint, it's not "scary" at all. To him, the business reward can outweigh the risk. However, the "scary" fly in the ointment is something far more terrifying than a default on an undercollateralized loan. It's something that utters the horrifying names "trial lawyers" and the Cherokee princess known as "The Spawn of She Who Dances With Donors" (h/t Dennis Miller) in the same fetid breath.

The new regulations that have come online in 2014, and this year say that lenders have a so-called “safe harbor” if they make loans underwritten to conforming, i.e., Fannie Mae, guidelines. These loans are called “qualifying mortgages.” If a loan is outside that qualifying mortgage safe harbor it means that a borrower, whose house is in foreclosure, can actually allege that the lender did not adequately assess the borrower’s ability to repay when making the loan, and sue the lender.

If the suit takes place during the first three years of the life of the loan, and the borrower is successful, that borrower can collect from the lender all the interest and fees paid during those three years, plus attorney fees (this last phrase is kind of important). After three years, there’s no cash settlement; the amount is simply offset against the foreclosure.

For a big lender, there has to be a goodly number of these cases before the company is at risk, and the likelihood of that is less in a recovering economy. But those three little words, “plus attorney fees,” really gets the attention of the class action bar.

And then there’s the regulatory risk, which could be considerable. No law or reg says a lender can’t make loans that are not “qualifying mortgages.” But the assumption of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the federal big-dog regulator, is that these loans can be traps to abuse consumers. And no lender wants to spark the attention of the CFPB.

This agency has enormous power. It answers to nobody but Congress, which isn’t exactly the best manager of anything. And the bureau can levy enormous fines, called civil money penalties, on the companies and people who work for these businesses. Just one CFPB audit can pull the plug that can send a lender down the drain.

A lender venturing outside the safe harbor can be like a Methodist missionary taking pictures in North Korea.

You’re definitely being watched.

Coloring outside the lines used to be dangerous because you could lose your shirt if you didn't manage the elevated risks with dexterity and price the product appropriately to compensate for the fact that the "earners" had to more than makeup for the "non-earners." In that respect, the economics were pretty much the same as those governing a Mafia family, so most subprime lenders "got it." Today, it's much more dangerous because you may have to face your two biggest nightmares: a lawyer with an cause of action that might have actual merit, and a government bureaucracy staffed by true believers and accountable only to God/Gaia/Zeus/Baal/Richard Dawkin's Eternal Nothingness/[Insert Name of Favorite Cosmic Muffin or Nihilist Here].

That should scare away all but the psychopathic, the suicidal, or the moronic. Or, perhaps, that rare fellow who looks into the muzzle of the .44 Magnum and says to himself, "Ya' know, come to think of it, I AM feeling lucky today!"

CFPB Spin Is Unspun

2015-03-29T21:50:00-05:00

For those readers who have failed to parse the nuances of the CFPB's 728-page report to Congress on mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts (mandated by Franken-Dodd), Ballard Spahr has you covered. They've not only read it, they've distilled the essence of the CFPB's analysis of the reams of statistics it compiled into the phrase "figures don't lie, but liars figure" (my characterization, not necessarily the law firm's).

To absolutely no ones surprise, the CFPB does not like consumers being obligated to arbitrate their claims rather than exercising their Gaia-given right to send the children of class-action plaintiff's attorneys to an Ivy League school for both undergraduate and post-graduate degrees. The brainchild of a demagogue who not only created a Native American ancestry for herself out of the whole cloth of "grandma always told me," but who also awakens in the wee hours from fevered dreams of toddlers falling into punji-stake-lined pits of "tricks and traps" set by commercial banks and their fellow travelers, the CFPB looks at the statistics regarding consumer arbitration and sees what its creator sees: unremitting evil.

Unfortunately for the CFPB's ideological imperative, Ballard Spahr concludes otherwise: "In fact, the study confirms that arbitration does benefit consumers."

Please read the entire client alert. For those who have actual lives, here are some highlights.

"The data demonstrate that arbitration is faster and more economical than litigation."
The costs of arbitration borne by a consumer are less than the filing fees for a lawsuit.
"Even when consumers initially paid a modest share of the fees, in 56 of 123 arbitrations examined by the study, they were reimbursed in the arbitrator’s award for at least some of the fees."
"According to the CFPB’s own statistics, arbitration was thus a factor in only 8 percent of the class actions studied."
"[I]n 60 percent of the class actions, the putative class members got nothing. And none of the class actions went to trial. By contrast, of 341 cases that were resolved by an arbitrator, in-person hearings were held in 34 percent of the cases, and there were at least 146 cases in which arbitrators reached a decision on the merits of the parties’ claims. The CFPB has it backwards—it is class actions that are a barrier to consumers obtaining meaningful relief in arbitration."
"In arbitrations where consumers obtained relief on their affirmative claims and the CFPB could determine the award amount, the average grant of relief to the consumer was $5,389, meaning an average recovery of 57 cents for every dollar claimed. Based on 73 of 74 individual federal court claims in which a judgment was entered for the consumer, the average amount awarded to the consumer was $5,245. So consumers fare just as well in arbitration as in court, and perhaps even better."
Class action plaintiffs' lawyers, on the other hand, made out like bandits. "Attorneys’ fees awarded to class counsel in settlements during the period studied amounted to a whopping $424,495,451."
"[T]he study’s Achilles’ heel: like the CFPB’s preliminary study issued in December 2013, it fails to examine the actual experiences of consumers who have gone through arbitration. In ascertaining whether consumer arbitration is in the public interest, real consumers’ actual experiences with arbitration and class action proceedings is at least as important as a telephone survey asking randomly selected consumers about their awareness of arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts, if not more so."

The "fact-driven" CFPB apparently ignores the facts. Instead, it opts for conclusions that are best summarized by the following representative headline from the left-leaning (i.e., "mainstream") magazine Time: "CFPB Says Mandatory Arbitration is Bad for Consumer.

Although the CFPB promises to meet with all "stakeholders" before adopting regulations on these provisions, that's like a vigilante posse in Wyoming during the 1880s saying they'd give a cattle rustler a fair trial before they hung him. Expect the CFPB to try to pound a stake through their heart. Meetings are window dressing to paper over a foregone conclusion with the appearance of due deliberation.